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Abstract 
Three Essays on Seasoned Equity Offerings 
Yueh-Fang Ho 
Michael Gombola, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
This study focuses on three related aspects of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) 
that together cast light on the relation between the market reaction to an SEO 
announcement and post-offering performance. Considering mediocre post-offering 
performance, the first essay addresses the question: Do investors learn from previous 
offerings in evaluating subsequent offerings? The second essay is motivated by 
previous studies showing that post-offering performance is linked to earnings 
management for primary SEOs. We examine whether earnings management extends to 
secondary and combination SEOs. Finally, although dilution is unrelated to market 
reaction to an SEO announcement, the third essay explores whether post-offering 
performance is related to dilution effects.  
In the first essay, learning by investors would produce a positive relation 
between the market reaction to the announcement and the operating and stock price 
performance following a previous SEO. The findings suggest that firms can offer 
multiple SEOs until their post-offering performance disappoints investors. However, 
the market reaction to an announcement depends more on the firms’ condition at the 
time of the announcement rather than its performance after a previous announcement.  
 The second essay examines whether earnings management observed prior to 
primary SEOs extends to secondary and combination SEOs. In primary offerings, all 
previous shareholders benefit from selling stock to new shareholders at a higher price, 
xi 
   
whereas the benefits of earnings management accrue solely to a smaller group of selling 
shareholders in a secondary offering. Because of greater convergence of interests in 
primary and combination SEOs, we hypothesize greater earnings management for 
primary SEOs than for secondary SEOs. Results show that firms manage earnings 
upward more for primary SEOs and combination SEOs than for secondary SEOs.   
The third essay explores the linkage between dilution and post-offering 
performance. We hypothesize that primary SEOs will exhibit greater post-offering 
negative earnings surprise than secondary SEOs. We find a significant and negative 
earnings surprise following primary SEOs, but not following secondary SEOs. There is 
also a positive relation between the negative earnings surprise and dilution effect. 
 
1 
Chapter 1. Do Investors Ever Learn from Seasoned Equity Offerings? 
Evidence from Recurring SEOs 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 The documented poor stock price performance and earnings performance 
following equity issuance presents a puzzle as to why investors buy stock on equity 
offerings despite the documented poor post-offering performance following stock 
issuance. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess & Affleck-Graves (1995) estimate that 
stock prices perform only about half as well as the market during the years following a 
stock issue. In another study, Loughran and Ritter (1997) document poor earnings 
performance following equity offerings. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b) 
present evidence that the poor earnings performance and accompanying poor stock 
price performance may result from earnings that are managed upwards prior to stock 
offerings. Since the pre-offering earnings management involves “borrowing” earnings 
from future periods, earnings performance declines after the offering along with the 
stock price. 
 This study focuses on recurring primary seasoned equity offerings in order to 
determine whether investors learn from previous offerings in responding to 
announcements of subsequent offerings. Although investors might not learn from the 
general evidence of companies offering equity to investors, they should be able to learn 
from specific evidence from previous equity offerings by the same company. If a 
company has previously offered equity and rewarded buyers with good earnings 
performance and good stock price performance, then they should have an easier time in 
selling future stock issues. Conversely, companies with poor earnings performance and 
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stock price performance following an equity offering should have a more difficult time 
in selling future stock issues. Investors who are fooled into buying overpriced stock on 
a previous offering should be cautious of purchasing the same stock on any subsequent 
offering.  
If investors learn from previous experience with seasoned equity offerings, then 
the success of a previous equity offering (measured in term of post-offering 
performance for new purchasers) and the success of a subsequent offering should be 
related. In order to sell a second equity offering to investors, they should not regret 
participating in a previous offering by the same company. Therefore, we should expect 
that only those companies who do not sell overpriced stock to investors are able to go 
back to markets for an additional offering. Once investors become disappointed with the 
firm’s performance, the opportunity to sell additional stock should disappear.  
 If investors can learn from the experience of previous offerings then there 
should be a relation between success of the first offering and the market reaction on 
announcement of a second offering. If investors fare well with a previous equity 
offering, then their response to a subsequent offering should be more favorable, or at 
least less unfavorable. Conversely, it should be very difficult for companies to issue 
stock if the company and its stock have performed poorly after a previous offering.  
 This study examines the earnings performance of companies around primary 
seasoned equity offerings, with both stock performance and operating performance used 
to measure the post-offering success of an offering to investors. Previous studies have 
shown that companies issuing SEOs enjoy particularly good earnings performance prior 
to the offering and that earnings performance drops off sharply after the offering. Teoh, 
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Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b) explain this earnings performance as the result of 
earnings management. Prior to issuing stock, earnings are managed upwards by 
incorporating all possible accruals into income and accelerating recognition of income. 
This acceleration borrows earnings from future periods, however. After the offering 
earnings fall, or are less than their potential, had the acceleration not taken place.  
Results of this study show that, following the first of multiple SEOs by the same 
company, the earnings decline is somewhat smaller than shown in other studies of SEOs. 
There is even some evidence of earnings increases for the third year following the first 
SEO. The significantly positive earnings and stock price returns are less likely to be 
found in years following the later SEO due to the increasing need of more financing 
from subsequent SEOs. Moreover, stock performance provides no evidence of 
significantly negative returns following the multiple SEOs. The post-offering stock 
performance is significantly positive for the first SEOs. The findings indicate that the 
good (relative to other subsequent SEOs) operating and market performance allows the 
firm to issue additional equity.  
In regression analysis, there is some evidence of a positive relation between the 
market reaction to current offerings and the post-offering performance of previous 
issues as well as the pre-offering performance of current issues. In particular, we find 
that the two-day (0, 1) announcement period abnormal returns are significantly higher 
for the firm with large market value and high operating performance (or stock price 
performance) than for the firm with small market value and low operating performance 
(or stock price performance). Meanwhile, we find less evidence that there is a 
significantly positive relationship between the two-day (0, 1) announcement period 
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abnormal return and operating and stock price performance following a previous SEO. 
The finding indicates that the small firm with poor operating performance (or stock 
price performance) has a more difficult time in going back to the market for an 
additional offering after investors are fooled into buying overpriced stock on a previous 
offering.  The results suggest that investors do not learn well from the experience of 
previous offerings. The market reaction to an SEO announcement depends more on the 
firms’ condition at the time of the announcement rather than its performance after a 
previous announcement.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses 
previous literature. Section 3 describes the sample selection and data. Section 4 creates 
testable hypotheses. Section 5 describes the methodology and measurement of 
standardized earnings changes and stock price returns. Section 6 tests the market 
reaction to the recurring SEO announcements and presents evidence regarding the 
operating performance and stock price performance sur rounding the announcement of 
recurring SEOs. Section 7 conducts regression analysis to document the relation 
between the two-day (0, 1) announcement period abnormal return and market value, 
operating performance as well as stock price performance. Section 8 concludes this 
study. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 Healy and Palupu (1990) report that SEO announcements convey no new 
information about subsequent earnings by the issuing firms listed on the NYSE and 
AMEX during 1966-1981. They find no earnings decline relative to the prior year’s 
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earnings either before or after adjusting earnings to an industry median. Unlike Healy 
Palupu (1990) focusing on earnings performance, Hansen and Crutchley (1990) 
examine the stock performance and  find a statistically significant post-offering decline 
in return on assets for issuing firms during 1975-1982. 
 Moreover, there are a number of previous studies focusing on the stock 
performance of offerings. Loughran and Ritter (1995) find that firms conducting IPOs 
and SEOs during 1970 to 1990 have been poor long-term investment for investors. They 
conduct three different procedures to measure the statistical significance of the 
underperformance. The first procedure uses annual holding-period returns on issuing 
firms relative to nonissuing firms. The second procedure uses a time series of cross-
sectional regressions on monthly individual firm returns. The third procedure uses 3-
factor time-series regressions of monthly returns for portfolios of issuing and 
nonissuing firms. All of these three procedures document underperformance at high 
degrees of statistical significance. In terms of the realized returns, an investor would 
have had to invest 44% more money in the issuers than in nonissuers of the same size to 
have the same wealth five years after the offering date. The evidence is consistent with 
the fact that companies announce stock issues when their stock is overvalued, the 
market does not revalue the stock appropriately, and the stock is still overvalued when 
the issue occurs. However, the result is still left with a ‘new issues puzzle’: why firms 
issue equity generate such low returns for investors five years after the issue; and why 
investors buy stock on equity offerings despite the documented poor post-offering 
performance following stock issuance.  
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 Spiess & Affleck-Graves (1995) show that firms making seasoned equity 
offering during 1975-1989 substantially underperformanced a sample of matched firms 
from the same industry and similar size that did not issue equity. The result of 
overvalued SEOs is consistent with that previously documented overvaluation of IPOs. 
Large information asymmetry causes the market to be irrationally optimistic about 
initial offerings. This leads investors to pay too much in the immediate aftermarket for 
an IPO, and then discover their mistake in the following years. Therefore, managers 
could take advantage of overvaluation in both IPO and SEO markets. In other words, 
the evidence of similar long-run underperformance following seasoned equity offering 
suggests that the offering prices of new equity issues must also be too high. In sum, a 
possible interpretation of both seasoned offering and IPO results is that managers are 
able to determine when the market is willing to overpay, or is currently overpaying, for 
their stock, and that they take advantage of these opportunities to issue equity. 
Therefore, evidence of persistent and economically significant market inefficiency has 
important implications for the way financial economists think about markets. 
 Loughran and Ritter (1997) link the stock price performance of firms conducting 
SEOs to the operating performance. The results document that the operating 
performance of issuing firms shows substantial improvement prior to the offering, but 
then decreases. Issuing firms are disproportionately high-growth firms, but issuers have 
much lower subsequent stock returns than nonissuers with the same growth rate. Their 
result is consistent with the findings of Hansen and Crutchley (1990) that new issues 
can forecast poor subsequent operation performance. However, their result is not 
consistent with the findings of Healy and Palupu (1990) due to different patterns 
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between large AMEX-NYSE issuers in Healy and Palupu (1990) and the primarily 
smaller NASDAQ listed firms in Loughran and Ritter (1997). 
 Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b) and Rangan (1998) find that the firms 
conducting IPOs and SEOs can manipulate reported earnings in excess of cash flows by 
taking positive discretionary accounting accruals. The findings show that the poor 
earnings performance and accompanying poor stock price performance may be 
attributed to earnings that are managed upwards prior to stock offerings. 
 Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) raise doubts about the matched-firm technique 
of Loughran and Ritter (1995) and others not adjusted for risk. They report smaller and 
insignificant levels of SEO underperformance. They conclude that issuer 
underperformance reflects lower systematic risk exposure for issuing firms relative to 
the matching firms. The main reason is that the equity issuer exposures to unexpected 
inflation and default risks decrease when they lower leverage. Besides, equity issuers 
also increase stock liquidity (turnover), so their expected returns are relatively lower to 
nonissuers. Therefore, they suggest that the ‘new issue puzzle’ is explained by a failure 
of the matched-firm to provide a proper risk adjustment.  
 Jegadeesh (2000) use various benchmark including the equal- and value-
weighted indexes for firms that issue seasoned equity. He points out that a suitable 
benchmark for evaluating long-term performance is essential. He finds that lowest level 
of underperformance when the benchmark matches on size and market-to-book ratio. 
Overall, the finding indicates that SEOs significantly underperform the best candidates 
for benchmark returns. He also finds that Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) including 
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new issues in the benchmark significantly understate the level of underperformance 
because this benchmark partly uses the new issue anomaly to explain itself.  
Multiple equity offerings by bank holding companies are studied by Slovin, 
Shushka, and Polonchek (1991). Multiple equity offerings are not as uncommon for 
banks as for industrial companies. Regulators can force equity sales in order for banks 
to meet capital requirements despite management preferences against selling equity. 
The market response to the first equity sale is insignificantly different from zero. For 
later sales, Slovin, Shushka and Polonchek (1991) separate sales by banks that meet 
capital requirements and sales by banks that do not meet capital requirements. For 
banks that meet capital requirements, investors could conclude that the sale is motivated 
by management’s desire to capture benefits from sale of overpriced equity. They find no 
significant market response to the issuance of seasoned equity by banking firms whose 
primary capital is not sufficient to meet regulatory requirements, regardless of whether 
the offering is a repeat or a first-stage issue. However, the market response to 
subsequent sales of equity by banks meeting capital requirements is strongly negative. 
Overall, their results show that the market’s reaction to SEO announcements by bank 
holding companies is affected by both the sequencing of issues and the existing capital 
position.  
Given that IPO underpricing is a signal of future firm value, Denning, Ferris, 
and Wolfe (1992) analyze the subsequent reissuance activity for IPO underpricing 
through an examination of the relationship between firm quality1 and subsequent SEOs. 
                                                 
1 Denning, Ferris, and Wolfe (1992) proxy high quality firms with a high degree of owner retention, 
increased use of total long-term debt, and the employment of more prestigious underwriters.  
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The previous empirical observation finds that IPO investors, on average, earn a positive 
abnormal return. However, investors in SEOs, on average, earn a negative abnormal 
return. Their findings suggest that IPO underpricing losses may be recovered through 
the significantly higher priced reissuances of SEOs. They find a positive relation 
between measures of firm quality and reissuance activity. Additionally, IPO 
underpricing and the level of future SEOs are positively related since firms attempt to 
recover IPO underpricing losses.  
  D’Mello, Tawatnuntacha, and Yaman (2002) study the market response to 
announcement of multiple seasoned equity offerings by a sample of firms that includes 
not only banks but is primarily composed of non-financial companies. Like Slovin, 
Shuska, and Polonchek, they find a difference between the first offering and subsequent 
offerings in their sample, but the difference is in the opposite direction. The first 
offering announcement for companies in their sample is  associated with an abnormal 
stock return that is negative and significantly different from zero. Subsequent offerings 
display announcement returns that are less negative than the first. The authors attribute 
the improvement is market reaction to a reduction in information asymmetry between 
managers and investors following the first offering. Investors learn about the company’s 
offerings from the first SEO and incorporate that learning into their assessment of 
subsequent offerings. 
  Similarly, Pilotte and Manuel (1996) examine the phenomenon recurring event. 
However, they focus on the case of stock splits for both split announcements and 
earnings announcements. The ir finding is that positive stock price reactions to 
announcement of later stock splits are no t as large as the reaction to the announcements 
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of earlier stock splits. They conclude that the market uses previous split experience to 
interpret the current stock split. 
 
1.3 Testable Hypotheses 
Due to reduction in information asymmetry between managers and shareholders 
with each subsequent offering, we expect to find the decline in negative reaction to 
subsequent SEOs. Additionally, due to the increasing need of more financing from 
subsequent SEOs, it is harder for the company to continue providing good operating 
performance and stock market performance following subsequent stock offerings. 
Therefore, we expect to observe that good earnings and stock price performance tend to 
decline with each succeeding SEO. Thus, our first two hypotheses are as follows:  
H1A: The announcement period (0, 1) return is less negative with subsequent 
offering announcements.  
If a company has previously offered equity and rewarded buyers with good 
earnings performance and good stock price performance, then they should have an 
easier time in selling future stock issues. Conversely, companies with poor earnings 
performance and stock price performance following an equity offering should have a 
more difficult time in returning to the capital market for additional issues. In terms of 
this line of reasoning, we expect to observe a positive relation between two-day 
announcement period abnormal return and market value as well as operating 
performance (or stock price performance).  
In general, investors are more willing to buy the stock on SEOs made by firms 
with the favorable pre-offering performance of current issues and post-offering 
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performance of previous issues which are the two major sources available for investors 
to justify the stock. Past experience including pre-offering performance of current issues 
and the post-offering performance of previous issues play an important role in the 
market’s interpretation of subsequent SEOs. In terms of this line of reasoning, the 
positive relation between two-day announcement period abnormal return and firm 
quality should exist for the pre-offering performance of current issues and the post-
offering performance of previous issues. Therefore, our hypotheses in the regression 
analysis are formulated as follows:  
H1B: There is a positive relation between the two-day (0, 1) announcement 
period abnormal return and market value and the post-offering operating performance 
(or stock price performance) of previous issues. 
H1C: There is a positive relation between the two-day (0, 1) announcement 
period abnormal returns and market value and the pre-offering operating performance 
(or stock price performance) of current issues. 
 
1.4 Sample Description 
1.4.1 Sample Selection  
 The initial sample for this study taken from the Securities Data Corporation 
Platinum (SDC) database consists of 2227 public primary seasoned equity offerings 
made dur ing the period 1980 through 1999. Although SEO data are available from SDC 
through 2002, the need to study long-term post-offering performance for three years 
after the offering requires ending the sample period in 1999. The SEOs retrieved from 
SDC meet the following selection criteria: (1) All issues are US common stocks; (2) all 
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issues are not right issues, warrants, unit issues, and shelf registrations; (3) the issuing 
companies are not regulated utilities (SIC codes 4910 – 4949) and financial institutions 
(SIC codes 6000-6999)2; (4) the issuing firms must have data present on the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT Research Insight databases.  
We identify 888 recurring SEOs for the period from 1980 through 1999. By 
searching the LexisNexis Academic Universe, we obtain financial press announcement 
dates for 758 recurring SEOs. If a filing date is earlier than an announcement date, we 
use the filing date (registration date) from SDC as the event date instead of the 
announcement date from LexisNexis. If the announcement date is unavailable, we use 
the filing date as the event date. Then we check 880 event dates for contaminating 
information releases during the three-day (-1,1) announcement period. Contaminating 
announcements are found about 12.3 percent of the sample, which reduces the sample 
size to 722 recurring SEOs3. Availability of CRSP and COMPUSTAT data reduces the 
final sample to 509 recurring SEOs made by 216 firms.  
Since equity offerings are at the bottom of the pecking order of funding sources, 
multiple seasoned equity offerings should be uncommon. Denning, Ferris, and Wolfe 
(1992) also provide an explanation why only 20% of their IPO sample firms during 
1977-1985 reissue SEOs. They argue that the rational investor would rather buy an 
underpriced IPO and then defer to the future the cost of overpriced SEOs. In other 
                                                 
2 Slovin, Shushka, and Polonchek (1991) discuss the unique nature of equity offering for regulated firms.  
Due to unique disclosure requirements for financial and utilities industries, we eliminate firms in these 
industries from our sample.  
3  We eliminate confounding effect from extraneous occurrence by dropping events between one day 
preceding and one day following the SEO announcements. Therefore, the SEO announcements are not 
contaminated by confounding events linked to firms that also announced quarterly or annual earnings 
results, mergers, acquisitions, dividend, bond ratings changes, and some other firm-specific information 
that might have impact on the stock prices. 
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words, due to the rationing of IPO shares, there may be a wealth transfer from those 
investors buying the overpricing SEOs to those buying IPO. This argument is consistent 
with the findings of negative abnormal returns to SEOs in previous studies. 
 Our sample is somewhat smaller than the sample of 863 offerings identified by 
D’Mello, Tawatnuntacha, and Yaman (2002) because they directly use the SDC filing 
date as the announcement date and do not require a WSJ announcement day4. They also 
do not present a discussion of checking for confounding events for their sample. 
Meanwhile, they include SEOs for banks and utility companies.  
 
1.4.2 Distribution of Recurring SEO Sample 
Table 1.1 presents the distribution of offerings in the sample by year of the 
offering in Panel A, by exchange listing of the offering company in Panel B, and by 
industry in Panel C. The time distribution for the sample is similar to that of other SEO 
studies, with a reduction in offerings after 1987 that turned around by the early 1990s. 
The distribution by exchange listing is about 39.88 percent of the sample for NYSE-
listed firms and about 48.53 percent of the sample for NASDAQ-listed firms. The 
industry distribution shows that about 59.92 percent of the issues are from 
manufacturing firms. One of the reasons for the high concentration of SEOs by 
manufacturing firms is the elimination of SEOs by utility or banking firms.  
 
                                                 
4 D’Mello, Tawatnuntacha, and Yaman (2002) indicated that they use the filing date in SDC instead of 
the WSJ date since WSJ’s reporting of equity announcement after 1984 declined significantly and most of 
the offerings in their sample are conducted after 1984.  
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1.4.3 Frequency of Recurring SEO Sample 
Table 1.2 presents the number of multiple SEOs in the sample, with the 
frequency of recurring issues as a proportion of total issues in Panel A and the 
proportion of firms with multiple issues as a proportion of the total number of firms 
presented in Panel B.  As should be expected, the most common multiple SEO is for 
two issues, with 159 firms issuing only 2 SEOs, 43 firms issuing 3 SEOs, 11 firms 
issuing 4 SEOs, 2 firms issuing 5 SEOs, and only one firm issuing 8 SEOs. There are 
216 first issues, 216 second issues, 57 third issues, 14 fourth issues, 3 fifth issues, and 
only one for sixth, seventh, as well as eighth issues.  
 
1.4.4 Characteristics of Recurring SEO Sample 
Table 1.3 summarizes the characteristics of the issue and issuer for the recurring 
primary SEOs. Except for the total assets, debt to assets ratio, book to market ratio, 
sales, and market value obtained from COMPUSTAT, other variables for characteristics 
are obtained from SDC. Total assets, debt to assets ratio, book to market ratio, sales, 
and market value are measured at the fiscal year end prior to the offerings. The mean 
and median time intervals between subsequent SEOs are 3.12 years and 2.18 years5. 
The mean and median numbers of years since IPO are 6.37 years and 4.61 years. The 
mean and median total assets at the fiscal year end prior to the offering announcements 
are $557.07 million and $127.93 million. The mean (median) debt to assets ratio at the 
fiscal year end prior to the offering announcements is 0.22 (0.19). The mean (median) 
                                                 
5 To avoid intercorrelation or multicollinearity among multiple SEOs, we exclude the sample with less 
than two years apart in the cross-sectional analysis.  
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book to market ratio at the fiscal year end prior to the offering announcements is 0.47 
(0.39). The mean sales at the fiscal year end prior to the offering announcements are 
$512.24 million but he median is only $80.4 million. The mean (median) market value 
at the fiscal year end prior to the offering announcements is $475.4 million ($191.67 
million). The mean and median total amount offered (principal amount) are $60.31 
million ($34.2 million). On common stock issues, principle amount basically equals 
proceeds amount. The relative offer size is measured by the total offer amount divided 
by the market value at the fiscal year end prior to the offering announcements. Mean 
(median) relative offer size is 0.26 (0.21). The time interval mean (median) between 
subsequent SEOs is 3.12 years (2.18 years). We use relative offer size, market value, 
debt to assets ratios, and age since IPO as control variables in our cross-sectional 
analysis.  
The mean and median shares offered as a percentage of shares outstanding 
before the offerings are 20.82 percent and 16.11 percent. The mean (median) percentage 
of shares held by insiders (managers, officers, and directors) before the offerings is 
21.86 percent (18.1 percent). The mean (median) percentage of shares held by insiders 
after the offerings is 17.9 percent (14.7 percent). Overall, the percentage of shares held 
by insiders declines after the offerings. The mean and median gross spread (including 
management fee, underwriting fee, selling concession, and reallowance fee) are $1.05 
per share and $0.97 per share. The mean (median) underwriting fee as a percentage of 
principal amount is 1.14 percent (1.13 percent). The mean (median) underwriting fee as 
a percentage of gross spread is 21.56 percent (20.91 percent).  
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1.5 Methodology 
1.5.1 Estimating Abnormal Returns  
To estimate the stock price reaction to SEO announcements, abnormal returns 
(AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are calculated using standard event study 
methodology. We calculate abnormal returns using the market model, with the CRSP 
equally weighted index as a proxy for the market return. To be more specific, abnormal 
returns ( tiAR , ) are computed as the prediction error tie ,  in the market model 
( titmiiti eRßaR ,,, ++=  ) as follows:  
)(- ,,, tititi RERAR = ,        (1.1) 
where tiR , represents the continuously compounded rates of return on stock i on day t 
and tmR ,  represents the equally-weighted CRSP index on day t. Expected returns 
( )( ,tiRE ) for each day from day –40 through +40 (examination period) are calculated as 
the prediction value based on the market return that day.  
 tmti RßaRE ,, ˆˆ)( += .        (1.2) 
We estimate the coefficients (aˆ  and ßˆ ) of the market model by ordinary least squares 
regression over the 255 day period (-300, -46) that begins 300 trading days before the 
announcement date and ends 46 trading days before the announcement. To test 
significance of abnormal returns we use the parametric t-test based on the cross-
sectional standard deviation of abnormal stock returns. Cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) over the (0, 1) announcement periods are the focus of the examination of 
abnormal returns. As previously noted day 0 is the day of the press release announcing 
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the SEOs. Since the announcement may have occurred after the stock market closed and 
usually was not carried in the Wall Street Journal until the next day, we utilize a two-
day announcement window (0, +1) to measure the market reaction to the SEO 
announcement. 
The announcement period will capture announcements made the day prior to 
publication in the financial press. The CARs are computed as follows:  
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tiå å
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ø
ö
ç
è
æ
= 1
,
,       (1.3) 
where N is the number of firms in the sample over an interval of two or more trading 
days beginning with day b and ending with e. The t statistic is the ratio of the average 
prediction error to its estimated standard deviation.  
 
1.5.2 Estimating Standardized Earnings Changes 
 Operating performance in the period surrounding SEOs is measure with changes 
in annual earnings, standardized according to the procedure suggested by Dann, Masulis, 
and Mayers (1991) and Pilotte and Manuel (1996). Use of annual earnings rather than 
quarterly earnings maintains comparability with earlier studies and allows a larger 
sample size. Standardizing earnings changes facilitates comparison across firms and 
reduces heteroskedasticity in the cross-sectional data. Three alternative earnings 
measures are employed: net operating income (NOI), earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT), and earnings per share (EPS).  
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First, we use standardized earnings changes (SEC) scaled by the market value of 
common stock. For the NOI and EBIT earnings measures, the SEC in event year t for 
SEO number y of firm j is calculated by: 
1,,
1,,,,
,,
)(
-
--=
tyj
tyjtyj
tyj MV
EE
SEC .        (1.4) 
For the EPS earnings measures, the SEC in event year t for SEO number y of firm j is 
calculated by: 
)/(
)(
1,,1,,
1,,,,
,,
--
--=
tyjtyj
tyjtyj
tyj nMV
EE
SEC ,        (1.5) 
where the SEO announcement data falls in year 0, tyjE ,,  is the earnings (NOI, EBIT, or 
EPS) for fiscal year t relative to the announcement of firm j’s yth SEO, 1,, -tyjMV  is the 
market value at the end of the fiscal year before the announcement of firm j’s yth SEO, 
and 1,, -tyjn  is the fiscal year-end number of outstanding shares for the year before the 
announcement of firm j’s yth.   
In addition, we use standardized earnings changes scaled by the total assets. For 
the NOI and EBIT earnings measures, the SEC in event year t for SEO number y of firm 
j is calculated by: 
1,,
1,,,,
,,
)(
-
--=
tyj
tyjtyj
tyj TA
EE
SEC .        (1.6) 
For the EPS earnings measures, the SEC in event year t for SEO number y of firm j is 
calculated by: 
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where 1,, -tyjTA  is the total assets at the end of the fiscal year before the announcement of 
firm j’s yth SEO. 
EPS is standardized by dividing by market value or total assets per share since 
the earnings measure is reported on a per-share basis. Since the calendar event year may 
be different from fiscal year for fiscal year-end earnings information, we adjust the 
event years to fiscal years by identifying the month-end from COMPUSTAT for each 
company’s accounting year.  
 
1.5.3 Estimating Stock Price Returns  
To measure the stock price performance, we employ the total stock price 
percentage return (PR) including capital gain plus dividend yield. The capital gain is 
measured by the stock price percentage changes of the fiscal year-end close price. The 
dividend yield is measured by the dividend per share by ex-date divided by the 
beginning fiscal year-end close price. Hence, the PR in event year t for SEO number y 
of firm j is calculated by: 
1,,
,,1,,,,
,,
-
- +-=
tyj
tyjtyjtyj
tyj P
DIVPP
PR ,      (1.8) 
where tyjP ,,  is the stock price in event year t for firm j’s yth SEO, 1,, -tyjP  is the 
stock price at the end of the year before the announcement of firm j’s yth SEO, and 
tyjDIV ,,  is the dividends per share price in event year t for firm j’s yth SEO. Meanwhile, 
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since the calendar event year may be different from fiscal year for fiscal year-end stock 
price information, we adjust the event years to fiscal years by identifying the month-end 
from COMPUSTAT for each company’s accounting year.  
We use the stock price percentage returns to measure the stock price 
performance instead of using the long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The reason 
is that there is an overlapping problem in event studies of long-term abnormal stock 
returns for the recurring event. Due to the lack of independence generate by overlapping 
returns in the recurring events, Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) indicate that overlapping 
returns are the most severe problem that a researcher could encounter in event studies of 
long-term abnormal returns.  
 
1.6 Empirical Results 
1.6.1 Event Study 
 Table 1.4 presents abnormal stock returns in response to the SEO 
announcements falling within the period of 1980-1999. Panel A, B, C, D, and E present 
abnormal returns for the entire sample, first, second, third, and fourth SEOs, 
respectively. We only estimate abnormal returns of first four SEOs since fifth and 
subsequent offerings are relatively rare and hence there are insufficient observations for 
meaningful estimation. CARs are calculate by summing the daily ARs for various 
windows over the period form 40 days before the SEO announcement through 40 days 
after: (1) pre-announcement: (-40, -21) and (-21, -1), (2) announcement period: (0, +1), 
and (3) post-announcement: (+2, +20) and (+21, +40).  
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Results shown in each and any of the panels are similar to those reported in 
other studies of announcement effects of SEOs. For the entire sample, shown in Panel A, 
the announcement period (0, 1) return is –1.97 percent, which is significant at the 0.01 
level. For the first SEO, shown in Panel B, the announcement period (0, 1) return is –
1.98 percent, which is also significant at the 0.01 level. For other subsequent SEOs, 
shown in Panel C, D, and E, the announcement period (0, 1) returns is –2.07, -1.92, and 
-1.11 percent for the second, third and fourth SEOs, respectively, which is significant at 
the 0.01 level only for the second and third SEOs.  
The results shown in Table 1.4 provide some weak indication that subsequent 
SEO announcements have a less negative announcement effect than previous 
announcements. The announcement period (0, 1) return becomes monotonically less 
negative with subsequent offering announcements. The monotonic decline in 
announcement period returns is consistent with the results of D’Mello, Tawatnuntacha 
and Yaman (2002). They explain that the decline in negative reaction to subsequent 
SEOs is due to reduction in information asymmetry between managers and shareholders 
with each subsequent offering. Likewise, Piolotte and Manuel (1996) find that the 
market reactions to later announcements of stock splits are not as large as the reaction to 
earlier announcements. 
 
1.6.2 Operating Performance 
Standardized earnings changes (including NOI, EBIT, and EPS) scaled by the 
market value and total assets surrounding the announcement are shown in Tables 1.5 
and 1.6, respectively. Panels A, B, and C of Tables 1.5 and 1.6 report the mean SECs 
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from years -2 to +3 relative to the recurring SEO announcements for NOI, EBIT, and 
EPS, respectively. In Table 1.5, most of the mean SECs scaled by the market value in 
year 0 of announcement date are positive and significant at the 0.01 level for the entire 
sample, first SEOs, and second SEOs. There is evidence of significant positive SECs of 
EBIT and EPS in year 0 of announcement date at the 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
Overall, the peak earnings performance occurs in year 0 for the first and all subsequent 
SEOs, except for the fourth SEOs. There is no evidence of significantly negative 
earnings changes following the SEOs, but positive earnings changes are less likely for 
subsequent SEOs.   
Moreover, in Table 1.6 the mean SECs scaled by the total assets in year 0 of 
announcement date are positive and significant for EPS of entire sample at the 0.01 
level, for EBIT and EPS of the second, third, and fourth SEOs. The peak earnings 
performance usually occurs in year. We also find that positive earnings changes are less 
likely for subsequent SEOs.   
In sum, there is some evidence of significant positive SECs following the SEO, 
particularly after the first SEOs. The results are similar for the mean standardized EPS, 
EBIT, and NOI surrounding the recurring SEO announcement. The evidence presented 
in Table 1.5 and 1.6 suggests that, with the progression of successive SEOs, positive 
earnings changes are less likely to be found in years following the SEO. There is almost 
no evidence of significantly negative earnings changes following the SEO year (except 
for the SECs of NOI scaled by the total assets for three years after the fourth SEOs). 
The results may attribute to the increasing need of more financing from subsequent 
SEOs. 
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1.6.3 Stock Price Performance 
Stock price returns following recurring SEOs are presented in Table 1.7 for 
years -2 to +3 relative to the recurring SEO announcements. Most of the mean stock 
price returns for the entire SEOs are significantly positive at the 0.10 level from years -2 
to +3. Likewise, most of the mean stock price returns for the first SEOs are significantly 
positive at the 0.10 level from years -1 to +3. In addition, the stock price returns tend to 
decline with each succeeding SEOs. In sum, significantly positive stock price returns 
are less likely to be found in years following the SEO due to the increasing need of 
more financing from subsequent SEOs. Meanwhile, there is also no evidence of 
significantly negative stock price returns following the SEO year.  
 
1.7 Regression Analysis 
1.7.1 Cross-Sectional Regression Model 
 In the regression analysis we use the market value as the proxy of firm size. We 
also use standardized earnings changes (SEC) and stock price return (PR) as the proxies 
of operating performance and stock price performance, respectively. To further examine 
the relationship between two-day (0, 1) announcement period abnormal return and 
market value as well as pre-offering performance of current issues and post-offering 
performance of previous issues which are the major sources available for investors to 
justify the stock. We focus on the operating performance measure by the standardized 
earnings changes and the stock price performance measured by the stock price returns, 
respectively.  
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   To avoid intercorrelation or multicollinearity among multiple SEOs, we exclude 
the sample with less than two years apart when we estimate the following cross-
sectional regressions: 
Model 1:  
AR(0,1) = a + ß1 Dummy1 + ß2 Dummy2 + ß3 Dummy3 + ß4 Log(Relative Offer Size) + e.     
           (1.9) 
Model 2:  
AR(0,1) = a + ß1 Dummy1 + ß2 Dummy2 + ß3 Dummy3 + ß4 Log(Relative Offer Size)  
                + ß5 Run-up + ß6 Log(MV-1) + ß7 Debt to Assets Ratio-1 + e.    (1.10) 
Model 3:  
AR(0,1) = a + ß1 Dummy1 + ß2 Dummy2 + ß3 Dummy3 + ß4 Log(Relative Offer Size)  
     + ß5 Run-up + ß6 Log(MV-1) + ß7 Debt to Assets Ratio-1 + ß8 Log(Age since IPO) + e.   (1.11) 
In the regression models, the dependent variable is the natural log of 1 plus two-
day (0, 1) abnormal return. SECy-1,1 and SECy,-1 represent the standardized earnings 
change for one year after previous offerings and one year before current offerings, 
respectively. SECs are measured by NOI, EBIT, and EPS and scaled by market value 
(in Panel A of Tables 1.8 and 1.9) and total assets (in Panel B of Tables 1.8 and 1.9) at 
the fiscal year end before the offering announcements. PRy-1,1 and PRy,-1 represent the 
stock price returns for one year after previous offerings and one year before current 
offerings, respectively.  PRs are measured by the total stock returns (in Panel C of 
Tables 1.8 and 1.9).  
In Table 1.8, we examine the relation between two-day abnormal return and 
different types of firms classified by four categories as large- low, small-high, small- low, 
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and large-high6 depending on the size of the market value at the fiscal year end of the 
offering announcements and the size of SEC (or PR) after previous offerings. Dummy1 
= 1, Dummy2 = 0, and Dummy3 = 0 are for the firm with large MV0 and low SECy-1,1  
(or PRy-1,1). Dummy1 = 0, Dummy2 = 1, and Dummy3 = 0 are for the firm with small 
MV0 and high SECy-1,1 (or PRy-1,1). Dummy1 = 0, Dummy2 = 0, and Dummy3 = 1 are 
for the firm with small MV0 and low SECy-1,1 or (or PRy-1,1). Dummy1 = 0, Dummy2 = 
0, and Dummy3 = 0 are for the firm with large MV0 and high SECy-1,1 (or PRy-1,1).  
In Table 1.9, we classify firms as large- low, small-high, small- low, and large-
high depending on the size of the market value at the fiscal year end of the offering 
announcement and the size of SEC (or PR) after current offerings. Dummy1 = 1, 
Dummy2 = 0, and Dummy3 = 0 are for the firm with large MV0 and low SECy,-1  (or 
PRy,-1). Dummy1= 0, Dummy2 = 1, and Dummy3 = 0 are for the firm with small MV0 
and high SECy,-1 (or PRy,-1). Dummy1 = 0, Dummy2 = 0, and Dummy3 = 1 are for the 
firm with small MV0 and low SECy,-1 (or PRy,-1). Dummy1 = 0, Dummy2 = 0, and 
Dummy3 = 0 are for the firm with large MV0 and high SECy,-1 (or PRy,-1).  
According to previous studies, the two-day abnormal return may be negatively 
associated with relative offer size, market value, debt to assets ratio and age since IPO 
but positively associated with run-up. Evidence shows that negative two-day abnormal 
return occurs while issuers have bigger firm size, greater offering size, higher leverage, 
or longer establishment due to more informational asymmetry between insiders and 
outside investors regarding the true value of the firm. Asquith and Mullins (1986) 
                                                 
6 We classify market value as large or small according to whether they are greater or less then the median 
value of market value at the year of offering announcements. We also classify SEC (or PR) as high or low 
performance according to whether they greater or less than the median of SEC (or PR).  
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examine the relation between the two-day announcement return and offer size, pre-
announcement returns, and change on net debt ratio. They find that announcement day 
price reduction is significantly  negatively related to the size of the equity offering.  
Therefore, in the regression analysis, we control for several variables including 
the relative offer size, run-up, market value, debt to asset ratio, and age since IPO. 
Relative offer size is measured by the natural log of the offer amount divided by MV-1. 
Run-up is the natural log of 1 plus the cumulative abnormal return from the day -40 
through the day -6. Log(MV-1) is the natural log of the market value at the fiscal year 
end before the offering announcements. Debt to assets ratio is also measured at the 
fiscal year end before the offering announcements. Log(IPO Age) is the natural log of 
the number of years since IPO.  
 
1.7.2 Post-Offering Performance of Previous Issues 
 Table 1.8 contains the regression results of two-day (0, 1) abnormal returns on 
post-offering performance after previous offerings. For the operating performance (in 
Panels A and B of Table 1.8) and stock price performance (in Panel C of Table 1.8), the 
coefficients (ß3) of Dummy3 for the firm with small MV and low SEC (or PR) are all 
significantly negative for models 1-3 at the 0.05 or 0.01 level. The coefficient (ß3) 
represents the difference in two-day (0, 1) announcement period abnormal returns 
between the firm with small MV and low SEC (or PR) and the firm with large MV and 
high SEC (or PR). The results indicate that the two-day (0, 1) announcement period 
abnormal returns are significantly higher for the firm with large MV and high SEC (or 
PR) than for the firm with small MV and low SEC (or PR).  
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Hence, by controlling for run-up, market value, debt to asset ratio, and age since 
IPO, we document that a positive relationship between the two-day (0, 1) announcement 
period abnormal return and post-offering operating and stock price performance one 
year after previous offerings. Meanwhile, we also find that the larger the relative offer 
size, the lower the two-day (0, 1) announcement period abnormal return in models 1 and 
2. Thus the more likely it should be the larger relative offer size implies more financing 
needs which are unfavorable information to investors. However, there is no evidence of 
relation between two-day (0, 1) announcement period abnormal return and other control 
variables including.  
Our regression tests suggest that the market reactions are smaller for the firm 
with small market value and low standardized earnings changes as well as stock price 
returns than for the firm with high market value and high standardized earnings changes 
as well as stock price returns. These major findings hold across all models for the 
operating performance measured by NOI, EBIT, and EPS and scaled by market value 
and total assets as well as stock price performance.  
The results show that the market uses past experience that followed the previous 
SEOs to interpret subsequent SEOs. If poor earnings changes and stock price returns are 
indicative of performance consequences of future SEOs, subsequent SEOs are unlikely 
to occur in an efficient market. The findings also indicate that small firms with poor 
post-offering performance after subsequent previous issues have a more difficult time in 
returning to the capital market for subsequent issues.  
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1.7.3 Pre-Offering Performance of Current Issues 
 In Table 1.9, an additional regression analysis is the examination of two-day (0, 
1) announcement period abnormal return and pre-offering performance of current issues. 
Although not statistically strong results for the negative coefficient associate with the 
firm with small market value and low SEC and PR for the pre-offering performance, 
our findings are in the hypothesized direction and do suggest evidence of a relationship 
between the market reaction to SEO announcements and market value and SEC (or PR).   
For the operating performance (in Panels A and B of Table 1.9) and stock price 
performance (in Panel C of Table 1.9), the coefficients (ß2) of Dummy2 for the firm 
with small MV and high SEC (or PR) are all significantly negative in the model. The 
coefficient (ß2) represents the difference in two-day (0, 1) announcement period 
abnormal returns between the firm with small MV and high SEC (or PR) and the firm 
with large MV and high SEC (or PR). The results show that the two-day (0, 1) 
announcement period abnormal returns are significantly higher for the large firm with 
high SEC (or PR) than for the small firm with low SEC (or PR). The findings indicate 
that the market reactions are smaller for the smaller firm than for the larger firm.  
Moreover, in Panel B of Table 1.9 the coefficients (ß3) of Dummy3 for the firm 
with small MV and low SEC are significantly negative in the model 1. The coefficient 
(ß3) represents the difference in two-day (0, 1) announcement period abnormal returns 
between the firm with small MV and low SEC (or PR) and the firm with large MV and 
high SEC (or PR). In Panel C of Table 1.9, the coefficients (ß3)  of Dummy3 for the firm 
with small MV and low SEC are significantly negative in all models. The results show 
that the two-day (0, 1) announcement period abnormal returns are significantly higher 
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for the large firm with high SEC (or PR) than for the small firm with low SEC (or PR). 
However, there is no evidence of relation between two-day (0, 1) announcement period 
abnormal return and other control variables including relative offer size, run-up, market 
value, debt to asset ratio, and age since IPO. 
 Overall, the findings regarding the relation between the market reaction to SEO 
announcements and market value as well as firm performance conclude that investors 
do not learn very well from past experience including the post-offering performance of 
previous issues and pre-offering performance of current issues. The results show that 
the smaller firm with poor operating performance and stock price performance has a 
more difficult time in returning the market for additional issues.  
 
1.8 Summary and Conclusions  
 This study empirically examines whether investors learn from previous offerings 
in responding to announcements of subsequent offerings. We focus on firms conducting 
recurring SEOs to provide evidence that the market use previous SEO and current SEO 
experience. We find that the market reaction to SEO announcements is not as negative 
when these announcements follow a previous SEO. In order for investors to be more 
confident of the stock value, the previous SEO should have been successful for 
investors. The operating performance and stock performance should have been good 
enough to convince investors that the subsequent offering is not overpriced.  
In examining the operating performance following the first of multiple equity 
offerings during 1980-1999, the characteristic decline in operating performance or stock 
returns following the offering is not observed. If the company can continue to provide 
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good operating performance and stock market performance, the market will accept 
additional stock offerings. Following subsequent stock offerings, the relatively good 
operating performance and stock performance following the first offering is typically 
not repeated due to the increasing need of more financing from subsequent SEOs. 
In the regression analysis, our major findings suggest that there is less evidence 
of a positive relationship between two-day (0, 1) announcement abnormal return and 
operating performance (or stock price performance). The stock price reactions to 
recurring SEO announcements depend on operating performance and stock price 
performance observed after previous SEOs and before current SEOs. Meanwhile, we 
also find that the larger the relative offer size, the lower the two-day (0, 1) 
announcement period abnormal return since larger relative offer size implies more 
financing needs which are unfavorable information to investors. Overall, our findings 
show that investors do not learn very well from previous experience including the pre-
offering performance of current issues and the post-offering performance of previous 
issues. Meanwhile, the results suggest that the small firm with poor operating 
performance and stock price performance has a more difficult time in returning the 
market for additional issues. 
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Chapter 2. Earnings Management before Primary and Secondary SEOs 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) give managers a great deal 
of latitude in determining the actual earnings reported in any given period, affording 
them discretion in recognizing both the timing and amounts of revenues and expenses. 
For instance, managers can improve current earnings by increasing current accruals, by 
advancing recognition of sales revenue through credit sales or delaying recognition of 
losses by waiting to establish loss reserves. Managers can also increase income through 
managing long-term accruals by decelerating depreciation or realizing unusual gains. 
When managers have discretion over accrual adjustments, it becomes difficult for 
investors to assess whether reported earnings in a given period are appropriate or 
whether they are misleading due to the informational asymmetry created in accrual 
items between investors and managers of issuing firms. The objective of earnings 
management is to either mislead some shareholders about underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
financial reports.  
Seasoned equity offerings (SEO) tend to be preceded by substantial increases in 
operating performance [Loughran and Ritter (1997)] and in abnormal accruals [Teoh, 
Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b), Rangan (1998), Shivakumar (2000)]. Teoh, Welch, 
and Wong (1998a, 1998b) and Rangan (1998) present evidence that reported earnings 
that are managed upwards prior to stock offerings are related to poor earnings 
performance and poor stock price performance. The earnings management hypothesis 
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suggests that firms that are more aggressive in the use of discretionary accruals tend to 
have the worst subsequent performance. Therefore, the earnings management 
hypothesis predicts that issuers have high abnormal accruals prior to offerings and poor 
earnings and stock return performance following offerings.  
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b) conclude that aggressive earnings 
management through income-increasing accounting adjustments leads investors to be 
overly optimistic about the firms’ performance. Likewise, they argue that investors may 
be misled by high earnings numbers reported at the time of the offering, and therefore 
overvalue the new issues.  
As a result of the overoptimism and overvaluation hypotheses, Loughran and 
Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Afflect-Graves (1995) show that firms issuing SEOs 
underperform the stock market in the five years following the offerings. Loughran and 
Ritter report average returns of only 7% per year compared with an average  of 15% per 
year for non- issuing firms. They also indicate that an investor would have had to invest 
44 percent more money in the issuers than in nonissuers of the same size to have the 
same wealth five years following offerings. The result of long-term underperformance 
suggests that firms announce SEOs when their stock is substantially overvalued despite 
the 3 percent average announcement-day price drop. Moreover, Loughran and Ritter 
(1997) document that seasoned offerings are followed by significant earnings declines. 
They conclude that investors are overly optimistic and firms are overvalued.  
However, Shivakumar (2000) argues that earnings management by SEO firms 
may not be designed to mislead investors, but may merely reflect the issuers’ rational 
response to anticipated market behavior at the offering announcement. He concludes 
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that earnings management by SEO firms is rational, since investors recognize earnings 
management and rationally undo its effect at equity offering announcements.  
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b) and Rangan (1998) examine only primary 
offerings. We extend  this research to secondary and combination SEOs. The major 
purpose of this study is to examine the difference in earnings management prior to 
primary, secondary, and combination SEOs because of different motivations or 
incentives of earnings management.  
The sample of this study contains firms that conduct primary, secondary, and 
combination SEOs during the period 1980-1999. Primary offerings refer to new issues 
in which the issuer of the security is also the seller of the security, and the proceeds 
from the sale of the primary shares provide new investment capital for the firm. 
Secondary offerings refer to issuances in which the seller of the security is one or more 
existing shareholders who offer existing shares for sale and proceeds from the sale of 
existing shares go to these selling shareholders. A combination offering is a mixture of 
a primary and secondary SEO with the sale of shares partially from the issuing firm and 
partially from current shareholders. Therefore, the proceeds of the combination SEOs 
will go partly to the issuing firms and partly to selling shareholder.  
Essentially, a firm’s managers make the decision to offer shares in a primary 
offering. Earnings management is thus likely to occur, since management can maximize 
the stock price and the proceeds from a primary SEO. In a secondary offering, however, 
the selling shareholders decide whether and when to offer shares. For secondary SEOs, 
it may be harder to obtain collusion regarding earnings management unless there is 
insider selling ownership. For combination SEOs, with characteristics of both primary 
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and secondary offerings, we may expect that the magnitude of earnings management 
would lie between that for primary and secondary SEO firms. 
Our fundamental hypothesis is that issuers conducting primary SEOs are more 
likely to do earnings management than secondary SEO firms since the primary issuers 
have much more motivation to manipulate the earnings upward. We also extend our 
analysis to consider combination SEOs, and expect earnings management to be between 
that of primary SEO firms and secondary SEO firms, due to the hybrid nature of 
combination SEOs.  
Our results show that earnings management behavior is stronger for primary 
SEO firms than for secondary SEO firms. Based on the pattern of discretionary current 
accruals, there is no evidence of earnings management prior to secondary SEOs since 
there is no incentive for secondary SEO firms to do earnings management due to the 
proceeds only going to selling shareholders. Interestingly, firms conducting 
combination SEOs engage in the strongest earnings management. On possible 
explanation is that combination SEOs tend to be conducted by smaller firms who could 
have more motive and opportunities for earnings management.  
Differences in earnings management could result from differences in sample 
characteristics of SEOs. Since incentives for earnings management differ across SEO 
firms, the difference in earnings management behavior could be attributed to the 
allocation of proceeds by controlling for firm size and relative offer size. For the 
primary and combination SEOs, there are net cash inflows to the issuing firms. For the 
secondary SEOs, however, net cash only inflows to selling shareholders rather than the 
firms. On average, firms conducting secondary SEOs tend to be bigger firms with larger 
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total assets and market value comparing to primary and combination SEO firms with 
smaller assets and market value. Larger SEO firms may find it relatively more difficult 
to manage earnings since they are more diversified. Moreover, larger SEO firms would 
typically issue a smaller relative offer amount and fewer shares as a proportion of shares 
outstanding before offer. Consequently, when we examine the difference in earnings 
management among different SEO types, we would include firm size and offer size as 
control variables. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
previous literature. Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the sample 
selection and data. Section 5 describes the measurement of earnings management and 
the regression model. Section 6 presents and interprets the emp irical results. Section 7 
concludes the study. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
Earnings management has been studied around a variety of corporate event s 
including IPOs [Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a), Aharony, Lin, and Loeb (1993)], 
SEOs [Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b), Rangon (1998), Shivakumar (2000)], 
management buyouts [Deangelo (1986), Perry and Williams (1994), Wu(1997)],  
takeovers [Groff and Wright (1989), Christie and Zimmerman (1994)], and proxy 
contests for board seats [DeAngelo (1988)]. 
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b) and Rangan (1998) find that the firms 
conducting IPOs and SEOs can manipulate reported earnings in excess of cash flows by 
taking positive discretionary accounting accruals. They find that issuers with unusually 
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high accruals prior to the IPO and SEO year have lower post-offering long-term 
abnormal stock returns and net income in subsequent years. Moreover, the relation 
between discretionary current accruals and future returns is stronger for issuers than for 
non- issuers. The findings show that equity issuance process is particularly susceptible to 
information asymmetry regarding a firms’ earnings management. 
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b) rank IPO and SEO firms into two 
quartiles based on offering year discretionary current accruals. Firms in the quartile 
with the highest level of accruals are labeled as “aggressive”. Firms in the lowest 
quartile are labeled as “conservative”. The findings are that IPO firms that are ranked in 
the highest quartile based on IPO-year discretionary current accruals (aggressive IPOs) 
earn a cumulative abnormal return of approximately 20% to 30 % less than the 
cumulative abnormal return of IPO firms ranked in the lowest quartile (conservative 
IPOs). On the other hand, they report that SEO issuers in the most aggressive quartile 
underperform their matched non-issuers by 7.50% in asset-scaled net income in the 
three years after the issue year. Conversely, SEO issuers in the conservative quartile 
outperform their matches by 0.99%.  
 Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b) find that the relation between discretionary 
current accruals and future return (adjusted for firm size and book-to-market ratio) is 
stronger for SEO issuers than for non-issuers. The evidence is consistent with the fact 
that investors naively extrapolate pre-offering earnings without fully adjusting for the 
potential manipulation of reported earnings. Therefore, the implication of the finding is 
that an informationally imperfect market is too optimistic prior to the SEO, so investors 
become disappointed when the high earnings cannot be maintained after offerings.  
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Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b) and Rangan (1998) document a 
negative relation between pre-offering abnormal accruals and post-offering abnormal 
stock returns, which they interpret as a failure by investors to recognize earnings 
management causing post-offering stock underperformance. Shivakumar (2000) argues 
that the statistical tests based on abnormal return metrics are biased due to long-term 
tests using raw returns and market-adjusted returns. To control for this misspecification, 
he conducts the control- firm approach suggested by Barber and Lyon (1997). In 
contrast to the findings of Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b) and Rangan (1998) 
with the test misspecification, he concludes that investors tend to rationally expect 
earnings management at an equity offering announcement and then revise their 
estimates of future earnings after offering announcements. In terms of rational 
expectations, their findings suggest that earnings management is not intended to mislead 
investors and may actually be the rational response of issuers to anticipated market 
behavior at offering announcements. 
Previous studies document poor stock return performance following SEOs. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) find that firms 
underperform the stock market in the five years following a seasoned equity issue. 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) document that seasoned offerings are followed by 
significant earnings declines. Moreover, Denis and Sarin (2001) examine the stock price 
reaction to post-offering earnings announcements by focusing on three-day quarterly 
earnings announcement windows and using a matched sample approach based on 
industry, size, and book-to-market ratio. They document that, on average, earnings 
announcements are related to significantly negative abnormal returns. Their findings are 
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consistent with the hypothesis that firms issue equity when the investors are 
overoptimistic about the firm’s future prospects. However, abnormal returns are reliably 
negative only within the smallest quartile of equity issuers. Since larger firms typically 
offer smaller SEOs as a proportion of shares outstanding, for smaller startup firms, 
earnings management is more likely to happen. Therefore, for small firms, their finding 
is consistent with the overoptimism hypothesis.  
Using a larger sample of SEOs, Brous, Dater, and Kini (2001) find that 
unfavorable information is not conveyed by post-offering earnings announcement. 
Unlike Denis and Sarin (2001), Brous, Dater, and Kini (2001) use a variety of 
benchmark methods and measure earnings announcement returns over various event 
windows. They argue that negative long-term benchmark-adjusted returns result from 
negative expected benchmark-adjusted returns over the earnings announcement period. 
To make an adjustment for this bias, they calculate the difference between the three-day 
abnormal return surrounding the quarterly earnings announcement and the average 
three-day abnormal returns during the rest of that same quarter. They find that post-
offering abnormal returns are not statistically significant. Hence, they conclude that 
investors are not disappointed by earnings announcements following SEOs. This 
finding is inconsistent with the optimistic expectation hypothesis. 
In contrast with previous studies [e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess 
and Afleck-Graves (1995)] only focusing on the primary SEOs, Lee (1997) further 
examines and finds the difference in the long-term stock return performance between 
primary SEOs and secondary SEOs during 1976-1990. Lee concludes that secondary 
SEOs could be less overvalued than primary SEOs on the offering date. The results 
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show that the primary SEO firms selling mostly newly- issued primary shares 
significantly underperform their benchmarks since the market underestimates possible 
increases in free cash flow problems after primary SEOs. However, the secondary SEO 
firms selling mostly secondary shares do not underperform their benchmarks since the 
market fully incorporates bad news of insider sales into the price on the announcement 
date.  
 
2.3 Testable Hypotheses 
Since primary offerings are issuances of new shares, the proceeds from the sale 
of the primary shares are new investment capital for the firm and will go directly to the 
issuing firm. However, secondary offerings are issuances in which the seller of the 
security is an existing shareholder rather than the issuer. The proceeds from the sale of 
existing shares go to the original shareholders. Since the combination offering is a 
mixture of primary and secondary SEOs, the sale of shares is from both of the issuing 
firm and current shareholder. Therefore, the proceeds of the combination SEOs will 
partially go to the issuing firms and partially go to selling shareholder.  
In addition, the managers of a primary offering could make the decision to offer 
shares. In a secondary offering, however, the selling shareholders decide whether and 
when to offer shares. According to characteristics of three different types of SEOs, we 
could expect that the firms conducting primary SEOs are more likely to do earnings 
management than secondary SEO firms since the primary SEO issuers could receive the 
entire proceeds and managers could also involve the decision making of offerings. Due 
to their hybrid nature, we expect that the magnitude and incentive strength of earnings 
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management behavior for combination SEO firms would lie between that for primary 
and secondary SEO firms. Hence, we formulate the following two hypotheses:  
H1A: Greater earnings management should be observed prior to primary SEOs 
than prior to secondary SEOs.  
H1B: Greater earnings management should be observed prior to combination 
SEOs than prior to secondary SEOs.  
 
2.4 Sample Description 
2.4.1 Sample Selection  
The initial sample for this study is from the Securities Data Corporation 
Platinum (SDC) database and consists of 2299 primary SEOs, 850 secondary SEOs, and 
1909 combination SEOs made during the period 1980 through 1999. Although SEO 
data are available from SDC through 2002, we terminate our sample in 1999 in order to 
examine long-term post-offering accruals for three years after the offerings. The SEOs 
retrieved from SDC meet the following selection criteria: (1) All issues are US common 
stocks; (2) all issues are not rights issues, warrants, unit issues and shelf registrations; (3) 
the issuing companies are not regulated utilities (SIC codes 4910 – 4949) or financial 
institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999)7; (4) the issuing firms must have data present on the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT Research Insight 
databases. 
                                                 
7 Slovin, Shushka, and Polonchek (1991) discuss the unique nature of equity offerings for regulated firms.  
Due to unique disclosure requirements for financial and utilities industries, we eliminate firms in these 
industries from our sample.  
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For inclusion in the final sample, we require available stock returns data 
available on CRSP and sufficient data available on Compustat to compute accounting 
accruals. To avoid survivorship bias, we do not require that firms have accruals data for 
the entire period of three years before to three years after the issue year. Thus, the actual 
sample size varies depending on the test procedures and accruals measures used. 
Availability of CRSP and COMPUSTAT data reduces the sample of primary, secondary, 
and combination to 1762, 638, and 1531 issues, respectively. If a firm has multiple 
issues, we include only the earliest issue to avoid using overlapping data to estimate the 
returns-accruals relation. After eliminating the multiple issues by keeping only the 
earliest issue, our final sample of the primary, secondary, and combination SEOs 
contains 1336, 490, 1321 issues, respectively. 
 
2.4.2 Distribution of SEO Firms  
Table 2.1 presents the distribution of the primary, secondary, and combination 
offerings by year of the offering in Panel A, by exchange listing of the offering 
company in Panel B, and by industry in Panel C. The time distribution for the sample is 
similar to that of other SEO studies, with a reduction in offerings after 1987 that 
reversed by the early 1990s. On average, the size of secondary SEO firms is larger than 
that of primary and combination SEO firms. The firms conducting primary SEOs are 
listed more on NASDAQ (51.05%) than on the NYSE (29.79%). Like the primary SEO 
firms, the combination SEO firms are listed more on NASDAQ (68.28%) than on the 
NYSE (14.99%). Consistent with the larger size, the secondary SEO firms are listed 
more on the NYSE (53.67%) than on NASDAQ (37.35%). The industry distribution 
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shows that 55.31%, 57.35%, and 43.45% of the primary, secondary, and combination 
SEO issues are from manufacturing firms. One of the reasons for the high concentration 
of SEOs by manufacturing firms is the elimination of utility or banking firms in this 
sample. 
 
2.4.3 Characteristics of SEO Firms  
Table 2.2 summarizes the characteristics of the issues and issuers for the 
primary, secondary, and combination SEOs. Total assets, debt to assets ratio, book to 
market ratio, sales, and market value are obtained from COMPUSTAT; other variables 
for characteristics of SEOs are obtained from SDC. Total assets, debt to assets ratio, 
book to market ratio, sales, and market value are measured at the fiscal year end prior to 
the offerings.  
The mean and median of total assets at the fiscal year end prior to the offerings 
are $486.81 and $65.99 million for primary, $786.22 and $206.7 million for secondary, 
and $159.38 and $47.59 million for combination. The mean and median of debt to 
assets ratio at the fiscal year end prior to the offerings are 0.25 and 0.21 for primary, 
0.25 and 0.21 for secondary, and 0.22 and 0.16 for combination. The mean and median 
of book to market ratio at the fiscal year end prior to the offerings are 0.41 and 0.32 for 
primary, 0.4 and 0.33 for secondary, and 0.34 and 0.28 for combination. The mean and 
median of sales at the fiscal year end prior to the offerings are $489.63 and $58.81 
million for primary, $941.58 and $236.11 million for secondary, and $198.11 and 
$53.19 million for combination. The mean and median of market value at the fiscal year 
end prior to the offerings are $604.24 and $123.51 million for primary, $103.23 and 
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$371.47 million for secondary, and $299.87 and $111.5 million for combination. The 
mean and median of number of years since IPO are 4.08 and 2.61 years for primary, 
3.06 and 1.28 years for secondary, and 3.12 and 1.5 years for combination. The mean 
and median of total dollar amount offered are $50.92 and $25.4 million for primary, 
$93.64 and $33.45 million for secondary, and $54.22 and $32 million for combination. 
The relative offer size is measured by the total offer amount divided by the market 
value at the fiscal year end prior to the offering announcements. Mean and median of 
relative offer size are 0.34 and 0.24 for primary, 0.19 and 0.15 for secondary, and 0.44 
and 0.34 for combination.  
To examine the relationship between accruals and insider ownership, in our 
cross-sectional analysis later, we use relative offer size, market value, book-to-market 
ratio, and IPO age as control variables. The reason is that these are potential factors that 
might affect incentive of earnings management and alter the relationship between 
discretionary current accruals and insider ownership change 8. 
The mean and median of shares offered as a percentage of shares out standing 
before the offerings are 29.95 and 19.48 percent for primary, 15.08 and 12.04 percent 
for secondary, and 28.33 and 25 percent for combination. The mean and median of 
percentage of shares held by insiders (managers, officers, and directors) before the 
offerings are 30.49 and 26.7 percent for primary, 37.54 and 34.6 percent for secondary, 
and 36.85 and 35.8 percents for combination. The mean and median of percentage of 
shares held by insiders after the offerings are 23.92 and 20.9 percent for primary, 29.29 
                                                 
8 Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b) use book-to-market ratio and market value as controls for the 
Fama-French regressions. 
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and 27.3 percent for secondary, and 27.21 and 25.94 percent for combination. On 
average, the percentage of shares held by insider declines after the offerings. The mean 
and median of gross spread (including management fee, underwriting fee, selling 
concession, and reallowance fee) are $1.02 and $0.92 per share for primary, $1.15 and 
$1.09 per share for secondary, and $1.12 and $1 per share for combination. The mean 
and median of underwriting fee as a percentage of principal amount are 1.26 and 1.23 
percent for primary, 1.04 and 1.02 percent for secondary, and 1.26 and 1.21 percent for 
combination. The mean and median of underwriting fee as a percentage of gross spread 
are 21.82 and 21.13 percent for primary, 21.35 and 20.51 percent for secondary, and 
21.91 and 21.36 percent for combination. 
To examine the difference in characteristics among different types of SEOs and 
further explain the impact on management’s motivations to manipulate reported 
earnings, we use the parametric unpaired t test to test mean and nonparametric 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum z test to test median. The results show that the mean and median 
of total assets of secondary SEO firms are significantly higher than that of primary and 
combination SEO firms. Likewise, the mean and median of sales of secondary SEO 
firms are significantly higher than that of primary and combination SEO firms. Also, 
the mean and median of market value of secondary SEO firms are significantly higher 
than that of primary and combination SEO firms. These results show that based on the 
total assets, sales, and market value, secondary SEOs tend to be conducted by bigger 
firms with the highest total assets, sales, and market value  comparing primary and 
combination SEO firms. In other words, the total assets, sales, and market value are the 
highest for the secondary SEO firms so the size of secondary SEO issuers is relatively 
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larger than other types of SEO firms. On the other hand, combination SEOs tend to be 
conducted by smaller firms the lowest total assets, sales, and market value among 
different types of SEOs. 
In addition, the mean and median of relative offer size for combination SEO 
firms are significantly larger than for primary and secondary SEO firms. Similarly, the 
mean and median of shares offered as a percentage of shares outstanding before offer 
for combination SEO firms are significantly higher than for primary and secondary SEO 
firms. On average, the relative offer size and shares offered as a percentage of shares 
outstanding before offer are total are the highest for the combination SEO firms. 
Moreover, the relative offer size and shares offered as a percentage of shares 
outstanding before offer are the lowest for the secondary SEO firms. 
 
2.5 Methodology 
2.5.1 Measurement of Earnings Management 
 Reported earnings consist of cash flows from operations and accounting 
adjustments called accruals. Earnings management is most likely to occur on the 
accruals item rather than on the cash flow component of earnings. In general, the firms 
conducting seasoned equity offerings can manage reported earnings upward by altering 
accounting adjustments for future business transactions. With the managerial flexibility 
in accrual system of accounting, firms have chances for earnings management. Based 
on Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b), we decompose net income into cash flow 
from operations and total accruals (accounting adjustments) as follows:  
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Net Income (172) = Total Accruals + Cash Flow from Operations (308)9.  (2.1) 
Therefore, total accrual (TA) is expressed as: 
Total Accruals = Net Income (172) - Cash Flow from Operations (308).  (2.2) 
Accruals could be decomposed into four categories based on time period 
(current and long-term) and managerial control (discretionary and nondiscretionary). 
Current accruals are adjustments regarding short-term assets and liabilities. Long-term 
accruals are adjustments regarding long-term net assets. Discretionary accruals are 
managed. Nondiscretionary accruals are not managed and independent of managerial 
manipulation. To summarize, there are four components of total accruals in the paper: 
(1) discretionary current accruals (DCA), (2) discretionary long-term accruals (DLA), (3) 
nondiscretionary current accruals (NDCA), and (4) nondiscretionary long-term accruals 
(NDLA). Generally, managers have more discretion over short-term accruals than over 
long-term accruals. The two discretionary accrual measures are proxies for earnings 
management and the two nondiscretionary accrual measures are proxies for accrual 
recognition outside the control of management.  
By definition, current accruals are the change in noncash current assets minus 
the change in operating current liabilities. Thus, 
CA = D[Current Assets (4) - Cash (1)]  
      -  D[Current Liabilities (5) - Current Maturity of Long-Term Debt (44)]. (2.3) 
                                                 
9 Numbers in parentheses are Compustat item numbers. According to the Compustat 1994 manual, cash 
flow from operations is not available as item (308) prior to 1987, so it is calculated as the fund flow from 
operations (110) minus current accruals. 
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To reduce the influence of nonstandard classifications of certain items, we 
follow Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b) and accounting literature in computing 
current accruals as  
CA = D[Current Receivables (2) + Inventory (3) + Other Current Assets (68)]  
 - D[Accounts Payable (70) + Tax Payable (71) + Other Current Liabilities (72)].   (2.4) 
Nondiscretionary variables are expected accruals from a cross-sectional 
modification of the Jones (1991) models as in Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b) 
and the discretionary variables are residuals. Current accruals are regressed on the 
change in sales in a cross-sectional regression using an estimation sample of all two-
digit SIC codes as the seasoned new issuer (but excluding the issuers of SEOs and IPOs 
in the regression). Thus, the cross-sectional approach automatically adjusts for 
economic conditions of different industries with influence accruals independently of 
earnings management. Consistent with the use of the model in the accounting literature, 
all variables including the intercept term in the cross-sectional regression are scaled by 
beginning total assets to reduce heteroskedasticity. The current accruals (CA) is 
obtained by running the following cross-sectional OLS regression10: 
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where j firms are in the same two-digit SIC codes as the issuing firm but excluding the 
issuer, TAj,t-1 is total asset (6) in year t-1, and DSalesj,t is the change in sales (12) in year 
t for firm j. Using industry benchmarks to measure accruals is consistent with the 
                                                 
10 In order to obtain meaningful parameter estimates, we require the estimation sample to have at least 20 
observations and exclude extreme observations using the DFFITS procedure.  
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common practice of underwriters, who value new equity issues by comparing market 
prices and accounting variables of similar firms.  
 The nondiscretionary current accruals scaled by beginning assets (NDCA) are 
regarded as independent of managerial control and are calculated as: 
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where 0aˆ  is the intercept estimator and 1aˆ  is the slope estimator for SEO firm i in year t. 
DTRj,t is the change in trade receivables (151) in year t for issuer i. To account for the 
possibility of credit sales manipulation, we subtract the increase in accounts receivable 
from sales growth. 
 The asset scaled discretionary current accruals (DCA) are the portion of current 
accruals subject to managerial manipulation. DCAi,t, discretionary current accruals for 
SEO firm i for year t, are calculated as: 
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, .        (2.7)
  
DCA is used as a proxy for earnings management.  
For long-term accruals, with a previous equivalent procedure we first estimate 
nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals by running the following regression in a 
similar method. Since long-term accruals are affected by the amount of long-term assets, 
we include property, plant, and equipment t (7) as an additional regressor.   
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where j firms are in the same two-digit SIC codes as the issuing firm but excluding the 
issuer, TACj,t is total accruals, and PPEj,t is gross, property, plant, and equipment (to 
adjust for depreciation) for in year t for firm j. 
 The nondiscretionary total accruals scaled by assets (NDTAC) are calculated as:  
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where 0ßˆ  is the intercept estimator and 1ßˆ  and 2ßˆ  are the slope estimators for SEO firm 
i in year t. Therefore, the discretionary total accruals scaled by assets (DTAC) are 
represented by the residual:   
it
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,  .       (2.10) 
Total accruals are sum of current accruals and long-term accruals. We 
decompose total accruals into current and long-term components and evaluate them 
separately because firms have more discretion over short-term than over long-term 
accruals. Therefore, nondiscretionary long-term accruals scaled by assets (NDLA) will 
be the difference between nondiscretionary total accruals (NDTAC) and 
nondiscretionary current accruals (NDCA). Discretionary long-term accruals scaled by 
assets (DLA) will be the difference between discretionary total accruals (DTAC) and 
discretionary current accruals (DCA). Thus,  
NDLA = NDTAC – NDCA.        (2.11) 
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DLA = DTAC – DCA.         (2.12) 
 In sum, accruals are decomposed into four components: discretionary and 
nondiscretionary current accruals, and discretionary and nondiscretionary long-term 
accruals. Nondiscretionary accruals are the asset-scaled proxies for unmanipulated 
accruals. Discretionary accruals are the asset-scaled proxies for manipulated earnings 
determined at the discretion of management. In general, discretionary current accruals 
(DCA) are the superior proxy for earning management.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the timing convention. The fiscal year in which the SEO 
occurs is year 0. Thus, fiscal year –1 ends before the date of the SEO, and fiscal year 0 
includes both pre-SEO and post-SEO information. Since the calendar year may be 
different from fiscal year for the accounting data, we adjust the event years to fiscal 
years by identifying the month-end from COMPUSTAT for each company’s accounting 
year.  
 
2.5.2 Comparisons  of Differences in Accruals  
 The parametric unpaired t test and nonparametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum z test are 
conducted to test the difference in mean and median of accruals between firms with 
insider ownership and without insider ownership or among different types of SEO 
firms11. Firms without insider ownership are defined by zero percentage of shares held 
by insiders including managers, officer, and directors before or after offerings. Firms 
with insider ownership are defined by positive percentage of shares held by insiders 
                                                 
11 Due to the unavailability of ownership data prior to 1991, we only use sample from 1991 to 1999 when 
we conduct tests with the variable of ownership.  
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before or after offerings. Basically, parametric tests are robust under violations of the 
distribution assumptions, particularly if sample sizes are sufficiently large. Since our 
sample size is large enough, we may focus on the results of the parametric unpaired t 
test. Besides, the results for unpaired t test are consistent with results for Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum Z test. 
 
2.6 Empirical Results 
2.6.1 Univariate Analysis 
2.6.1.1 Time-series Profile of Earnings Management 
 Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 present the profile of four accrual measures surrounding 
offering for primary, secondary, and combination SEOs, respectively. In Panel A of 
Table 2.3, we find that discretionary current accruals for primary SEOs are significantly 
positive, rising to a peak in the offering year. The asset-scaled discretionary current 
accruals of primary SEOs in year 0 is statistically significantly positive at a mean and 
median of 4.32% and 2.04%. Teoh, Wech, and Wong (1998b) report that the year 0 
peak in asset-scaled discretionary current accruals is statistically significant at a mean 
and median of 5.59% and 2.50%. In general, discretionary current accruals of firms 
conducting primary SEOs grow before the offering, peak in the offering year, and 
decline thereafter. This result suggests manipulation of current accruals during the 
offering year. The current accruals do not turn negative immediately after the offering, 
suggesting that issuers avoid immediate reversals in accruals. Teoh, Wech, and Wong 
(1998a) suggest that some institutional explanations for this phenomenon. First, there 
may be a threat of lawsuits if reversals in accruals happen immediately after offerings. 
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Secondly, underwriters have a commitment to stabilize price near the offering price. 
Thirdly, there is the presence of lock-up periods when insiders commit not to sell. 
In Panel B of Table 2.3, we do not find significant ly positive discretionary long-
term accruals. Managers generally have more discretion over short-term accruals than 
over long-term accruals. In Panel C of Table 2.3, the nondiscretionary current accruals 
show a similar profile to discretionary current accruals. The nondiscretionary current 
accruals decline significantly after the offering year. Nondiscretionary current accruals 
are a positive linear function of sales growth (see the equation 2.6). After adjusting sales 
growth for the increase in accounts receivable, nondiscretionary current accruals are 
considered typical in the industry for the level of sales growth. In Panel D of Table 2.3, 
the nondiscretionary long-term accruals are significantly negative in all years. The long-
term nondiscretionary accruals are less likely manipulated by managers since issuers 
need more lead time to change long-term accruals before offerings. In addition, issuers 
are less willing to manipulate long-term accruals because they are more visible than 
current accruals. These results are similar for the primary SEO firms with or without 
insider ownership 12. 
 For secondary SEOs, in Panel A of Table 2.4, there is no evidence of significant 
current accruals prior to secondary SEOs. In Panel B of Table 2.3, we do not find 
significantly positive discretionary long-term accruals. The results show that secondary 
SEO firms are less likely to manage the earnings upward prior to offerings. In Panel C 
                                                 
12 Ownership is measured by the percentage of shares held by insiders  including  managers, officers, and 
directors. Firms without ownership have zero percentage of shares held by insiders before or after 
offerings. Firms with ownership have positive percentage of shares held by insiders before or after 
offerings. 
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of Table 2.4, the nondiscretionary current accruals peak in the issue year and decline 
significantly after the offering year. In Panel D of Table 2.4, the nondiscretionary long-
term accruals are significantly negative in all years. The results are also similar for the 
secondary SEO firms with or without insider ownership. 
 For the combination SEOs, in Panel A of Table 2.5, we find that discretionary 
current accruals are significantly positive from year -2 to 3, monotonically rising to a 
peak in the offering year. The asset-scaled discretionary current accruals of combination 
SEOs in year 0 is statistically significantly positive at a mean and median of 11.1% and 
5.59%. The discretionary current accruals of firms conducting combination SEOs 
increase before the offering, peak in the offering year, and decline thereafter. The 
current accruals do not turn negative immediately after the offering.  
 We expect that the earnings management for combination SEO firms should lie 
between that for primary and secondary SEO firms. However, the results in next section 
show that earnings management for combination SEO firms is  more severe than that for 
both of primary and secondary SEO firms since combination SEOs tend to be 
conducted by smaller firms who could have more motive and opportunities for earnings 
management.  
In Panel B of Table 2.5, we also do not find the significantly positive 
discretionary long-term. In Panel C of Table 2.5, the nondiscretionary current accruals 
show a similar profile to discretionary current accruals. The nondiscretionary current 
accruals decline significantly after the offering year. In Panel D of Table 2.5, the 
nondiscretionary long-term accruals are significantly negative in all years. Also, these 
results are similar for the combination SEO firms with or without insider ownership. 
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In summary, we observe significant earnings management for primary and 
combination SEOs but not for secondary SEOs. The results suggest that it is more likely 
for primary and combination SEO issuers to make collusion of earnings management to 
realize return by selling at higher prices. However, it is less likely for secondary SEO 
issuers to reach collusion agreement of earnings management unless there is insider 
selling ownership.  
 
2.6.1.2 Earnings Management Comparisons  
 The different types of SEOs and insider ownership presence may play a role in 
explaining the difference in mean accruals. The insider ownership presence is defined 
by a positive percentage of shares held by insiders before or after offerings. Table 2.6 
presents the results of tests for differences in discretionary current accruals (DCA), 
discretionary long-term accruals (DLA), nondiscretionary current accruals (NDCA), 
and nondiscretionary long-term accruals (NDLA) between primary and secondary SEOs 
from the three years before to three years after the offerings. Table 2.7 presents the 
results of tests for differences in DCA, DLA, NDCA, and NDLA between primary and 
combination offerings. Table 2.8 presents the results of tests for difference in DCA, 
DLA, NDCA, and NDLA between secondary and combination SEOs. 
According to both the parametric unpaired t test and nonparametric Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum z test, in Table 2.6 we find that the mean of discretionary current accruals are 
higher for primary SEO firms than for secondary SEO firms  from year -2 to 0. In Table 
2.7 we find that the mean and median of discretionary current accruals are higher for 
combination SEO firms than for primary SEO firms from year -1 to 1 and year 3. 
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Likewise, in Table 2.8 we find that the mean and median of discretionary current 
accruals are higher for combination SEO firms than for secondary SEO firms from year 
-2 to 1. Hence, we conclude that earnings management differs dramatically among three 
different types of SEO firms.  
Based on our two hypotheses, greater earnings management should be observed 
prior to primary SEOs than secondary prior to SEOs. Meanwhile, greater earnings 
management should be observed prior to combination SEOs than prior to secondary 
SEOs. The results support these two hypotheses that primary and combination SEO 
firms are more likely to have managed earnings upward than secondary SEO firms.  
Due to the hybrid nature, we expect that the earnings management for the 
combination SEO firms would lie between that for primary and secondary SEO firms. 
However, the results show that the magnitude of earnings management for combination 
SEO firms is not between primary and secondary SEO firms. Surprisingly, firms 
conducting combination SEO engage in the strongest earnings management. One 
possible explanation is that combination SEOs tend to be conducted by smaller firms 
with larger relative offer size, so combination SEO firms have more motive and 
opportunities for earning management.   
Conversely, the firm size is the largest and relative offer size is the smallest for 
the secondary SEO firms among three types of SEOs. In general, it would be more 
difficulty for larger firms to have managed earnings since they are more diversified. 
Also, for larger firms, SEO firm would typically issue smaller relative offer amount and 
fewer shares as a proportion of shares outstanding before offer. Hence, the results show 
that secondary SEO firms are less aggressive in doing earnings management. 
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In addition, the managers should have more incentives to manipulate the 
earnings upwards for primary and combination SEOs than for secondary SEOs since 
some proceeds from the primary and combination offering inflow to the issuing firms. 
Sellers, however, are the existing shareholders and proceeds only inflow to selling 
shareholders for a secondary equity offering. Therefore, the results show that firms 
conducting primary and combination SEOs have more incentive to engage in earnings 
management than secondary SEO firms.  
Due to the documented relation between earnings management and insider 
ownership structure in previous studies (such as Dempsey, Hunt, and Schroeder (1993), 
we examine the difference in earnings management between firms with insider 
ownership and without insider ownership for primary, secondary, and combination 
SEOs in Tables 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11, respectively. We use the percent of shares held by 
insider as a proxy of insider ownership. However, there is no evidence of a positive 
relation between earnings management prior to offerings and insider ownership among 
three types of SEOs.  
One of reasons for this result might be that data in this study for the insider 
ownership mix with non-owner (non-founder) managers and owner (founder) managers. 
Dempsey, Hunt and Schroeder (1993) find that non-owner managers are more likely to 
engage in earnings management than owner managers. Their interpretation for this 
phenomenon is twofold: first, non-owner managers have incentives to do earnings 
management to cover up their poor managerial performance and to keep shareholders 
satisfied and unwilling to support hostile takeover attempt. However, owner-managers 
have less fear of outsider takeover than professional non-owner managers. Second, due 
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to earnings-based compensation contracts, for non-owner managers, they have more 
incentive to do earnings management to maximize their welfare and bonus. 
 
2.6.2 Regression Analysis 
 We further employ the regression model to examine the relation among mean 
discretionary current accruals (DCA) and SEO types. According to Table 2.2 presenting 
the difference in offer size, firm size and insider ownership  among different SEO types, 
we control for relative offer size, market value, as well as insider ownership. Therefore, 
we construct the following regression model: 
Accrual = a + ß1  SEOTYPE + ß2 Log(Relative Offer  Size)  
                           + ß3 Log(MV-1) + ß4 ?Ownership 13 + e.       (2.13) 
In the above regression model, the dependent variable is the mean discretionary 
current accruals. Dependent variable is discretionary current accruals (DCA). In Panel 
A, dummy variable SEOTYPE is equal to one for the primary SEOs and zero for the 
combination SEOs. In Panel B, dummy variable SEOTYPE is equal to one for the 
secondary SEOs and zero for the combination SEOs. In Panel C, dummy variable 
SEOTYPE is equal to one for the primary SEOs and zero for the secondary SEOs, 
respectively. Control variables include Log(Relative offer Size), Log(MV) as well as 
?Ownership. Log(Relative offer Size) is the natural log of the offer size measured by 
the total offer amount divided by the market value at the fiscal year end before the 
offering. Log(MV) is the natural log of the market value and measured at the fiscal year 
                                                 
13 Ownership data is unavailable prior to 1991 in SDC Platinum. In Table 2.12, we exclude ?Ownership 
variable to include more complete sample period during 1980 and 1999. The result with ? Ownership is 
less significant than that without ?Ownership variable.  
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end before the offering. ?Ownership is change in insider ownership measured in terms 
of the difference between percent of shares held by insiders before and after offer. The 
offering date falls in year 0. However, ?Ownership data is unavailable prior to 1991 in 
SDC Platinum. Sample sizes depend on data availability in COMPUSTAT and SDC 
databases. The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 In Panel A of Table 2.12, the coefficients (ß1) of SEO type (primary v.s. 
combination) are significantly negative at years 1 and 2 at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. It indicates that abnormal accruals for combination SEOs are greater than 
for primary SEOs. In Panel B of Table 2.12, the coefficients (ß1) of SEO type 
(secondary v.s. combination) are significantly negative at years 1 and 2 at the 0.01 and 
0.05 levels, respectively. It indicates that abnormal accruals for combination SEOs are 
greater than for secondary SEOs. In Panel C of Table 2.12, the coefficients (ß1) of SEP 
type (primary v.s. secondary) are all insignificant.  
  We also find some evidence of negative relation between mean accruals and 
control variables such as relative offer size and market value. We could conclude that 
more well-established and bigger firms such as secondary SEO issuers are less likely to 
have earnings management since it is harder to reach collusion agreement of earnings 
management.   
 
2.7 Summary and Conclusions  
Previous studies document that firms conducting seasoned equity offerings can 
also manage reported earnings upward by alt ering discretionary accounting accruals. 
According to recent issues of financial statement fraud, manipulating income could lead 
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to an erosion of the quality of earnings and financial reporting. Analysis of a firm’s pre-
offering accounting accruals may provide useful information for investors to predict the 
level of earnings management and discriminate among different issues and issuers. 
However, previous studies provide less evidence with regard to the difference in 
earnings management among different types of SEOs. Therefore, this study focuses on 
examining the earnings management behavior of issuers for the primary, secondary and 
combination seasoned equity offerings. The sample of this study contains firms that 
conduct primary, secondary, and combination SEOs during the period 1980-1999. The 
findings suggest that firms conducting primary and combination SEOs are more likely 
to engage in earnings management than secondary SEOs.  
Results show that discretionary current accruals of firms conducting primary and 
combination SEOs grow before the offering, peak in the offering year, and decline 
thereafter. The implication of results is that the collusion of earnings management is 
more likely to be reached for primary or combination SEOs. However, there is no 
evidence of earnings management prior to secondary SEOs since it is less likely to 
reach collusion agreement of earnings management for secondary SEOs. Inconsistent 
with the second hypothesis that the magnitude of earnings management for 
combinations is between primary and secondary SEO firms due to their hybrid 
characteristics. The results show that the firms conducting combination SEOs have the 
strongest earnings manipulation behavior. In other words, the combination SEO firms 
are most likely to use discretionary accounting choices to manage earnings disclosures 
around the time of offerings.  
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 The difference in earnings management behavior among different types of 
SEOs could be attributed to the allocation of proceeds by controlling firm size and 
relative offer size. For the primary and combination SEOs, there are net cash inflows to 
the issuing firms. For the secondary SEOs, however, net cash inflows to selling 
shareholders rather than the firms. Therefore, firms conducting secondary SEOs are 
reluctant to do earnings management. In addition, the primary and combination SEO 
firms have much more motivation to manipulate the earnings upwards than secondary 
SEO firms prior to offerings.  
Moreover, the firms conducting secondary SEOs tend to be larger firms than the 
primary and combination SEO firms. Combination SEOs tend to be conducted by 
smaller firms with smallest firm size and relative offer size comparing primary and 
secondary SEO firms. In general, large firms are more difficult to have managed 
earnings since it is less likely to reach collusion agreement of earnings management. 
Overall, firms conducting combination SEOs appear to have the strongest incentive to 
manage the earnings comparing to primary and secondary SEO firms. 
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Chapter 3. Dilution and Post-offering Performance 
3.1 Introduction  
 There is well-documented evidence of poor post-offering performance following 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Afleck-
Graves (1995) show that stock returns of firms conducting primary SEOs significantly 
underperform a matching sample of nonissuing firms over three to five years following 
the offerings, which is consistent with investors being overly optimistic about the 
issuing firm’s future performance. They also present evidence that an investor would 
have had to invest 44 percent more money in the issuers than in nonissuers of the same 
size to have the same wealth five years following offerings. The result of long-term 
underperformance suggests that firms announce SEOs when the ir stock is substantially 
overvalued.  
Unlike Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Afleck-Graves (1995) who 
only focus on primary SEOs, Lee (1997) examines and finds differences in the long-
term stock return performance between primary SEOs and secondary SEOs. Lee shows 
that primary SEO firms selling mostly newly- issued shares significantly underperform 
their benchmarks. However, the secondary SEO firms do not underperform their 
benchmarks. He suggests that the difference in long-term performance is due to 
difference in investor beliefs. For primary SEOs, the market underestimates a possible 
increase in the free cash flow problem described by Jensen (1986). The free cash flow 
problem is one of the most severe agency conflicts between management and 
shareholders. It results from managers deploying internally generated cash flow in a 
way that does not maximize shareholder wealth, and includes managers using internally 
62 
   
generated funds to finance value destroying investments rather than returning funds to 
investors. However, the market fully incorporates bad news of insider sales into the 
price on the announcement date of secondary SEOs, so long-term performance is not 
affected.  
In addition to the overoptimism and overvaluation hypotheses, a possible 
explanation for the difference in the post-offering long-term performance could be due 
to the dilution effect of primary offerings. Primary SEOs differ from secondary SEOs in 
this respect. By definition, primary offerings refer to market transactions in which the 
issuing firm is the seller of the security. Secondary offerings refer to underwritten 
offerings of existing shares where the proceeds are not received by the issuing firm, but 
by a seller of existing shares. Since a primary offering involves the issuance of new 
shares, dilution causes a reduction in earnings per share (EPS) due to the increase in the 
number of shares outstanding after a primary SEO. Since a secondary offering is the 
sale of existing shares, however, the number of shares outstanding remains unchanged 
after secondary SEOs. Therefore, there is no dilution effect for secondary offerings.  
Asquith and Masulis (1986) examine the dilution in firm value from an offering, 
measured as the ratio of the change in the equity value of the firm to the proceeds of the 
issue. Value dilution will be related to size of the offering and its announcement effect 
on stock price. Larger offerings tend to produce greater dilution in total firm value. 
Based on their measure of offering dilution, they find a greater effect for secondary 
offerings than for primary offerings. Investors are apparently more pessimistic about 
secondary offerings than primary offerings. The effect on earnings dilution, however, 
should be the reverse.  
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Earnings dilution from primary offerings could lead to a negative earnings 
surprise after the offering. Actual earnings will be lower than predicted by financial 
analysts if they do not account for the increase in shares in their forecast. The earnings 
surprise should, in turn, be linked to poor market performance. Despite previous studies 
suggesting a number of possible explanations for the post-offering underperformance of 
issuing firms, there is little empirical work examining the relation between the dilution 
and post-offering underperformance. If earnings dilution is not anticipated, the 
difference in long-term performance between the primary and secondary SEOs could be 
attributed to the dilution effect. In this study, the relation between dilution effect and 
negative earnings surprise provides an alternative explanation for the difference in post-
offering long-term performance.  
 According to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), issuance of 
common stock will gradually be reflected in an increase in the number of shares 
outstanding. The number of shares outstanding is calculated as a monthly weighted 
average of outstanding shares, which is used in the denominator in earnings per share 
computations 14. A weighted average gives due consideration to all shares outstanding 
and assumed to have been outstanding during a period. In terms of the computation of 
weighted average shares outstanding, it takes one year for new outstanding shares to be 
fully reflected. An empirical study by Boyer and Gibson (1979) finds that a majority of 
                                                 
14 Earnings per share (EPS) have long been considered one of the most important measures of a firm's 
performance. EPS is simply net income divided by the number of shares issued and outstanding. However, 
according to accounting principles, an adjustment is required if the number of outstanding shares has 
varied over the year as a result of issue of new shares, stock dividends, stock splits, exercised stock 
options, or stock repurchase by the corporation. In that case, a weighted average of shares outstanding is 
used in the denominator where the weights are the number of days in the year during which each different 
quantity of the shares that have been outstanding (except in case of stock dividends or stock splits, in 
which case the change is retroactive to the beginning of the fiscal year). 
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practitioners and academics in accounting and finance do not understand EPS 
disclosures and struggle with the effects of common stock equivalents and other 
calculation complexities.  
 This study investigates the difference in the earnings surprise between primary 
SEOs and secondary SEOs during 1980-1999. We examine the pattern of earnings 
surprise after the first, second, third and fourth quarterly earning announcement dates 
following each SEO. The results show a significant and negative earnings surprise 
following primary SEOs and no evidence of a negative earnings surprise following 
secondary SEOs.  
 Results of this study are consistent with the proposition that financial analysts do 
not fully incorporate the additional shares in their forecast of EPS. If additional shares 
are not incorporate in EPS forecast, a negative earnings surprise would occur following 
primary offerings. Eventually, financial analysts revise downward their earnings 
forecast and the earnings surprise becomes smaller, as additional shares are reflected in 
their forecast. In contrast, we find no evidence of earnings surprises after secondary 
SEOs since the number of shares outstanding is unchanged.  
 The results show that there is difference in earnings surprise between primary 
and secondary SEOs, particularly in the second and third quarters following the 
earnings announcement. We also find that the shares offered as percentage of shares 
outstanding are significantly and positively related to the negative earning surprise in 
the first and second quarters after offerings. The results indicate that, the more shares 
offered in the primary SEOs, the greater is negative earnings surprise.  
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This study is developed as follows. Section 2 discusses previous literature. 
Section 3 develops the hypotheses. In Section 4, we describe the sample and data. 
Section 5 discusses the methodology for measuring earnings surprises.  Section 6 
presents and interprets the empirical results. Section 7 then provides the summary and 
conclusions.  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
Extensive previous studies document poor post-offering performance [(e.g., 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Afleck-Graves (1995)] and a negative 
announcement effect [eg., Asquith and Mullins (1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986), and 
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996)] following seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Loughran 
and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Afleck-Graves (1995) show that stock returns of firms 
conducting primary SEOs significantly underperform a matching sample of nonissuing 
firms over three to five years following SEOs. These results are consistent with the 
proposition that investors are overly optimistic at the time about the issuing firm’s 
future performance. Loughran and Ritter report average returns on SEO firms of only 7 
percent per year in the five years after offerings, compared with 15 percent per year for 
nonissuing firms of the same size. They also present that an investor would have had to 
invest 44 percent more money in the issuers than in nonissuers of the same size to have 
the same wealth five years following offerings. The results of long-term 
underperformance suggest that firms announce SEOs when their stock is grossly 
overvalued, despite the average announcement-day price of only 3 percent. Moreover, 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) document that seasoned offerings are followed by 
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significant earnings declines. They conclude that investors are overly optimistic and 
firms are overvalued.  
In contrast with Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Afleck-Graves 
(1995), who focus on primary SEOs, Lee (1997) extends his study to include secondary 
SEOs and finds a difference in the long-term stock return performance between primary 
SEOs and secondary SEOs during the period 1976-1990. Lee concludes that secondary 
SEOs could be less overvalued than primary SEOs on the offering date. The results 
show that primary SEO firms, selling mostly newly- issued shares, significantly 
underperform their benchmarks since the market underestimates possible increases in 
free cash flow problems after primary SEOs. However, the secondary SEO firms do not 
underperform their benchmarks. According to Lee (1997), the market fully incorporates 
bad news of insider sales into the price on the announcement date. If the market price 
does not fully reflect the free cash flow problem, we could observe underperformance 
for primary SEOs but not for secondary SEOs. 
Using a sample of IPOs and all SEOs including pure primary and combination 
offerings, Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) find that IPO firms are similar to 
benchmark firms, but SEO firms still show some underperformance relative to various 
benchmarks. They utilize buy and hold returns, cumulative abnormal returns, and time-
series Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor model and document that model 
misspecification is an important consideration in long-term performance tests. They 
argue that using buy and hold returns tends to magnify the underperformance of IPOs 
and SEOs. The findings provide only weak evidence of abnormal post-offering 
performance for firms issuing secondary equity offerings.  
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  The main difference between primary and secondary offerings is the change in 
the number of shares outstanding after offerings. Primary offerings are essentially 
market transactions in which the issuer of the security is the seller of the security and 
receives the proceeds from the sale. Secondary offerings are market transactions in 
which the seller of the security is not the issuer and receives no proceeds. Therefore, the 
number of shares outstanding increases after primary SEOs since a primary offering 
involves the issuance of new shares. The number of shares outstanding, however, 
remains unchanged after secondary SEOs since a secondary offering is the sale of 
existing shares. Therefore, dilution may be a possible alternative factor to explain the 
difference in the long-term performance between primary and secondary SEOs.  
 Asquith and Mullins (1986) investigate the announcement effect of primary and 
secondary SEOs on stock price returns and examine the relation between dilution and 
the announcement day price reduction. Prior to an offering announcement, the average 
cumulative excess return from 490 days before until the announcement date of offerings 
is 30 percent. Their results show that a negative announcement period abnormal stock 
return is associated with the equity offering. They report that the average two-day 
announcement period return is about -3 percent. The implication is that the unfavorable 
market reaction to equity offerings is the result of the release of unfavorable 
information regarding future earnings. In other words, an equity offering announcement 
may inform the market that management believes the assets- in-place and the future 
investment opportunities are overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984), that the expected 
level of funds generated internally has been overstated (Miller and Rock, 1985), or that 
there is an increase in the likelihood that free cash flows will be investigated in negative 
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net present value projects (Jensen, 1986)15. These results may explain why firms are 
reluctant to issue new equity and tend to issue equity after a rise in stock prices. It is 
also consistent with the results of Myers and Majluf (1984) that the price reduction 
associated with equity issues varies through time and that firms respond by issuing 
equity when price reductions are relatively small.  
Asquith and Mullins measure offering dilution by the ratio of the change in the 
equity value of the firm to the proceeds of the issue. 100% dilution occurs when the 
same common stock value is divided by a larger number of shares, and the decrease in 
stock price is exactly proportional to the increase in shares outstanding. Asquith and 
Mullins (1986) argue that offering dilution between 0 and –100%16 will leave post-issue 
equity value greater than pre-announcement equity value and will result in a stock price 
reduction which is less than proportional to the increase in shares. The larger reductions 
in the stock price observed for secondary SEOs compared with primary SEOs suggest 
that secondary issues may be viewed as more pessimistic signals.  
Asquith and Mullins essentially examine the dilution in firm value from an 
offering rather than dilution in earnings. Value dilution is related to size of the offering 
and announcement effect on stock price. Larger offerings generate greater dilution in 
total firm value. Based on their measure of offering dilution, they report a greater effect 
for secondary offerings than for primary offerings. Investors are obviously more 
                                                 
15 Different explanations include transaction costs, capital structure changes, downward sloping demand 
curves, and increasing free cash flow problem [see Asquith and Mullins (1986), and McLaughlin, 
Safieddine and Vasudevan (1994)]. 
16 A ratio of 0% represents that the equity value of the firm is unchanged on announcement day. A ratio 
of -100% represents that the equity value falls by an amount equal to the new equity raised in the issue on 
announcement day.  
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pessimistic about secondary offerings than primary offerings. The effect on earnings 
dilution, however, should be the opposite.  
According to GAAP, the monthly weighted average of shares outstanding is 
used in EPS17 computations. For example, assume that a firm had 100,000 common 
shares outstanding on January 1 and issued 6,000 additional common shares on March 1. 
The weighted average would be 102,000 shares for the quarter ending March 31, or 
104,000 shares for the six months ending June 30, or 105,000 shares for the year ending 
December 31. The weighed average would be 106,000 shares for the quarter ending 
March 31 next year. Therefore, it takes one year for the additional shares to be fully 
reflected in the weighted average of shares outstanding. In other words, the weighted 
average of shares outstanding gradually captures the additional issuance of shares 
within one year.  
 Prior to the primary SEO, we assume that the original number of shares 
outstanding is N0. By definition, a primary offering is the issuance of new shares. If 
primary SEO firms sell N1 newly issued shares to investors, the new number of shares 
outstanding after primary SEOs is (N0+N1). However, analysts are likely not to consider 
the post-offering dilution effect for the primary SEOs. On the other hand, since a 
secondary offering is the sale of existing shares, the number of shares outstanding of 
                                                 
17  Share outstanding can be classified as either primary (basic EPS) or fully diluted (diluted EPS). 
Basically, basic EPS is calculated using the number of shares that have been issued and held by investors  
at the time. These are the shares that are currently in the market and can be traded. However, diluted EPS 
entails a complex calculation that determines how many shares would be outstanding if all exercisable 
warrants, options, etc. were converted into shares at a point in time, generally the end of a quarter. 
Diluted EPS is a more conservative number that calculates EPS as if all possible shares were issued and 
outstanding. The number of diluted shares can change as share prices fluctuate (as options fall into/out of 
the money), but generally the Street professional assumes the number is fixed as stated in the 10Q or 10K. 
In terms of GAPP, primary EPS incorporates the effects of dilutive common stock equivalents, and fully 
diluted EPS incorporates the effects of all dilutive convertible securities. 
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secondary SEOs should be unchanged (N0). There is no post-offering dilution following 
secondary SEOs.  
Due to the post-offering dilution, the number of shares outstanding is increasing. 
Thus, we would adjust the computation of EPS after offerings in the following steps.  
The pre-offering EPS0 is calculated as: 
0
0 N
NI
EPS = .         (3.1) 
Therefore, the net income (NI) is expressed as:  
00 NEPSNI ×= .        (3.2) 
The EPS computation after a primary SEO considers the change in the number of shares 
outstanding. In terms of the equation (3.2), if we substitute ( 00 NEPS × ) for NI in the 
equation (3.3), the post-offering EPS1 is calculated as:  
 
10
00
10
1 NN
NEPS
NN
NI
EPS
+
×
=
+
= .      (3.3) 
Consequently, the post-offering EPS1 is computed as the pre-offering EPS0 multiplied 
by the original number of shares outstanding and then divided by the total number of 
shares outstanding after SEOs. In terms of this line of reasoning, analysts should adjust 
potential dilution based on the equation (3.3). After rearranging the equation (3.3), the 
ratio of EPS1 to EPS0 should be expressed as:  
1
10
0
0
1 <
+
=
NN
N
EPS
EPS
        (3.4) 
Hence, we could conclude that  
01 EPSEPS <          (3.5) 
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In other words, EPS0 without dilution adjustment would be greater than EPS1 
with dilution adjustment. Hence, the earnings surprise is expected to be negative if the 
financial analysts do not make an adjustment for the additional shares following 
primary SEOs in their earnings forecast. Likewise, I/B/E/S stores a dilution factor for 
each company to incorporate the dilution effect. To take into account dilution effect 
after primary offerings, the analyst’s estimates should be divided by the dilution factor. 
If analysts’ estimates do not incorporate the dilution factor, then earnings forecast after 
the offering will have to be adjusted downward.  
 Brous (1992) finds that forecasts of both the current year earnings per share and 
of the five-year earnings growth are abnormally raised prior to the offering 
announcement. The forecasts of the current year earnings decrease following the 
announcement month. The finding suggests the hypothesis that the announcement to 
issue common stock conveys unfavorable information regarding the level of future 
earnings. The decrease in analysts’ forecast is positively and significantly related to the 
announcement period abnormal stock returns. Forecasts of the five-year growth of 
earnings, however, remain unchanged when firms announce a stock offering. Hence, 
equity offering announcements convey unfavorable information regarding the firm’s 
short-term, but not necessarily its long-term, earnings prospects.    
 Brous and Kini (1994) furthermore examine revisions in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts around announcements and institutional ownership, and the relation between 
revisions in analysts’ earnings forecast and institutiona l ownership. They find a 
significant positive relation between announcement period abnormal stock returns and 
institutional ownership, which lends support to the effective-monitoring hypothesis. The 
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evidence suggests that the presence of higher institutional ownership influences 
analysts’ revisions in long-term earnings forecast that are related to the announcement 
of an equity offering.  
 The optimistic expectation of the future prospects of SEO firms by market 
participants is the hypothesized source of the underperformance. Brous, Datar, and Kini 
(2001) conduct an extensive set of tests to examine the hypothesis that the long-term 
underperformance of equity issuing firms reflects the correction of optimistic 
expectations. They find that quarterly earnings announcements do not convey 
unfavorable information. The findings are inconsistent with the optimistic expectation 
hypothesis and suggest that investors’ expectations about future earnings at the time of 
the SEO are not optimistic.  
 There is little evidence showing whether dilution may play an important role in 
explaining the difference in long-term performance between primary and secondary 
issuing firms. Moreover, the earnings surprise is likely to be associated with post-
offering long-term performance. Therefore, this study investigates the difference in 
earnings surprises between primary SEOs and secondary SEOs. Moreover, we examine 
whether the post-offering dilution is associated with the earnings surprise when the 
financial analysts do not fully take into account the additional share in their earnings 
forecast. By this logic, dilution could be an alternative explanation of the difference in 
long-term performance, in addition to the overoptimism and overvaluation hypotheses.  
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3.3 Testable Hypotheses 
 A primary offering is the issuance of new shares. Hence, the number of shares 
outstanding increases after primary SEOs. However, a secondary offering is the sale of 
existing shares. The number of shares outstanding remains unchanged after secondary 
SEOs. Therefore, we expect that post-offering dilution will impact earnings surprise for 
primary offerings rather than secondary equity offerings. Greater earnings surprise for 
primary offerings would be consistent with the proposition that financial analysts do no 
fully incorporate the dilution effect in their EPS forecast. The hypotheses can be 
summarized as follows:  
H1A: Greater earnings surprises should exist for primary SEOs than secondary 
SEOs. 
 H1B: The more the dilution effect, the more the negative earnings surprise. 
 
3.4 Sample Description 
3.4.1 Sample Selection 
The initial sample for this study is from the Securities Data Corporation 
Platinum (SDC) database and consists of 2299 primary seasoned equity offerings and 
850 secondary seasoned equity offerings made dur ing the period 1980 through 1999. 
Due to our desire to examine earnings surprises for three years (12 quarters) after the 
offerings, we terminate our sample in 1999 although SEO data are available from SDC 
through 2002. The SEOs retrieved from SDC meet the following selection criteria: (1) 
all issues are US common stocks; (2) all issues are not right issues, warrants, unit issues 
and shelf registrations; (3) the issuing companies are not regulated utilities (SIC codes 
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4910 – 4949) or financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999)18; (4) the issuing firms 
must have data present on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 
COMPUSTAT Research Insight databases, and the Institutional Brokers Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S) tape earnings databases. 
For inclusion in the final sample, we require available stock returns data 
available on CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and I/B/E/S databases. In addition, if a firm has 
multiple issues, we include only the earliest issue to avoid using overlapping data to 
estimate the earnings forecast revision relation. From COMPUSTAT we retrieve the 
reported data of quarterly earnings per share which represents the date on which 
quarterly earnings per share are first publicly reported in various new media (such as the 
Wall Street Journal or the Dow Jones News Service). Availability of CRSP, 
COMPUSTAT, and I/B/E/S databases reduces the sample of primary and secondary 
SEOs to 1651 and 622, respectively. After eliminating the multiple issues by keeping 
only the earliest issue, our final sample  consists of 1258 primary SEOs and 481 
secondary SEOs.  
 
3.4.2 Distribution of SEO Firms 
Table 3.1 presents the distribution of primary and secondary offerings by year of 
the offering in Panel A, by exchange listing of the offering company in Panel B, and by 
industry in Panel C. The time distribution for the sample is similar to that of other SEO 
studies, with a reduction in offerings after 1987 that turned around by the early 1990s. 
                                                 
18 Slovin, Shushka, and Polonchek (1991) discuss the unique nature of equity offering for regulated firms.  
Due to unique disclosure requirements for financial and utilities industries, we eliminate firms in these 
industries from our sample. 
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The firms conducting primary SEOs are listed more on NASDAQ (52.15%) than on the 
NYSE (31%). Conversely, the firms conducting secondary SEOs are listed more on the 
NYSE (54.47%) than on NASDAQ (37.01%). The industry distribution shows that 
about 56.44% (57.8%) of the primary (secondary) seasoned equity issues are from 
manufacturing firms. One of the reasons for the high concentration of SEOs by 
manufacturing firms is the elimination of SEOs by utility or banking firms. 
 
3.4.3 Characteristics of SEO Firms 
Table 3.2 summarizes the characteristics of the issues and issuers for the 
primary and secondary SEOs. Except for the total assets, debt to assets ratio, book to 
market ratio, sales, and market value obtained from COMPUSTAT, other variables for 
characteristics are obtained from SDC. Total assets, debt to assets ratio, book to market 
ratio, sales, and market value are measured at the fiscal year end prior to the offerings.  
The mean and median of total assets at the fiscal year end prior to the offerings 
are $510.99 and $70.8 million for primary and $771.95 and $207.46 millions for 
secondary. The mean and median of debt to assets ratio at the fiscal year end prior to the 
offerings are 0.25 and 0.21 for primary and 0.24 and 0.21 for secondary. The mean and 
median of book to market ratio at the fiscal year end prior to the offerings are 0.41 and 
0.32 primary and 0.4 and 0.33 for secondary. The mean and median of sales at the fiscal 
year end prior to the offerings are $520.66 and $66.41 millions for primary and $907.59 
and $238.78 millions for secondary. The mean and median of market value at the fiscal 
year end prior to the offerings are $634.44 and $128.81 millions for primary and 
$983.33 and $373.64 millions for secondary. The mean and median of number of years 
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since IPO are 4.14 and 2.65 years for primary and 3.09 and 1.3 years for secondary. The 
mean and median of total amount offered (principal amount) are $51.36 and $27 
millions for primary and $92.73 and $33.1 millions for secondary.  
Relative offer size is measured by the total offer amount divided by the market 
value at the fiscal year end prior to the offering announcements. The mean and median 
of relative offer size are 0.33 and 0.24 for primary and 0.19 and 0.15 for secondary. The 
mean and median of shares offered as a percentage of shares outstanding before the 
offerings are 25.51 and 19.05 percents for primary and 14.94 and 12.11 percents for 
secondary.  
The mean and median of percentage of shares held by insiders (managers, 
officers, and directors) before the offerings are 30.2 and 26.1 percents for primary and 
37.72 and 34.95 percents for secondary. The mean and median of percentage of shares 
held by insiders after the offerings are 23.8 and 20.1 percents for primary and 29.38 and 
27.5 percents for secondary. Therefore, the offering shares for both of secondary and 
primary SEOs are mostly not held by managers. 
The mean and median of gross spread (including management fee, underwriting 
fee, selling concession, and reallowance fee) are $1.03 and $0.94 per share for primary 
and $1.15 and $1.09 per share for secondary. The mean and median of underwriting fee 
as a percentage of principal amount are 1.25 and 1.22 percents for primary and 1.04 and 
1.02 percents for secondary. The mean and median of underwriting fee as a percentage 
of gross spread are 21.87 and 21.18 percents for primary and 21.36 and 20.51 percents 
for secondary.  
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To examine the difference in characteristics between primary and secondary 
SEOs, we employ the parametric unpaired t test to test the mean and the nonparametric 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum z test to test median. The results show that the mean and median 
of total assets, sales, and market value of secondary SEO firms are significantly higher 
than that of primary SEO firms. Hence, the secondary SEO firms on average tend to be 
larger firms than primary SEO firms. Besides, the mean and median of relative offer 
size of primary SEO firms is significantly larger than that of secondary SEO firms. 
Likewise, the mean and median of shares offered as a percentage of shares outstanding 
before offer are significantly higher than that of primary and secondary SEO firms. It 
shows that the larger firms usually tend to have higher relative offer size and shares 
offered as a percentage of shares outstanding before offer. Due to difference in firm size, 
comparison of earnings surprise between primary and secondary offerings should 
incorporate firm size as a control variable.  
  
3.5 Measuring Earnings Surprise  
  The I/B/E/S database provides forecasts from analysts employed at over 700 
brokerage firms that cover more than 6500 firms. The actual number of analysts’ 
forecasts collected for each firm ranges from one to fifty-three. I/B/E/S contains data for 
up to three annual fiscal periods, four quarterly fiscal periods, and long-term growth. 
We use forecast period indicator to identify estimates for each unique period from File 1 
of I/B/E/S. Then we retrieve the actual earnings from File 2 of I/B/E/S. The earnings 
surprise is defined as the difference in actual earnings per share and the forecasted 
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earnings per share. We use the quarterly consensus estimate EPS and actual EPS to 
calculate the earnings surprise as follows:  
     ESi,t = AEi,t – FEi,t.,         (3.6) 
where ESi,t is the earnings surprise (forecast error) for firm i at quarter t. AEi,t is the 
actual EPS for firm i at quarter t, and FEi,t is the forecasted EPS for firm i at quarter t. 
  We investigate the patterns of the earning forecast errors (surprises) and the 
earning forecast revisions after the post-offering first, second, third, and forth quarterly 
earning announcement dates. In Figure 3.1, after SEO offering dates we find the first, 
second, third and forth quarterly earning announcement dates19. We use the first, second, 
third, and forth quarterly earnings announcement dates as our event date (t = 0), 
respectively.  
  According to GAAP, it takes one year to fully incorporate the dilution based on 
the computation of the weighted average of shares. A negative earnings surprise could 
therefore occur for an entire year following primary offerings.  
 
3.7 Empirical Results 
3.7.1 Univariate Analysis 
3.7.1.1 Earnings Surprise Pattern Analysis 
 Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present earnings surprise patterns for primary and secondary 
SEOs, respectively. Quarter 0 indicates the first, second, third, and fourth quarterly 
earnings announcement date following the offerings in Panel A, B, C and D, 
                                                 
19 If we could not find the first quarterly earnings announcement date within 3 months after offering dates, 
truncated data are included in analysis. In addition, the sample firms have complete four continuous 
quarterly earnings announcement dates after offerings.  
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respectively. In Table 3.3, we find that earnings surprises are significant and negative 
following primary SEOs. This result is consistent with the proposition that financial 
analysts do not fully incorporate the effect of additional shares in their earnings 
forecasts. In Table 3.4, however, there is no evidence of negative earnings surprise from 
quarter 0 to 9 following the secondary SEOs since there is no dilution for the secondary 
SEOs. Consequently, in addition to the signaling effect of the overvaluation of equity at 
the time of issue, a dilution effect would be one of the possible explanations for the 
poor post-offering performance and negative earnings surprise.  
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 depict the earnings surprise pattern surrounding the first 
quarterly earnings announcements after primary and secondary SEOs, respectively. The 
earnings surprise patterns surrounding the second, third and fourth quarterly earnings 
announcements after primary and secondary SEOs are also shown in Figurers 3.4, 3.5, 
3.6, 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9.  
According to Figures 3.2 and 3.3, earnings surprises are all negative following 
primary SEOs. Earnings surprises are not negative in quarters 1, 2, 3, and 4 following 
secondary SEOs. The fact that the earning surprise appears to be negative due to the 
increases in the number of shares outstanding after offe rings based on the assumption 
that financial analysts do not fully consider the effect of dilution in forecasting EPS. On 
average, we also find that it takes analysts about one year (four quarters) to fully make 
adjustments for dilution following SEOs. 
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3.7.1.2 Earnings Surprise Comparisons  
 The parametric unpaired t test and nonparametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum z test are 
employed to test differences in earnings surprise between primary and secondary SEOs. 
In Table 3.5, we find that there significant difference in earnings surprise between 
primary and secondary SEOs from quarter 2 to 4. The results show that the earnings 
surprise for the primary SEOs is lower than for the secondary SEOs. It indicates that 
primary SEOs have greater negative earnings surprise than secondary SEOs.  
 
3.7.2 Regression Analysis 
 Using the following regression model, we investigate the relation between 
earnings surprise and dilution measured by shares offered as percentage of shares 
outstanding before the offer.   
ES = a + ß1  OFFER/OUT + ß2  Log(MV-1) + e.       (3.7) 
The dependent variable ES is earnings surprise measured by the difference 
between the actual quarterly EPS and estimated EPS. OFFER/OUT measures the 
dilution effect and is calculated by shares offered as percentage of shares outstanding 
before offer. Log(MV) is the natural log of the market value measured at the fiscal year 
end before the offering. In the regression of earnings surprise on dilution, we use the 
market value as a control variable, due to differences in firm size between primary and 
secondary SEO firms reported in Table 3.2.  
Panel A of Table 3.6 presents that there is a significant and positive relation 
between earnings surprise and dilution for the primary SEOs in quarters 1, 2 and 4 
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following offerings at the 0.01, 0.1, and 0.05 levels, respectively. However, Panel B of 
Table 3.6 shows that there is no relation between earnings surprise and dilution for 
secondary SEOs, which is expected since there is no dilution effect. The results 
conclude that primary SEOs have greater negative earnings surprise due to dilution 
effect. Meanwhile, the more dilution the more negative earnings surprise for the 
primary SEOs. Therefore, the results show a positive relation between dilution effect 
and negative earnings surprise.   
 
3.8 Summary and Conclusions  
Previous studies document a number of possible explanations for the poor 
subsequent performance of issuing firms. These explanations include overvaluation, 
overoptimism, and free cash flow problem. Our study extends the explanations for poor 
performance to considering the effect of earnings dilution. The purpose of this study is 
to examine whether the post-offering dilution can explain some post-offering 
performance of issuing companies. This study is one of first attempts to link the earning 
surprise and dilution effect. It is consistent with proposition that financial analysts do 
not fully consider the effect of additional shares in forecasting EPS.  
Since the difference between primary and secondary offerings is the change in 
the number of shares outstanding after an offering, we cannot exclude the possibility 
that the difference in the long-term performance between the primary and secondary 
SEOs could be attributed to the dilution effect. Therefore, in addition to the signaling 
effect of overvaluation of equity at the time of issue and the effect of free cash flow 
problem, the dilution effect could be an alternative explanation contributing to the poor 
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post-offering performance and negative earnings surprise. The results show that the 
difference in the earnings surprise between primary and secondary SEOs is due to the 
dilution effect.  
We find that no evidence of negative earnings surprise following the secondary 
equity offerings. There is also no dilution effect since the number of shares outstanding 
remain unchanged after offerings. However, we document a significant and negative 
earnings surprise following primary seasoned offerings. The result is consistent with 
proposition that financial analysts do not fully incorporate the effect of increases in the 
number of shares outstanding after offerings in their earnings forecast.  
83 
   
List of References 
 
1. Aharony, Joseph, Chan-Jane Lin and Martin P. Loeb, 1993, “Initial Public 
Offerings, Accounting Choices, and Earnings Management,” Contemporary 
Accounting Research 10 (1), 61-81. 
2. Alexander, John C., Jr., 1992, “Earnings Surprise, Market Efficiency, and 
Expectations,” Financial Review 27 (4), 475-502. 
3. Asquith, Paul and David W. Mullins, Jr., 1986, “Equity Issues and Offering 
Dilution,” Journal of Financial Economics 15 (1/2), 61-89. 
4. Barber, Brad M. and John D. Lyon, 1997, “Detecting Long-Run Abnormal Stock 
Returns: The Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistics,” Journal of 
Financial Economics 43 (3), 341-372. 
5. Bayless, Mark and Susan Chaplinsky, 1996, “Is there a ‘Window Of 
Opportunity’ for Seasoned Equity Issuance?” Journal of Finance 96 (51), 253-
278. 
6. Boyer, Patricia A. and Charles H. Gibson, 1979, “How about Earnings Per 
Share?,” CPA Journal 49 (2), 36-42. 
7. Brav, Alon, Christopher Geczy and Paul A. Gompers, 2000, “Is the Abnormal 
Return Following Equity Issuances Anomalous?,” Journal of Financial 
Economics 56 (2), 209-250. 
8. Brav, Alon and Paul A. Gompers, 1997, “Myth or Reality? The Long-Run 
Underperformance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and 
Nonventure Capital-Backed Companies,” Journal of Finance 2 (5), 1791-1821. 
9. Brous, Peter Alan, 1992, “Common Stock Offerings and Earnings Expectations: 
A Test of the Release on Unfavorable Information,” Journal of Finance 47 (4), 
1517-1536. 
10. Brous, Peter A. and Omesh Kini, 1994, “The Valuation Effects of Equity Issues 
and the Level of Institutional Ownership: Evidence from Analysts' Earnings 
Forecasts,” Financial Management 23 (1), 33-46. 
11. Brous, Peter A., Vinay Datar and Omesh Kini, 2001, “Is the Market Optimistic 
about the Future Earnings of Seasoned Equity Offering Firms?,” Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 36 (2), 141-168. 
84 
   
12. Christie, Andrew A. and Jerold L. Zimmerman, 1994, “Efficient and 
Opportunistic Choices of Accounting Procedures: Corporate Control Contests,” 
Accounting Review 1994 (4), 539-566. 
13. Chung, Dennis Y. and Jason Lee, 1998, “Ownership Structure and Trading 
Volume Reaction to Earnings Announcements: Evidence from Japan,” Pacific-
Basin Finance Journal 6 (1-2), 45-60. 
14. D’Mello, Ranjan, Oranee Tawatnuntacha, and Devrim Yaman, 2002, “Analysis 
of Announcement Returns for Firms that Conduct Multiple Seasoned Equity 
Offerings,” paper presented at 2002 meetings of the Financial Management 
Association, San Antonio, Texas.   
15. DeAngelo, Linda E., 1986, “Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation 
Substitutes: A Study of Management Buyouts of Public Stockholders,” 
Accounting Review 61 (3), 400-420. 
16. DeAngelo, Linda E., 1988, “Managerial Competition, Information Costs, and 
Corporate Governance: The Use of Accounting Performance Measures in Proxy 
Contests,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 1988 (10), 3-36. 
17. Dempsey, Stephen J., Herbert G. Hunt, III and Nicholas W. Schroeder, 1993, 
“Earnings Management and Corporate Ownership Structure: An Examination of 
Extraordinary Item Reporting,” Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 20 
(4), 479-500. 
18. Denis, David J. and Atulya Sarin, 2001, “Is the Market Surprised by Poor 
Earnings Realizations Following Seasoned Equity Offerings?,” Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 36 (2), 169-193. 
19. Denning, Karen C., Stephen P. Ferris and Glen Wolfe, 1992, “IPO Underpricing, 
Firm Quality, and Subsequent Reissuance Activity,” Journal of Small Business 
Finance 2 (1), 71-86. 
20. DuCharme, Larry L., Paul H. Malatesta and Stephan E. Sefcik, forthcoming, 
“Earnings Management, Stock Issues, and Shareholder Lawsuits,” Journal of 
Financial Economics.  
21. Eckbo, E. Espen, Ronald W. Masulis and Oyvind Norli, 2000, “Seasoned Public 
Offerings: Resolution of the ‘New Issues Puzzle’,” Journal of Financial 
Economics 56 (2), 251-291. 
22. Ederington, Louis H. and Jeremy C. Goh, 1998, “Bond Rating Agencies and 
Stock Analysts: Who Knows What When?,” Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 33 (4), 569-585. 
85 
   
23. Fama, Eugene F. and Kenneth R. French, 1992, “The Cross-Section of Expected 
Stock Returns,” Journal of Finance 47(2), 427-466. 
24. Fama, Eugene F. and Kenneth R. French, 1993, “Common Risk Factors in the 
Returns on Stocks and Bonds,” Journal of Financial Economics 33 (1), 3-56. 
25. Fama, Eugene F. and Kenneth R. French, 1995, “Size and Book-to-Market 
Factors in Earnings and Returns,” Journal of Finance 50 (1), 131-155. 
26. Fama, Eugene F. and Kenneth R. French, 1996, “Multifactor Explanation of 
Asset Pricing Anomalies,” Journal of Finance 51 (1), 55-84. 
27. Fulghieri, Paolo and Dmitry Lukin, 2001, “Information Production, Dilution 
Costs, and Optimal Security Design,” Journal of Financial Economics 61 (1), 3-
42. 
28. Gabrielsen, Gorm, Jeffrey D. Gramlich and Thomas Plenborg, 2002, “Managerial 
Ownership, Information Content of Earnings, and Discretionary Accruals in a 
Non-US Setting,” Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 29 (7/8), 967-988. 
29. Gao, Pengjie and Ronald E. Shrieves, 2002, “Earnings Management and 
Executive Compensation: a Case of Overdose of Option and Underdose of 
Salary?,” Working Paper, University of Tennessee, Tennessee.  
30. Gerard, Bruno and Vikram Nanda, 1993, “Trading and Manipulation around 
Seasoned Equity Offerings,” Journal of Finance 48 (1), 213-246. 
31. Gombola, Michael, Hei Wai Lee and Feng-Ying Liu, 1997, “Evidence on Selling 
by Managers after Seasoned Equity Offering Announcements,” Financial 
Management 26 (3), 38-53. 
32. Gombola, Michael J., Hei Wai Lee and Feng-Ying Liu, 1999, “Further Evidence 
on Insider Selling Prior to Seasoned Equity Offering Announcements: The Role 
of Growth Opportunities,” Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 26 (5/6), 
621-649. 
33. Gombola, Michael J. and Feng-Ying Liu, 1999, “The Signaling Power of 
Specially Designated Dividends,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
34 (3), 409-424. 
34. Groff, James E. and Charlotte J. Wright, 1989, “The Market for Corporate 
Control and its Implications for Accounting Policy Choice,” Advances in 
Accounting 1989 (7), 3-21. 
86 
   
35. Guo, Lin and Timothy S. Mech, 2000, “Conditional Event Studies, Anticipation, 
and Asymmetric Information: The Case of Seasoned Equity Issues and Pre-Issue 
Information Releases,” Journal of Empirical Finance 7 (2), 113-141. 
36. Hansen, Robert S. and Claire Crutchley, 1990, “Corporate Earnings and 
Financing: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Business 63, 347-371. 
37. Healy, Paul M., and Krishna G. Palepu, 1990, “Earnings and Risk Changes 
Surrounding Primary Stock Offers,” Journal of Accounting Research 28, 25-48. 
38. Hess, Alan C. and Peter A. Frost, 1982, “Tests for Price Effects of New Issues of 
Seasoned Securities,” Journal of Finance 37 (1), 11-25. 
39. Hochberg, Yael V., 2002, “Venture Capital and Corporate Governance in the 
Newly Public Firm,” Working paper, Stanford University, CA.  
40. Huson, Mark R., Thomas W. Soctt and Heather A. Wier, 2001, “Earnings 
Dilution and the Explanatory Power of Earnings for Returns,” Accounting 
Review 76 (4), 589-612. 
41. Jegadeesh, Narashimhan, 2000, “Long-Term Performance of Seasoned Equity 
Offerings: Benchmark Errors and Biases in Expectations,” Financial 
Management 29 (3), 5-30. 
42. Jensen, Michael C., 1986, “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, 
and Takeovers,” American Economic Review 76 (2), 323-329. 
43. John, Kose and Joseph Williams, 1985, “Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A 
Signalling Equilibrium,” Journal of Finance 40 (4), 1053-1070. 
44. Jones, Jennifer J., 1991, “Earnings Management during Import Relief 
Investigations,” Journal of Accounting Research 29 (2), 193-228. 
45. Lamm-Tennant, Joan and Theresa Rollins, 1994, “Incentives for Discretionary 
Accounting Practices: Ownership Structure, Earnings, Size, and Taxation,” 
Journal of Risk and Insurance 61 (3), 476-491. 
46. Lee, Hei Wai, 1997, “Post Offering Earnings Performance of Firms that Issue 
Seasoned Equity: The Role of Growth Opportunities,” Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance 37 (1), 97-114. 
47. Lee, Inmoo, 1997, “Do Firms Knowingly Sell Overvalued Equity?,” Journal of 
Finance 52 (4), 1439-1466. 
87 
   
48. Lin, J.R. Philip, 2003, “The Long-Run Underperformance of Post-Listing Stock 
Returns: The Evidence of Earnings Management,” paper presented at 2003 
meetings of the American Finance Association, Washington, DC.   
49. Loughran, Tim and Jay R. Ritter, 1995, “The New Issues Puzzle,” Journal of 
Finance 50 (1), 23-51. 
50. Loughran, Tim and Jay R. Ritter, 1997, “The Operating Performance of Firms 
Conducting Seasoned Equity Offerings,” Journal of Finance 52 (5), 1823-1850. 
51. Lyon, John D., Brad M. Barber and Chih-Ling Tsai, 1999, “Improved Methods 
for Tests of Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns,” Journal of Finance 54 (1), 165-
201. 
52. Masulis, Ronald W. and Ashok N. Korwar, 1986, “Seasoned Equity Offerings: 
An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Financial Economics 15(1/2), 91-118. 
53. McLaughlin, Robyn, Assem Safieddine, and Gopala Vasudevan, 1996, “The 
Operating Performance of Seasoned Equity Issuers: Free Cash Flow and Post-
Issue Performance,” Financial Management 25 (4), 41-53. 
54. Miller, Merton H. and Kevin Rock, 1985, “Dividend Policy under Asymmetric 
Information,” Journal of Finance 40 (4), 1031-1051. 
55. Mitchell, Mark L. and Erik Stafford, 2000, “Managerial Decisions and Long-
Term Stock Price Performance,” Journal of Business 73(3), 289-329. 
56. Myers, Stewart C. and Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984, “Corporate Financing and 
Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not 
Have,” Journal of Financial Economics 13 (2), 187-221. 
57. O'Brien, Patricia C, 1988, “Analysts' Forecasts as Earnings Expectations,” 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 10 (1), 53-83. 
58. Perry, Susan E. and Thomas H. Williams, 1994, “Earnings Management 
Preceding Management Buyout Offers,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 
18 (2), 157-179. 
59. Pilotte, Eugene and Timothy Manuel, 1996, “The Market's Response to 
Recurring Events: The Case of Stock Splits,” Journal of Financial Economics 41 
(1), 111-127. 
60. Rangan, Srinivasan, 1998, “Earnings Management and the Performance of 
Seasoned Equity Offerings,” Journal of Financial Economics 50 (1), 101-122. 
88 
   
61. Shivakumar, Lakshmanan, 2000, “Do Firms Mislead Investors by Overstating 
Earnings before Seasoned Equity Offerings,” Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 29 (3), 339-371. 
62. Slovin, Myron B., Marie E. Shushka and John A. Polonchek, 1991, “The 
Information Content of Multiple Seasoned Common Stock Offerings by Bank 
Holding Companies,” Journal of Banking and Finance 15, 633-646. 
63. Slovin, M.B., M.E. Sushka and K.W.L. Lai, 2000, “Alternative Flotation 
Methods, Adverse Selection, and Ownership Structure: Evidence from Seasoned 
Equity Issuance in the U.K.,” Journal of Financial Economics 57 (2), 157-190. 
64. Spiess, D. Katherine and John Affleck-Graves, 1995, “Underperformance in 
Long-Run Stock Returns Following Seasoned Equity Offerings,” Journal of 
Financial Economics 38 (3), 243-267. 
65. Spiess, D. Katherine and Richard H. Pettway, 1997, “The IPO and First Seasoned 
Equity Sale: Issue Proceeds, Owner/Managers' Wealth, and the Underpricing 
Signal,” Journal of Banking and Finance 21 (7), 967-988. 
66. Szewczyk, Samuel H., 1992, “The Intra-Industry Transfer of Information 
Inferred from Announcements of Corporate Security Offerings,” Journal of 
Finance 47 (5), 1935-1945. 
67. Szewczyk, Samuel H. and George P. Tsetsekos, 1993, “The Effect of Managerial 
Ownership on Stock Split-Induced Abnormal Returns,” Financial Review 28 (3), 
351-370. 
68. Tamura, Hiromichi, 2002, “Individual-Analyst Characteristics and Forecast 
Error,” Financial Analyst Journal 58 (4), 28-35. 
69. Teoh, Siew H., Ivo Welch and T. J. Wong, 1998a, “Earnings Management and 
the Long-Run Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings,” Journal of 
Finance 53 (6), 1935-1974. 
70. Teoh, Siew H., Ivo Wlech and T.J. Wong, 1998b, “Earnings Management and the 
Underperformance of Seasoned Equity Offerings,” Journal of Financial 
Economics 50 (1), 63-99. 
71. Welch, Ivo, 1989, “Seasoned Offerings, Imitation Costs, and the Underpricing of 
Initial Public Offerings,” Journal of Finance 44 (2), 421-450. 
72. Wu, Y. Woody, 1997, “Management Buyouts and Earnings Management,” 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance12 (4), 373-389. 
89 
   
Appendix A: Tables 
 
Table 1.1: Distribution of Recurring Primary SEO Sample from 1980-1999 
The sample consists of 509 primary SEOs made by 216 companies at least twice with non-contaminated 
announcement dates from 1980 to 1999. The sample is identified through CRSP and COMPUSTAT.  
Panel A: Time Distribution 
Issue Year Number of Issues  % of Sample 
1980 25 4.91 
1981 23 4.52 
1982 20 3.93 
1983 61              11.98 
1984 18 3.54 
1985 24 4.72 
1986 26 5.11 
1987 23 4.52 
1988   8 1.57 
1989 11 2.16 
1990 10 1.96 
1991 43 8.45 
1992 29 5.70 
1993 39 7.66 
1994 27 5.30 
1995 38 7.47 
1996 37 7.27 
1997 21 4.13 
1998 11 2.16 
1999 15 2.95 
Total                        509          100.00 
Panel B: Exchange Listing Distribution 
Exchange Number of Issues  % of Sample 
NYSE 203 39.88 
Nasdaq 247 48.53 
AMEX   25   4.91 
Other   34   6.68 
Total 509           100.00 
Panel C: Industry Distribution  
Industry SIC Codes Number of Issues  % of 
Sample 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 0000 – 0999  2 0.39 
Mining 1000 – 1499 50 9.82 
Construction 1500 – 1999  2 0.39 
Manufacturing 2000 – 3999             305     59.92 
Transportation and Public Utility 4000 – 4999 38 7.47 
Wholesale Trade 5000 – 5199 12 2.36 
Retail Trade 5200 – 5999 38 7.47 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 6000 – 6999   0 0.00 
Services 7000 – 8999 62     12.18 
Total  509     100.00 
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Table 1.2: Frequency of Recurring Primary SEO Sample from 1980-1999 
The sample consists of 509 primary SEOs made by 216 companies at least twice with non-
contaminated announcement dates from 1980 to 1999. The sample is identified through 
CRSP and COMPUSTAT. Sample firms do not necessarily have a complete set of desired 
COMPUSTAT data for every SEO they issued. 
Panel A: Number of Issues 
Number of recurring SEOs Number of Issues % of Issues 
1 216 42.44 
2 216 42.44 
3   57 11.20 
4   14   2.75 
5    3   0.59 
6    1   0.20 
7    1   0.20 
8    1   0.20 
Total 509           100.00 
Panel B:  Number of Firms  
Number of recurring SEOs Number of Firms % of Firms 
2 159 73.61 
3  43 19.91 
4  11  5.09 
5    2  0.93 
6    0  0.00 
7    0  0.00 
8    1  0.46 
Total                      216           100.00 
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Table 1.3: Characteristics of Recurring Primary SEO Sample from 1980-1999 
Total assets, debt to assets ratio, book to market ratio, sales, and market value are measured at the fiscal year end 
before the offering announcement date. 
  Mean  
Std. 
Dev. Min 
First 
Quartile  Median 
Third 
Quartile  Max N 
Time Interval 
between Sequent 
SEOs (Year) 
3.12 2.82 0.05 1.12 2.18 4.08 16.98 293 
Number of Years 
since IPO 6.37 5.12 0.28 2.63 4.61 9.01 22.74 291 
Total Assets -1                
($ Millions) 
557.07 1118.38 1.32 44.45 127.93 448.26 7027.00 341 
Debt to Assets -1 0.22 0.19 0.00 0.05 0.19 0.36 0.99 341 
Book to Market 
Ratio-1 
0.47 0.34 0.02 0.25 0.39 0.58 2.87 328 
Sales -1 ($ Millions) 512.24 1221.44 0.00 13.65 80.40 415.62 11938.47 341 
Market Value-1             
($ Millions) 475.40 880.27 4.88 90.58 191.67 516.33 7800.32 336 
Total Amount 
Offered ($ Millions) 60.31 81.45 0.90 17.60 34.20 68.00 725.60 503 
Total Offer Amount 
/Market Value-1 
0.26 0.21 0.01 0.14 0.21 0.33 1.50 336 
Total Shares Offered 
(Milllions) 2.73 3.00 0.10 1.00 2.00 3.00 25.00 503 
Shares Offered as % 
of Shares 
Outstanding Before 
Offer 
20.82 35.18 2.03 9.91 16.11 22.42 627.85 364 
% of Shares Held by 
Insiders before Offer 21.86 16.49 0.65 9.46 18.10 29.65 70.10 76 
% of Shares Held by 
Insiders after Offer 17.90 13.91 0.54 7.29 14.70 26.20 57.70 75 
Gross Spread  
($ per Share) 1.05 0.52 0.01 0.69 0.97 1.35 4.28 498 
Underwriting Fee as 
% of Principal 
Amount 
1.14 0.34 0.21 0.90 1.13 1.36 3.75 434 
Underwriting Fee as 
% of Gross Spread 21.56 3.20 8.89 20.00 20.91 23.33 41.67 434 
    
Table 1.4: Average Abnormal Returns Surrounding Recurring SEO Announcement 
The sample consists of 509 primary SEOs made by 216 companies at least twice with non-contaminated announcement dates from 1980 to 1999. This table report s the 
average abnormal returns of the daily and selected windows for the entire, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th SEOs samples. Day 0 is the announcement date for SEOs. We use a two-day 
announcement window (0, +1) to measure the market reaction to the SEO announcement. Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using standard 
event study methodology. We calculate abnormal returns using the market model, with the CRSP equally weighted index as a proxy for the market return. Abnormal returns 
are computed as the prediction error ei,t in the market model (R i,t= a i+ ßiRm,t+ ei,t) as follows: AR i,t = Ri,t -  E(Ri,t) where Ri,t represents the continuously compounded rates of 
return on stock i on day t and Rm,t represents the equally-weighted CRSP index on day  t. Expected returns  E(Ri,t) for each day from day –40 through +40 are calculated as the 
prediction value based on the market return that day. We estimate the coefficients (a and ß) of the market model by ordinary least squares regression over the 255 day period 
(-300, -46) that begins 300 trading days before the announcement date and ends 46 trading days before the announcement. All returns are reported in percent.  
Panel A: Entire Sample (509 SEOs) Panel B: 1st SEOs (216 SEOs) Panel C: 2nd SEOs (216 SEOs)  
Day 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
(%) 
t-statistic % Negative N 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
(%) 
t-statistic 
% 
Negative N 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
(%) 
t-statistic 
% 
Negative N 
-5 -0.27  -2.08 **   57.94 504 -0.21  -1.08     57.94 213 -0.35  -1.70 * 57.94 214 
-4 -0.07  -0.41      50.47 504 -0.18  -0.79     50.47 213 -0.05  -0.20     50.47 214 
-3 0.08  0.56      54.21 504 0.07  0.28     54.21 213 0.07  0.32     54.21 214 
-2 -0.42  -2.93 ***  53.27 504 -0.70  -3.27 *** 53.27 213 -0.21  -0.98     53.27 214 
-1 -0.34  -2.38 **   56.54 504 -0.42  -1.95 * 56.54 213 -0.49  -2.00 ** 56.54 214 
0 -1.14  -6.88 ***  63.08 504 -1.15  -4.44 *** 63.08 213 -1.10  -4.07 *** 63.08 214 
1 -0.82  -5.18 ***  66.36 504 -0.83  -2.98 *** 66.36 213 -0.97  -4.53 *** 66.36 214 
2 -0.01  -0.08      53.27 504 -0.19  -0.79     53.27 213 0.00  0.02     53.27 214 
3 -0.11  -0.81      57.94 504 0.12  0.57     57.94 213 -0.24  -1.19     57.94 214 
4 0.00  0.01      62.62 504 0.09  0.38     62.62 213 -0.01  -0.06     62.62 214 
5 0.20  1.13      49.53 504 0.02  0.07     49.53 213 0.52  1.60     49.53 214 
Event 
Period 
CAR (%) t-statistic 
% 
Negative N 
CAR (%) t-statistic 
% 
Negative N 
CAR (%) t-statistic 
% 
Negative N 
(-40,-21) 3.40   4.48 *** 36.45 504 1.23   1.14      36.45 213 4.74   3.87 *** 36.45 214 
(-20,-1)   0.33  0.48     43.93 504 -1.33  -1.29      43.93 213 1.37  1.19     43.93 214 
(0,+1)   -1.97  -9.32 *** 68.22 504 -1.98  -5.40 ***  68.22 213 -2.07  -6.88 *** 68.22 214 
(+2,+20) -1.69  -3.00 *** 62.15 504 -1.71  -1.83 * 62.15 213 -2.15  -2.59 *** 62.15 214 
(+21,+40) -3.04   -4.89 *** 58.41 504 -4.11   -4.18 ***  58.41 213 -2.40   -2.49 ** 58.41 214 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
    
Table 1.4 (Continued) 
Panel D: 3rd SEOs (57 SEOs) Panel E: 4th SEOs (14 SEOs) 
Day 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
(%) 
t-statistic % Negative N 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
(%) 
t-statistic 
% 
Negative N 
-5 -0.13  -0.28     50.00 57 0.14  0.34    50.00 14 
-4 -0.09  -0.18     42.86 57 0.96  1.03    42.86 14 
-3 0.32  0.75     78.57 57 -0.95  -1.58    78.57 14 
-2 0.35  0.83     57.14 57 -1.51  -1.52    57.14 14 
-1 0.21  0.61     42.86 57 0.44  0.79    42.86 14 
0 -1.21  -2.89 *** 78.57 57 -1.23  -2.39   ** 78.57 14 
1 -0.71  -1.56     42.86 57 0.12  0.15    42.86 14 
2 0.51  1.19     50.00 57 -0.15  -0.23    50.00 14 
3 -0.28  -0.78     57.14 57 -0.30  -0.54    57.14 14 
4 -0.33  -0.52     42.86 57 0.59  0.86    42.86 14 
5 -0.22  -0.49     35.71 57 0.85  1.47    35.71 14 
Event 
Period 
CAR (%) t-statistic 
% 
Negative N 
CAR (%) t-statistic 
% 
Negative N 
(-40,-21) 4.39   2.18  ** 42.86 57 11.51   1.72  * 42.86 14 
(-20,-1)   2.49  1.49     57.14 57 0.41  0.15  57.14 14 
(0,+1)   -1.92  -3.57  *** 71.43 57 -1.11  -1.21  71.43 14 
(+2,+20) -0.20  -0.13     64.29 57 -1.70  -0.64  64.29 14 
(+21,+40) -2.31   -1.28     50.00 57 -0.13   -0.05   50.00 14 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
    
 
Table 1.5: Mean Standardized Earnings Changes (by Market Value) Surrounding Recurring SEO Announcement 
To measure the operating performance, we employ the standardized earnings changes (SEC) by market value. The earnings measures include net operating 
income (NOI), earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), and earnings per share (EPS) before extraordinary items and discontinued operations. The NOI and 
standardized EBIT are scaled by dividing by the market value for the fiscal year end preceding the announcement. The standardized EPS measure is scaled by 
dividing by the market value per share for the fiscal year end preceding the announcement. The SEO announcement date falls in year 0. Sample sizes depend 
on earnings data availability in COMPUSTAT. All earnings changes are reported in percent. 
 
Entire Sample 1st SEOs 2nd SEOs 3rd SEOs 4th SEOs Fiscal 
Year 
Relative 
to SEO 
SEC 
(%) 
t-stat N 
SEC 
(%) 
t-stat N 
SEC 
(%) 
t-stat N 
SEC 
(%) 
t-stat N 
SEC 
(%) 
t-stat N 
Panel A: Net Operating Income (NOI) 
-2 2.15 2.16 ** 241 2.19 1.58  55 2.77 1.62  127 1.22 0.94  47 -0.87 -0.25  10 
-1 0.79 1.61  288 1.19 1.07  83 0.90 1.47  146 -0.98 -0.91  47 4.78 2.10 * 10 
0 2.39 4.19 *** 320 1.89 2.75 *** 108 3.09 3.11 *** 155 1.43 1.03  45 1.02 0.69  10 
1 0.64 1.28  358 -0.15 -0.27  144 0.49 0.57  158 2.88 1.6  43 4.11 1.60  11 
2 0.48 0.37  358 0.87 0.75  146 -0.06 -0.02  156 -0.03 -0.04  41 4.92 1.54  12 
3 1.42 1.51  332 3.16 1.62  139 0.22 0.24  139 1.97 1.08  40 -6.54 -1.66  11 
Panel B: Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT)  
-2 2.73 3.49 *** 250 3.67 1.87 * 57 2.96 2.81 *** 134 2.05 1.51  47 -1.58 -0.36  10 
-1 2.28 2.95 *** 298 2.72 1.96 * 86 2.89 2.38 ** 153 -0.51 -0.42  47 3.21 1.19  10 
0 3.73 6.00 *** 338 3.30 4.27 *** 116 4.22 3.94 *** 163 3.18 2.08 ** 47 2.63 1.09  10 
1 1.41 2.56 ** 383 0.72 1.03  154 1.24 1.37  171 3.14 1.72 * 45 6.42 1.57  11 
2 1.82 1.83 * 379 2.01 1.41  157 1.81 1.01  164 0.39 0.31  43 5.01 0.97  12 
3 2.40 2.41 * 351 3.82 1.97 * 148 1.02 1.38  147 4.82 1.37  42 -6.82 -1.00  11 
Panel C: Earnings per Share (EPS) 
-2 0.04 2.26 ** 249 2.96 1.62  57 5.06 1.65  133 1.86 0.75  47 6.19 0.96  10 
-1 0.88 0.84  298 4.38 2.59 ** 86 -0.67 -0.39  153 -0.13 -0.07  47 0.24 0.07  10 
0 3.02 4.65 *** 337 1.50 2.07 ** 115 3.85 3.54 *** 163 3.57 1.81 * 47 3.86 1.31  10 
1 0.19 0.30  383 0.26 0.34  154 -0.50 -0.45  171 1.37 0.88  45 4.80 1.65  11 
2 -0.36 -0.26  379 -0.16 -0.11  157 -0.60 -0.21  164 -0.31 -0.3  43 0.10 0.02  12 
3 1.71 1.32  351 3.50 1.66 * 148 -0.15 -0.11  147 1.96 0.33  42 1.24 0.18  11 
         ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
    
Table 1.6: Mean Standardized Earnings Changes (by Total Assets) Surrounding Recurring SEO Announcement 
To measure the operating performance, we employ the standardized earnings changes (SEC) by total assets. The earnings measures include net operating income (NOI), 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), and earnings per share (EPS) before extraordinary items and discontinued operations. The NOI and standardized EBIT are scaled by 
dividing by the total assets for the fiscal year end preceding the announcement. The standardized EPS measure is scaled by dividing by the total assets per share for the fiscal 
year end preceding the announcement. The SEO announcement date falls in year 0. Sample sizes depend on earnings data availability in COMPUSTAT. All earnings changes 
are reported in percent. 
Entire Sample 1st SEOs 2nd SEOs  3rd SEOs 4th SEOs Fiscal 
Year 
Relative 
to SEO 
SEC 
(%) t-stat N 
SEC 
(%) t-stat N 
SEC 
(%) t-stat N 
SEC 
(%) t-stat N 
SEC 
(%) t-stat N 
Panel A: Net Operating Income (NOI) 
-2 -1.37 -0.86  272 0.51 0.21  77 -3.69 -1.31  136 1.22 0.94  47 1.60 1.63  10 
-1 -3.06 -2.09 ** 310 -7.74 -1.88 * 102 -1.03 -0.97  149 -0.98 -0.91  47 2.98 2.84 ** 10 
0 -0.79 -0.93  327 -3.83 -2.11 ** 115 0.79 0.72  155 1.43 1.03  45 3.24 1.68  10 
1 -0.09 -0.14  358 -1.72 -1.93 * 144 1.14 0.96  158 2.88 1.60  43 2.16 1.90 * 11 
2 0.66 0.93  358 -0.50 -0.48  146 1.54 1.28  156 0.01 0.01  42 6.98 1.16  12 
3 1.65 2.08 ** 332 2.09 1.39  139 0.87 0.98  139 2.04 1.14  41 -2.08 -2.09 * 11 
Panel B: Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT)  
-2 -0.72 -0.44  282 0.43 0.15  80 -2.62 -0.96  143 2.05 1.51  47 2.36 1.69  10 
-1 -2.09 -1.42  324 -6.40 -1.60  108 -0.16 -0.14  157 -0.51 -0.42  47 3.44 1.87 * 10 
0 0.76 0.79  346 -2.61 -1.37  124 2.70 2.00 ** 163 3.18 2.08 ** 47 4.69 2.14 * 10 
1 0.68 0.98  383 -0.67 -0.66  154 1.80 1.50  171 3.14 1.72 * 45 2.60 2.10 * 11 
2 1.09 1.46  379 0.26 0.23  157 1.82 1.45  164 0.49 0.40  44 1.84 1.27  12 
3 2.41 2.96 *** 351 2.62 1.74 * 148 1.66 1.84 * 147 4.81 1.40  43 -1.83 -1.13  11 
Panel C: Earnings per Share (EPS) 
-2 2.93 3.22 *** 279 4.67 2.28 *** 79 2.25 1.80 * 141 1.86 0.75  47 1.99 0.93  10 
-1 9.10 1.07  323 27.69 1.08  107 0.16 0.16  157 -0.12 -0.07  47 3.80 1.14  10 
0 2.47 3.05 *** 345 0.62 0.53  123 3.92 2.92 *** 163 3.56 1.81 * 47 4.54 2.25 * 10 
1 0.72 1.02  383 0.29 0.27  154 1.23 1.02  171 1.37 0.88  45 1.68 1.65  11 
2 0.33 0.39  379 -0.02 -0.02  157 0.47 0.30  164 -0.21 -0.20  44 3.14 0.78  12 
3 2.50 2.44 ** 351 2.96 1.83 * 148 0.56 0.47  147 2.28 0.39  43 0.04 0.03  11 
         ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
    
 
Table 1.7: Stock Price Returns Surrounding Recurring SEO Announcement 
To measure the stock price performance, we  employ the total stock price percentage return (PR) including capital gain plus dividend yield. The capital gain is 
measured by the stock price percentage changes of the fiscal year-end close price. The dividend yield is measured by the dividend per share by ex-date 
divided by the beginning fiscal year-end close price. The SEO announcement date falls in year 0. Sample sizes depend on price data availability in 
COMPUSTAT. All stock price returns are reported in percent. 
 
Entire Sample  1st SEOs 2nd SEOs 3rd SEOs 4th SEOs 
Fiscal 
Year PR 
(%) t-stat N 
PR 
(%) t-stat N 
PR 
(%) t-stat N 
PR 
(%) t-stat N 
PR 
(%) t-stat N 
-2 29.28 6.20 *** 255 13.97 1.55  59 38.35 5.38 *** 136 21.23 2.37 ** 47 39.51 2.47 ** 11 
-1 59.15 3.60 *** 302 56.57 5.16 *** 88 70.54 2.24 ** 154 31.63 4.14 *** 47 42.98 2.84 ** 11 
0 63.54 11.69 *** 343 61.68 6.41 *** 117 66.21 8.22 *** 165 66.22 4.96 *** 48 21.89 1.58  11 
1 6.65 2.16 ** 387 12.11 2.24 ** 155 2.14 0.50  172 4.17 0.49  46 5.43 0.45  12 
2 9.21 2.86 *** 389 22.32 3.75 *** 159 1.55 0.38  170 -6.02 -0.81  46 8.68 0.55  12 
3 14.53 2.69 *** 370 22.09 3.37 *** 152 1.04 0.26  161 41.30 1.13  44 2.94 0.32  11 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
    
Table 1.8: Regression Results of Two-Day Abnormal Returns on Post-Offering Performance of Previous Issues 
Dependent variable is the natural log of 1 plus two-day (0, 1) abnormal return. SECy -1,1 is the standardized earnings change for one year after previous offerings. SECs are 
measured by NOI, EBIT, and EPS and scaled by market value (in Panel A) and total assets (in Panel B) at the fiscal year end before the offering announcements. PRy-1,1 is the 
stock price return for one year after previous offerings. PRs are measured by the stock percentage returns (in Panel C). We classify firms as large-low, small-high, small-low, and 
large-high  depending on the size of the market value at the fiscal year end of the offering announcements and the size of SEC (or PR) after previous offerings. Dummy1=1, 
Dummy2=0, and Dummy3=0 are for the firm with large MV0 and low SECy -1,1 or PRy -1,1. Dummy1=0, Dummy2=1, and Dummy3=0 are for the firm with small MV0 and high 
SECy -1,1 or PRy-1,1. Dummy1=0, Dummy2=0, and Dummy3=1 are for the firm with small MV0 and low SECy -1,1 or PRy -1,1. Dummy1=0, Dummy2=0, and Dummy3=0 are for firm 
with large MV0 and high SECy -1,1 or PRy -1,1. Relative offer size is measured by the natural log of the offer amount divided by MV-1. Run-up is the natural log of 1 plus cumulative 
abnormal return from the day -40 through the day -6. Log(MV-1) is the natural log of the market value at the fiscal year end before the offering announcements. Debt to assets 
ratio is measured at the fiscal year end before the offering announcements. Log(IPO Age) is the natural log of the number of years since IPO. The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Panel A: Operating Performance Measured by SEC Scaled by Market Value 
 Earnings Measure 
 NOI EBIT EPS 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.042   -0.009   0.024   -0.035   -0.008   0.029   -0.034   -0.009   0.028  
                    (-3.50) ***   (-0.30)  (-0.73)  (-2.96) ***  (-0.28)   (0.87)   (-2.96) *** (-0.33)  (0.87) 
Dummy1 (Large MV0; Low SECy-1, 1) -0.002  -0.005  -0.001  0.004  0.001  0.007   0.002  0.000  0.007  
   (-0.18)    (-0.57) (-0.06)  (0.49)   (0.16)   (0.66)   (0.18)  (-0.01)  (0.69) 
Dummy2 (Small MV0; High SECy-1, 1) -0.011  -0.020  -0.020  -0.012  -0.019  -0.016   -0.006  -0.012  -0.017  
   (-1.04)    (-1.43)  ( -1.12)  (-1.14)   (-1.38)   (-0.92)   (-0.60)  (-0.88)  ( -0.98) 
Dummy3 (Small MV0; Low SECy-1, 1) -0.022  -0.033  -0.038  -0.024  -0.033  -0.036   -0.033  -0.041  -0.037  
   (-2.14) **   (-2.47)** (-2.59) ** (-2.27) **  (-2.57) **  (-2.52) ** (-3.15) *** (-3.28) *** (-2.64)** 
Log(Offer Amount/MV-1) -0.016  -0.022  -0.012  -0.011  -0.017  -0.007   -0.011  -0.017  -0.008  
                    (-2.73) ***   (-2.89)*** (-1.26)  (-2.02) **  (-2.31) **  (-0.77)   (-2.05) ** (-2.39) ** (-0.89) 
Run-up           0.004  -0.029       0.009  -0.025     0.013  -0.022  
                      (0.25) (-1.50)      (0.53)   (-1.38)     (0.80)  (-1.18) 
Log(MV-1)    -0.006  -0.007      -0.005  -0.006     -0.005  -0.006  
                        (-1.12) (-1.05)       (-0.98)   (-0.88)     (-0.95)  (-0.96) 
Debt to Assets Ratio -1               -0.011  0.035      -0.013  0.037     -0.017  0.037  
                        (-0.55) (1.40)       ( -0.63)   (1.49)     (-0.86)  (1.48) 
Log(Age since IPO)      -0.011        -0.014                     -0.014  
                       (-1.37)        (-1.78) *                   (-1.72)*  
N 117   117   71   124   124   76   124   124   76   
Adjusted R2 0.113  0.106  0.131  0.097  0.091  0.127   0.126  0.126  0.127  
F 4.68 *** 2.96*** 2.32 ** 4.30 *** 2.75 ** 2.36 ** 5.42 *** 3.53 *** 2.36** 
         ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
    
Table 1.8 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Operating Performance Measured by SEC Scaled by Total Assets 
 Earnings Measure 
 NOI EBIT EPS 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.042       -0.009       0.026    -0.035       -0.009     0.029      -0.033      -0.009       0.029     
                   (-3.51) ***   (-0.31)      (0.80)    (-3.02)***  (-0.32)     (0.88)      (-2.89) *** (-0.32)       (0.91)    
Dummy1 (Large MV0; Low SECy-1, 1) 0.000       -0.004       -0.001    0.005       0.002     0.007      0.001      0.000       0.007     
  (-0.02)        (-0.42)       (-0.06)    (0.54)      (0.27)     (0.61)      (0.07)      (-0.03)       (0.68)    
Dummy2 (Small MV0; High SECy-1, 1) -0.012       -0.021       -0.022    -0.012       -0.019     -0.016      -0.007      -0.012       -0.017     
  (-1.03)       (-1.43)      (-1.27)    (-1.13)      (-1.31)     (-0.93)      (-0.65)      (-0.88)       (-1.03)    
Dummy3 (Small MV0; Low SECy-1, 1) -0.020       -0.031       -0.037    -0.024       -0.033     -0.037      -0.033      -0.042       -0.037     
  (-1.99) **    (-2.34) **   (-2.51) ** (-2.28)**   (-2.53) **  (-2.57) **  (-3.19) *** (-3.28) ***  (-2.71)*** 
Log(Offer Amount/MV-1) -0.016       -0.022       -0.012    -0.011       -0.017     -0.007      -0.011      -0.017       -0.008     
                   (-2.74) ***   (-2.90) ***  (-1.29)    (-2.00)**   (-2.28) **  (-0.75)      (-2.05) **   (-2.39) **   (-0.91)    
Run-up                         0.004       -0.030                   0.009     -0.025                       0.013       -0.022     
                                   (0.21)       (-1.59)          (0.54)     (-1.37)                      (0.80)       (-1.20)    
Log(MV-1)                  -0.006       -0.007                   -0.005     -0.005                       -0.005       -0.006     
                                   (-1.12)       (-1.19)          (-0.95)     (-0.85)                      (-0.95)       (-0.99)    
Debt to Assets Ratio -1                             -0.010       0.037                   -0.013     0.037                       -0.017       0.037     
                                   (-0.51)       (1.49)          (-0.64)     (1.47)                      (-0.85)       (1.49)    
Log(Age since IPO)                                    -0.010                                  -0.015                                     -0.014     
                                               (-1.27)                                       (-1.79) *                                   (-1.73)*   
N 117       117       71    124       124     76      124      124       76     
Adjusted R2           0.11       0.103       0.125    0.097       0.091     0.126      0.125      0.126       0.127     
F  4.60 ***  2.89 *** 2.25 ** 4.32*** 2.76 **  2.35 **  5.41 *** 3.53 ***  2.36**  
 ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
    
Table 1.8 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Stock Price Performance Measured by Total Stock Returns 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.031      -0.002       0.034      
                  (-2.68)***  (-0.07)       (1.02)      
Dummy1 (Large MV0; Low PRy-1, 1) -0.004      -0.006       0.004      
  (-0.47)      (-0.71)        (0.36)      
Dummy2 (Small MV0; High PRy-1, 1) -0.011      -0.020       -0.026      
  (-0.95)     (-1.38)       (-1.55)      
Dummy3 (Small MV0; Low PRy-1, 1) -0.030      -0.038       -0.036      
  (-3.05) ***  (-3.12) ***   (-2.57) **   
Log(Offer Amount/MV-1) -0.011      -0.017       -0.007      
                  (-2.00)**   (-2.33) **    (-0.76)      
Run-up                      0.005       -0.027      
                                 (0.30)        (-1.51)      
Log(MV-1)               -0.006       -0.007      
                                 (-1.07)        (-1.11)      
Debt to Assets Ratio -1                          -0.011       0.042      
                            (-0.55)        (1.67) *    
Log(Age since IPO)                               -0.012      
                                                (-1.50)      
N 124      124       76      
Adjusted R2           0.109      0.102       0.105      
F  4.75 ***  2.99 ***  2.10 **   
    ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
    
Table 1.9: Regression Results of Two-Day Abnormal Returns on Pre-Offering Performance of Current Issues 
Dependent variable is the natural log of 1 plus two-day (0, 1) abnormal return. SECy ,-1 is the standardized earnings change for one year before current offerings. SECs measured 
by NOI, EBIT, and EPS and scaled by market value (in Panel A) and total assets (in Panel B) at the fiscal year end before the offering announcements. PRy ,-1 is the stock price 
return for one year before current offerings. PRs are measured by the stock percentage returns (in Panel C). We classify firms as large-low, small-high, small-low, and large-high 
depending on the size of the market value at the fiscal year end of the offering announcement and the size of SEC (or PR) after current offerings. Dummy1=1, Dummy2=0, and 
Dummy3=0 are for the firm with large MV0 and low SECy ,-1 or PRy ,-1. Dummy1=0, Dummy2=1, and Dummy3=0 are for the firm with small MV0 and high SECy ,-1 or PRy ,-1. 
Dummy1=0, Dummy2=0, and Dummy3=1 are for the firm with small MV0 and low SECy ,-1 or PRy ,-1. Dummy1=0, Dummy2=0, and Dummy3=0 are for the firm with large MV0 
and high SECy ,-1 or PRy ,-1. Relative offer size is measured by the natural log of the offer amount divided by MV-1. Run-up is the natural log of 1 plus cumulative abnormal return 
from the day -40 through the day -6. Log(MV-1) is the natural log of the market value measured at the fiscal year end before the offering announcements. Debt to assets ratio is 
also measured at the fiscal year end before the offering announcements. Log(IPO Age) is the natural log of the number of years since IPO. The t-statistics are in parentheses.  
Panel A: Operating Performance Measured by SEC Scaled by Market Value 
 Earnings Measure 
 NOI EBIT EPS 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.019       -0.032   -0.006   -0.02     -0.030   0.000   -0.017      -0.023   0.011     
(-1.64)      (-1.13) (-0.15)  (-1.77) *   (-1.10)  (0.01)   (-1.45)      (-0.83)   (0.29)     
Dummy1 (Large MV0; Low SECy, -1) -0.001       -0.001  -0.005  0.011     0.010  -0.004   0.002      0.002   -0.014     
 (-0.10)       (-0.06)  (-0.34)  (1.12)     (1.07)  (-0.25)   (0.26)      (0.18)   (-0.94)     
Dummy2 (Small MV0; High SECy, -1) -0.023       -0.018  -0.023  -0.017     -0.012  -0.022   -0.024      -0.022   -0.031     
 (-2.11) **   (-1.30) (-1.11)  (-1.66) *   (-0.92)  (-1.10)   (-2.39) **  (-1.67) * (-1.64)     
Dummy3 (Small MV0; Low SECy, -1) -0.016       -0.013  -0.023  -0.015     -0.014  -0.027   -0.015      -0.014   -0.033     
 (-1.59)       (-0.99)  (-1.26)  (-1.54)     (-1.11)  (-1.60)   (-1.43)      (-1.11)   (-1.85) *   
Log(Offer Amount/MV-1) -0.003       -0.001  0.007  -0.001     0.000  0.009   -0.001      -0.001   0.009     
(-0.52)       (-0.20)  (0.76)  (-0.12)     (0.04)  (0.98)   (-0.15)      (-0.09)   (0.94)     
Run-up                        0.014  -0.003                   0.016  0.002                 0.017   0.003     
               (0.78)  (-0.12)                   (0.93)  (0.10)           (0.97)   (0.13)     
Log(M V-1)                 0.003  0.003                   0.002  0.003                 0.001   0.002     
               (0.47)  (0.37)                   ( 0.39)  (0.39)                   (0.21)   (0.25)     
Debt to Assets Ratio -1                            -0.007  0.019                   -0.010  0.017                 -0.005   0.015     
               (-0.36)  (0.64)                   (-0.51)  (0.57)         (-0.23)   (0.53)     
Log(Age since IPO)                             -0.009                               -0.010                             -0.010     
                            (-0.98)                                (-1.12)                                 (-1.13)     
N 181       181   109   188     188   113   188      188   113     
Adjusted R2           0.023       0.012  -0.023  0.034     0.024  -0.007   0.032      0.021   0.000     
F  2.07 *    1.30   0.70   2.64 ** 1.67   0.90   2.54 ** 1.58   1.00     
         ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
    
Table 1.9 (Continued) 
Panel B: Operating Performance Measured by SEC Scaled by Total Assets 
 Earnings Measure 
 NOI EBIT EPS 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.018     -0.032  -0.010  -0.02      -0.032  -0.017  -0.013     -0.025     -0.004  
(-1.62)     (-1.20)  (-0.25)  (-1.88) *   (-1.24)  (-0.47)  (-1.19)     (-0.95)     (-0.10)  
Dummy1 (Large MV0; Low SECy, -1) -0.005     -0.004  -0.017  0.010      0.010  -0.002  -0.007     -0.007     -0.015  
 (-0.48)     (-0.37)  (-1.14)  (1.04)      (1.02)  (-0.16)  (-0.78)     (-0.76)     (-1.13)  
Dummy2 (Small MV0; High SECy, -1) -0.022     -0.016  -0.022  -0.018      -0.013  -0.017  -0.026     -0.022     -0.027  
 (-2.10) **  (-1.20)  (-1.11)  (-1.82) *   (-1.02)  (-0.93)  (-2.72) *** (-1.77) *   (-1.53)  
Dummy3 (Small MV0; Low SECy, -1) -0.015     -0.012  -0.022  -0.013      -0.01  -0.019  -0.02     -0.017     -0.026  
 (-1.66) *   (-0.99)  (-1.30)  (-1.38)      (-0.91)  (-1.19)  (-2.05) **  (-1.47)     (-1.62)  
Log(Offer Amount/MV-1) -0.003     0.000  0.008  0.000      0.001  0.009  -0.001     0.000     0.009  
(-0.48)     (-0.07)  (0.90)  (-0.08)      (0.17)  (1.10)  (-0.20)     (0.07)     (1.08)  
Run-up                      0.01  -0.005                   0.011  -0.001               0.013     -0.001  
                (0.64)  (-0.25)                  (0.73)  (-0.05)                  (0.84)     (-0.06)  
Log(M V-1)               0.003  0.003                   0.003  0.004               0.002     0.002  
                (0.60)  (0.44)                  (0.51)  (0.50)                  (0.46)     (0.33)  
Debt to Assets Ratio -1                          -0.009  0.012                   -0.009  0.01               -0.004     0.013  
                (-0.50)  (0.44)                  (-0.47)  (0.38)                  (-0.22)     (0.49)  
Log(Age since IPO)                           -0.005                               -0.003                           -0.004  
                             (-0.79)                               (-0.54)                                  (-0.60)  
N 194     194  119  204      204  126  203     203     126  
Adjusted R2           0.017     0.006  -0.021  0.029      0.019  -0.02  0.029     0.019     -0.01  
F  1.82     1.16  0.7  2.53 ** 1.56  0.69  2.51 ** 1.56     0.85  
        ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
    
Table 1.9 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Stock Price Performance Measured by Total Stock Returns 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.010     -0.015     0.009     
                  (-0.85)    (-0.57)    (0.23)     
Dummy1 (Large MV0; Low PRy, -1) -0.004     -0.004     -0.010     
  (-0.43)     (-0.44)    (-0.67)     
Dummy2 (Small MV0; High PRy, -1) -0.017     -0.015     -0.023     
  (-1.71) *   (-1.19)    (-1.26)     
Dummy3 (Small MV0; Low PRy, -1) -0.028     -0.029     -0.035     
  (-2.69) *** (-2.27)**  (-1.95) *   
Log(Offer Amount/MV-1) 0.001     0.000     0.010     
                  (0.19)     (0.07)    (1.09)     
Run-up                     0.022     0.004     
                                 (1.29)    (0.16)     
Log(MV-1)              0.001     0.002     
                                 (0.15)    (0.33)     
Debt to Assets Ratio -1                         -0.009     0.018     
                                 (-0.45)    (0.64)     
Log(Age since IPO)                            -0.010     
                                     (-1.21)     
N 190     189     113     
Adjusted R2           0.03     0.028     0.002     
F  2.44 **  1.78*   1.02     
                                                           ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Primary, Secondary, and Combination SEO Firms from 
1980-1999 
The final sample consists of 1336 primary SEOs, 490 Secondary SEOs, and 1321 Combination SEOs 
from 1980 to 1999. The samples are identified through CRSP and COMPUSTAT. Sample firms do not 
necessarily have a complete set of desired COMPUSTAT data for every SEO they issued. 
Panel A: Time Distribution  
Primary SEOs Secondary SEOs Combination SEOs 
Issue Year Number 
of Issues 
% of 
Sample 
Number of 
Issues 
% of 
Sample 
Number of 
Issues 
% of 
Sample 
1980 78 5.84 13 2.65 51 3.86 
1981 75 5.61 26 5.31 44 3.33 
1982 42 3.14 49   10.00 33 2.50 
1983     156   11.68 54   11.02         122 9.24 
1984 29 2.17 13 2.65 13 0.98 
1985 36 2.69 17 3.47 48 3.63 
1986 54 4.04 20 4.08 52 3.94 
1987 52 3.89 12 2.45 33 2.50 
1988 17 1.27   8 1.63 16 1.21 
1989 33 2.47  11 2.24 36 2.73 
1990 33 2.47   7 1.43 24 1.82 
1991 92 6.89 16 3.27 61 4.62 
1992 66 4.94 25 5.10 55 4.16 
1993 83 6.21 31 6.33         104 7.87 
1994 57 4.27 26 5.31 75 5.68 
1995 83 6.21 25 5.10         118 8.93 
1996     115 8.61 38 7.76         142   10.75 
1997 95 7.11 41 8.37         131 9.92 
1998 52 3.89 31 6.33 80 6.06 
1999 88 6.59 27 5.51 83 6.28 
Total   1336  100.00        490 100.00       1321 100.00 
Panel B: Exchange Listing Distribution 
Primary SEOs Secondary SEOs Combination SEOs 
Exchange Number 
of Issues 
% of 
Sample 
Number of 
Issues 
% of 
Sample 
Number of 
Issues 
% of 
Sample 
NYSE 398 29.79 263 53.67 198 14.99 
Nasdaq 682 51.05 183 37.35 902 68.28 
AMEX 111    8.31   24   4.90   92   6.96 
Other 145 10.85   20   4.08  129   9.77 
Total    1336  100.00 490 100.00 1321 100.00 
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Industry Distribution  
Primary SEOs Secondary SEOs Combination SEOs 
Industry SIC Codes Number 
of Issues  
% of 
Sample 
Number 
of Issues  
% of 
Sample 
Number 
of Issues 
% of 
Sample 
Agriculture, 
Forestry, and 
Fishing 
0000 – 0999    8 0.60    2 0.41 9   0.68 
Mining 1000 – 1499 105 7.86  28 5.71 48  3.63 
Construction 1500 – 1999  13 0.97    2 0.41 13   0.98 
Manufacturing 2000 – 3999 739  55.31 281  57.35    574 43.45 
Transportation 
and Public Utility 4000 – 4999  87 6.51  31 6.33 82   6.21 
Wholesale Trade 5000 – 5199  45 3.37  15 3.06 65   4.92 
Retail Trade 5200 – 5999  99 7.41  64  13.06     153 11.58 
Finance, 
Insurance, and 
Real Estate 
6000 – 6999    0 0.00    0 0.00  0   0.00 
Services 7000 – 8999 240  17.96  67  13.67     377 28.54 
Public 
Administration 9000 – 9899     0 0.00    0 0.00 0   0.00 
Nonclassifiable 
Establishment 9900 – 9999    0 0.00    0 0.00 0   0.00 
Total     1336 100.00 490 100.00    1321 100.00 
 
    
Table 2.2: Characteristics of Primary, Secondary, and Combination SEO Firms from 1980-1999 
Total assets, debt to assets ratio, book to market ratio, sales, and market value are measured at the fiscal year end prior to the offerings. We conduct the unpaired t test and 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test to examine the difference in characteristics between two different types of SEOs. Prim-Sec indicates the difference between the primary and 
secondary SEOs. Prim-Combin indicates the difference between the primary and combination SEOs. Sec-Combin indicates the difference between the secondary and 
combination SEOs. 
Unpaired t-stat Wilcoxon Rank Sum z-stat 
  SEO Type Mean  Med Std. Dev. N Prim- 
Sec 
Prim-
Combin 
Sec -
Combin 
Prim- 
Sec 
Prim-
Combin 
Sec-
Combin 
Primary 486.81 65.99 1871.81 907 -2.77 ***  5.00 ***  6.91 *** -9.65 *** 4.77 ***  15.05 *** 
Secondary 786.22 206.77 1614.73 334              
Total Assets -1   
($ Millions) 
Combination 159.38 47.59 650.29 998              
Primary 0.25 0.21 0.23 904 0.54      2.91 ***  1.56     0.79     3.77 ***  1.96  *   
Secondary 0.25 0.21 0.23 334              
Debt to Assets Ratio -1 
Combination 0.22 0.16 0.24 996              
Primary 0.41 0.32 0.38 818 0.47      4.10 ***  3.10 *** -0.89     3.40 ***  3.58 *** 
Secondary 0.40 0.33 0.27 287              
Book to Market  
Ratio-1 
Combination 0.34 0.28 0.26 840              
Primary 489.63 58.81 1949.74 906 -3.55 ***  4.07 ***  6.31 *** -11.29 *** -0.07      14.29 *** 
Secondary 941.58 236.11 2076.26 333              
Sales -1 ($ Millions) 
Combination 198.11 53.19 968.25 998              
Primary 604.24 123.51 3316.56 848 -2.39 **   2.48 **   5.07 *** -10.71 *** 2.37 **   13.25 *** 
Secondary 1030.23 371.47 2360.38 298              
Market Value-1     
($ Millions) 
Combination 299.87 111.50 1341.17 861              
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
    
Table 2.2 (Continued) 
 
Unpaired t-stat Wilcoxon Rank Sum z-stat 
  SEO Type Mean  Med Std. Dev. N Prim- 
Sec 
Prim-
Combin 
Sec- 
Combin 
Prim- 
Sec 
Prim-
Combin 
Sec-
Combin 
Primary 4.08 2.61 3.95 729 3.59 ***  4.95 ***  -0.21     7.15 *** 9.04 ***  -1.36     
Secondary 3.06 1.28 4.09 269              
Number of Years 
since IPO 
Combination 3.12 1.50 3.99 977                   
Primary 50.92 25.40 92.33 1336 -4.43 ***  -0.97      4.11 *** -4.56 *** -5.52 ***  1.29     
Secondary 93.64 33.45 206.28 490              
Total Dollar Amount 
Offered ($ Millions) 
Combination 54.22 32.00 83.43 1322              
Primary 0.34 0.24 0.41 848 9.48 ***  -4.36 ***  -13.50 *** 8.97 *** -9.28 ***  -15.54 *** 
Secondary 0.19 0.15 0.15 298              
Total Offer Amount 
/Market Value-1 
Combination 0.44 0.34 0.49 861              
Primary 2.45 1.70 3.19 1336 -3.40 ***  0.49      3.74 *** 0.37     -3.76 ***  -2.35 **  
Secondary 3.26 1.60 4.90 490              
Total Shares Offered 
(Milllions) 
Combination 2.40 1.95 2.30 1322              
Primary 25.95 19.48 33.92 1053 8.88 ***  -1.80 *    -12.90 *** 8.95 *** -8.26 ***  -14.15 *** 
Secondary 15.08 12.04 11.21 308              
Shares Offered as % 
of Shares Outstanding 
Before Offer 
Combination 28.33 25.00 26.52 1082              
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
    
 
Table 2.2 (Continued) 
 
Unpaired t-stat Wilcoxon Rank Sum z-stat 
  SEO Type Mean  Med Std. Dev. N Prim- 
Sec 
Prim-
Combin 
Sec -
Combin 
Prim- 
Sec 
Prim-
Combin 
Sec-
Combin 
Primary 30.49 26.70 20.54 344 -2.89 ***  -4.59 ***  0.30     -2.64 *** -4.81 ***  0.07     
Secondary 37.54 34.60 24.26 125              
% of Shares Held by 
Insiders before Offer 
Combination 36.85 35.80 21.06 671              
Primary 23.92 20.90 16.47 338 -2.62 ***  -2.99 ***  1.07     -2.24 **  -3.31 ***  0.56     
Secondary 29.29 27.30 20.14 119              
% of Shares Held by 
Insiders after Offer 
Combination 27.21 25.94 16.51 664              
Primary 1.02 0.92 0.57 1318 -4.59 ***  -4.40 ***  1.06     -5.69 *** -4.99 ***  2.43 **  
Secondary 1.15 1.09 0.53 459              
Gross Spread     
($ per Share) 
Combination 1.12 1.00 0.62 1321              
Primary 1.26 1.23 0.37 1107 10.11 ***  -0.48      -11.18 *** 9.66 *** -0.59      -11.48 *** 
Secondary 1.04 1.02 0.31 299              
Underwriting Fee as 
% of Principal 
Amount 
Combination 1.26 1.21 0.30 1196              
Primary 21.82 21.13 3.15 1107 2.32 **   -0.74      -2.91 *** 2.82 *** -1.37      -4.09 *** 
Secondary 21.35 20.51 3.05 299              
Underwriting Fee as 
% of Gross Spread 
Combination 21.91 21.36 2.77 1196              
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
    
Table 2.3: Time-Series Profile of Asset-Scaled Accruals for Primary SEOs 
This table presents the discretionary and nondiscretionary current and long-term accruals of firms offering primary seasoned equity offering from the three years before to three 
years after the offering. The accruals measures are scaled by beginning-period total assets. Insider ownership is measured by the percentage of shares held by insiders 
(managers, officers, and directors). The offering date falls in year 0. Mean and median of accruals are reported in percent. 
 
All Primary SEOs (1980-1999) Primary SEOs without Ownership (1991-1999) Primary SEOs with Ownership (1991-1999) Fiscal 
Year Mean t-stat Med Signed Rank t  N Mean t-stat Med Signed Rank t  N Mean t-stat Med Signed Rank t  N 
Panel A: Discretionary Current Accruals (DCA)  
-3 1.33 1.17     -0.38 0.70     430 1.47 1.91  *   -0.28 0.74      231 -0.08 -0.04      -0.78 -0.60     14
-2 4.24 3.82 *** 0.76 3.35 *** 570 1.43 1.68  *   0.26 1.57      282 3.06 1.89 *    1.42 2.05 **  20
-1 2.96 4.35 *** 0.86 3.96 *** 727 1.63 2.44  **  0.44 1.98 **   305 1.66 1.05      0.89 1.73 *   27
0 4.32 7.54 *** 2.04 7.49 *** 785 4.41 5.89  *** 1.59 5.09 ***  326 2.84 2.22 **   1.57 2.73 **
* 
29
1 0.89 2.78 *** 0.56 2.98 *** 754 0.47 1.09      0.03 0.91      311 0.66 0.99      1.12 2.00 *  26
2 0.91 3.06 *** 0.28 2.82 *** 811 0.55 1.32      0.23 1.22      295 2.00 2.82 ***  1.30 3.45 **
* 
23
3 0.17 0.56     0.38 0.98     757 0.14 0.31      0.03 0.29      237 0.25 0.32      0.63 0.88     19
Panel B: Discretionary Long-Term Accruals (DLA) 
-3 -0.54 -0.86     -0.44 -0.61     411 -0.29 -0.42      -0.32 -0.06     223 -0.73 -0.54        -0.12 0.00     14
-2 -2.31 -1.98 **  -1.04 -3.93 *** 560 -1.03 -1.02      -0.40 -1.56     279 -4.73 -2.76 ***   -1.38 -3.15 **
* 
19
-1 -2.70 -3.77 *** -1.19 -5.06 *** 724 -2.35 -2.64 ***  -1.22 -2.88 *** 315 -3.74 -2.86 ***   -1.66 -3.20 *
* 
26
0 -0.67 -0.95     -0.37 -1.70 *   770 -1.45 -1.41      -0.36 -1.72 *   324 -0.50 -0.31        0.07 -0.18     28
1 -1.14 -2.34 **  -0.50 -2.13 **  743 0.12 0.15      0.08 0.21     309 -1.49 -1.56        0.06 -0.52     25
2 -1.44 -2.96 *** -0.94 -4.63 *** 793 -0.76 -0.73      -0.54 -1.67 *   290 -0.20 -0.16        0.06 -0.31     23
3 -1.94 -3.72 *** -1.43 -6.54 *** 753 -1.42 -1.56      -0.91 -2.49 **  232 -1.56 -1.01        -0.67 -2.00 **  19
Panel C: Nondiscretionary Current Accruals (NDCA) 
-3 2.92 7.58 ***  0.98 8.18 ***  431 2.68 5.96 *** 0.75 6.19 ***  239 3.35 4.06 *** 1.03 4.19 *** 148 
-2 5.35 1.90 *    0.90 9.02 ***  580 2.61 6.24 *** 0.98 7.31 ***  287 1.57 2.85 *** 0.58 3.35 *** 205 
-1 2.09 7.71 ***  0.65 9.01 ***  745 1.67 5.65 *** 0.60 6.04 ***  318 1.49 3.10 *** 0.28 3.53 *** 283 
0 3.08 10.64 ***  1.28 11.96 ***  809 2.44 5.64 *** 1.16 6.91 ***  335 2.92 6.28 *** 0.81 5.95 *** 298 
1 1.45 9.52 ***  0.56 9.74 ***  774 1.43 5.84 *** 0.37 5.56 ***  318 1.23 3.95 *** 0.41 4.41 *** 269 
2 0.83 5.55 ***  0.31 6.43 ***  827 0.98 4.75 *** 0.37 4.73 ***  301 0.67 1.74 *   0.14 2.39 **  239 
3 0.89 7.37 ***  0.37 7.47 ***  778 0.97 4.63 *** 0.17 3.90 ***  241 0.11 0.42     0.00 0.93     200 
Panel D: Nondiscretionary Long-Term Accruals (NDLA) 
-3 -7.24 -13.62 ***   -5.94 -15.74 *** 432 -7.46 -15.13 ***   -6.34 -12.03 ***  237 -8.99 -6.36 ***  -6.46 -9.32 ***  149 
-2 -9.44 -11.84 ***   -5.88 -18.84 *** 579 -8.14 -13.43 ***   -6.64 -13.40 ***  287 -8.78 -10.52 ***  -5.73 -10.84 ***  203 
-1 -8.69 -16.45 ***   -6.11 -21.16 *** 749 -8.64 -11.72 ***   -6.84 -13.31 ***  323 -8.56 -13.42 ***  -6.10 -13.59 ***  280 
0 -8.72 -23.07 ***   -6.53 -21.98 *** 797 -8.32 -15.35 ***   -7.11 -13.52 ***  324 -10.29 -13.95 ***  -7.18 -13.52 ***  295 
1 -6.73 -21.02 ***   -4.99 -21.45 *** 774 -8.41 -13.02 ***   -5.98 -14.11 ***  318 -7.00 -11.42 ***  -5.09 -11.90 ***  267 
2 -6.12 -16.32 ***   -4.94 -20.77 *** 823 -7.06 -8.14 ***   -5.60 -11.58 ***  297 -7.88 -9.15 ***  -5.60 -11.24 ***  239 
3 -6.03 -17.13 ***   -4.63 -20.13 *** 775 -7.07 -9.66 ***   -5.55 -11.31 ***  241 -7.20 -5.99 ***  -5.39 -9.04 ***  200 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
    
Table 2.4: Time-Series Profile of Asset-Scaled Accruals for Secondary SEOs 
This table presents the discretionary and nondiscretionary current and long-term accruals of firms offering secondary seasoned equity offering from the three years 
before to three years after the offering. The accruals measures are scaled by beginning-period total assets. Insider ownership is measured by the percentage of shares 
held by insiders (managers, officers, and directors). The offering date falls in year 0. Mean and median of accruals are reported in percent. 
 
All Secondary SEOs (1980-1999) Secondary SEOs without Ownership (1991-1999) Secondary SEOs with Ownership (1991-1999) Fiscal 
Year Mean t-stat Med Signed Rank t  N Mean t-stat Med Signed Rank t  N Mean t-stat Med Signed Rank t N 
Panel A: Discretionary Current Accruals (DCA)  
-3 -0.1 -0.1     -0.7 -0.5      134 0.5 0.6      -0.0 0.6      83 -0.8 -0.7    -0.9 -1.3      38 
-2 0.6 0.7     0.4 0.8      172 0.2 0.3      -0.6 0.1      95 0.3 0.2    0.8 0.6      55 
-1 0.8 1.1     0.1 0.7      245 1.0 1.0      0.1 0.9      114 1.5 1.2    0.8 0.7      96 
0 1.5 2.7 *** 1.3 2.9 ***  282 1.4 1.9 *    1.3 2.3 ** 117 0.8 0.8    1.2 1.3      104 
1 2.1 4.3 *** 1.3 4.2 ***  282 2.4 2.8 ***  1.3 2.9 ***  113 1.2 2.0 *  1.1 1.9 *   102 
2 1.5 3.5 *** 0.9 3.4 ***  288 1.5 2.7 ***  0.9 2.4 ** 96 2.1 2.6 ** 0.9 1.9 *   98 
3 0.7 1.6     0.6 2.0 **   298 -1.0 -1.4      -0.4 -1.2      87 1.7 1.9 *  0.5 1.7 *   77 
Panel B: Discretionary Long-Term Accruals (DLA) 
-3 -2.4 -2.5 **   -1.3 -2.8 ***  130 -0.7 -0.5  -0.9 -1.2  79 -3.2 -2.0 *     -2.3 -1.9 *    38 
-2 -1.5 -1.8 *    -2.1 -2.6 ***  170 -1.1 -0.9  -1.3 -1.4  97 -2.0 -1.4       -2.3 -1.9 *    53 
-1 -3.1 -3.2 ***  -1.2 -3.3 ***  249 -1.5 -1.4  -0.7 -1.4  113 -3.3 -2.0 **    -1.4 -2.1 **   98 
0 0.4 0.8      -0.4 -0.2      277 1.0 1.0  0.2 0.6  114 0.4 0.5       -1.3 -0.0       105 
1 0.3 0.4      -1.2 -1.9 *    280 0.9 0.3  -0.9 -0.4  112 -1.1 -1.0       -1.2 -1.3       100 
2 -1.2 -1.9 *    -1.0 -2.9 ***  282 1.5 1.1  0.4 1.2  93 -2.5 -2.3 **    -1.9 -2.7 ***  97 
3 -1.3 -2.4 **   -1.2 -3.7 ***  297 0.2 0.2  -0.4 0.1  84 -1.0 -0.6       -0.9 -1.5       76 
Panel C: Nondiscretionary Current Accruals (NDCA) 
-3 1.6 5.0 ***  1.1 5.2 ***  135 1.6 5.1 ***  1.1 4.8 ***  84 2.0 2.4 **   1.0 2.2 **  39 
-2 1.8 5.4 ***  1.0 6.2 ***  175 1.7 5.7 ***  1.3 5.2 ***  94 1.2 2.2 **   0.7 2.6 *** 55 
-1 2.5 8.4 ***  1.1 8.5 ***  248 1.8 3.8 ***  0.9 5.0 ***  116 3.3 6.0 ***  1.6 5.8 *** 99 
0 3.4 9.2 ***  1.9 10.1 ***  285 1.9 3.9 ***  1.1 4.6 ***  116 4.3 6.6 ***  2.4 7.2 *** 110 
1 1.9 7.8 ***  1.1 8.4 ***  281 1.4 3.5 ***  0.8 4.1 ***  112 1.8 4.8 ***  1.3 5.0 *** 104 
2 1.3 5.9 ***  0.6 5.9 ***  291 1.0 3.4 ***  0.5 3.1 ***  98 0.7 1.5       0.7 2.6 *** 95 
3 1.2 6.0 ***  0.4 5.9 ***  305 1.1 2.9 ***  0.2 2.6 **  88 0.9 2.4 **   0.4 2.5 **  77 
Panel D: Nondiscretionary Long-Term Accruals (NDLA) 
-3 -6.1 -12.4 *** -5.5 -9.2 ***  134 -6.27 -11.9 *** -5.9 -7.6 ***  82 -5.4 -5.1 ***  -4.4 -4.4 ***  38 
-2 -6.6 -14.4 *** -5.8 -10.6 ***  174 -7.21 -13.3 *** -6.3 -8.4 ***  97 -7.4 -5.8 ***  -5.0 -5.9 ***  55 
-1 -7.4 -12.1 *** -5.7 -12.1 ***  254 -6.41 -9.5 *** -5.6 -7.8 ***  114 -8.3 -9.1 ***  -6.0 -7.8 ***  100 
0 -8.1 -17.6 *** -6.1 -14.1 ***  285 -9.57 -10.1 *** -6.9 -8.9 ***  117 -8.3 -12.6 ***  -6.4 -9.0 ***  110 
1 -7.1 -14.0 *** -5.0 -13.5 ***  285 -7.54 -7.1 *** -5.4 -8.0 ***  112 -7.5 -10.4 ***  -5.9 -8.4 ***  104 
2 -6.3 -12.5 *** -4.9 -12.3 ***  294 -8.80 -8.2 *** -6.5 -7.3 ***  97 -5.9 -5.8 ***  -5.4 -6.2 ***  99 
3 -6.1 -13.2 *** -4.8 -12.9 ***  302 -6.57 -7.99 *** -5.1 -6.7 ***  85 -7.2 -4.1 ***  -5.4 -5.8 ***  77 
       ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
    
Table 2.5: Time-Series Profile of Asset-Scaled Accruals for Combination SEOs 
This table presents the discretionary and nondiscretionary current and long-term accruals of firms offering combination seasoned equity offering from the three years before to 
three years after the offering. The accruals measures are scaled by beginning-period total assets. Insider ownership is measured by the percentage of shares held by insiders 
(managers, officers, and directors). The offering date falls in year 0. Mean and median of accruals are reported in percent. 
 
All Combination SEOs (1980-1999) Combination SEOs without Ownership (1991-1999) Combination SEOs with Ownership (1991-1999) Fiscal 
Year Mean t-stat Med Signed Rank t  N Mean t-stat Med Signed Rank t  N Mean t-stat Med Signed Rank t N 
Panel A: Discretionary Current Accruals (DCA)  
-3 1.1 1.5       0.3 1.5       329 1.0 0.8      0.6 1.2       93 1.1 1.1      -0.2 0.9      208 
-2 4.2 4.6 ***   1.5 4.5 ***   477 3.2 2.5 **   1.5 2.3 **    114 3.1 2.7 ***  0.9 2.7 ***  310 
-1 6.4 6.7 ***   2.5 6.4 ***   747 3.5 1.7      -0.3 0.8       140 7.1 5.9 ***  3.4 5.8 ***  497 
0 11.1 12.4 ***   5.6 13.6 ***   878 8.7 5.2 ***  3.5 5.0 ***   146 11.9 9.5 ***  6.0 11.1 ***  569 
1 4.3 10.9 ***   2.9 10.3 ***   821 2.4 3.1 ***  1.0 2.6 ***   145 4.7 9.0 ***  3.4 8.8 ***  515 
2 1.3 3.6 ***   1.0 3.4 ***   819 0.4 0.6      0.0 0.1       129 1.6 3.1 ***  1.4 3.3 ***  459 
3 1.3 3.4 ***   0.6 3.2 ***   737 1.0 1.2      0.4 0.8       103 2.0 3.5 ***  1.1 3.5 ***  383 
Panel B: Discretionary Long-Term Accruals (DLA) 
-3 -1.3 -1.6      -0.7 -1.8 *    329 -3.7 -3.0 ***  -1.3 -2.1 **  94 -0.6 -0.6      -0.2 -0.8     209 
-2 -1.0 -1.3      -0.5 -2.1 **   470 -2.7 -1.7 *   -0.9 -2.0 **  117 -0.5 -0.5      -0.1 -0.9     307 
-1 2.3 2.1 **  0.2 0.9      745 4.6 1.6      -0.8 -0.3      137 0.8 0.5      0.2 0.9     497 
0 -1.0 -1.2      -0.6 -1.3      863 -4.3 -3.5 ***  -1.8 -3.8 ***  143 0.7 0.6      0.0 0.7     565 
1 0.5 0.7      -0.6 -2.3 **   814 -1.7 -1.2      -0.3 -1.5      135 1.9 1.8 *    -0.8 -1.3     518 
2 -1.8 -3.2 *** -1.5 -6.3 ***  804 -2.7 -2.0 *   -1.6 -2.0 **   126 -2.5 -2.7 ***  -1.6 -4.2 *** 456 
3 -1.3 -2.2 **  -2.1 -6.0 ***  728 -2.1 -1.4      -3.3 -3.3 ***  100 0.0 0.0      -1.6 -1.7 *   383 
Panel C: Nondiscretionary Current Accruals (NDCA) 
-3 2.5 7.8 ***  1.3 7.9 ***  332 2.0 3.2 ***  0.7 3.4 ***  93 2.7 6.7 ***  1.4 6.7 *** 212 
-2 3.0 8.4 ***  1.7 11.1 ***  483 3.3 5.7 ***  1.6 6.6 ***  117 2.7 6.6 ***  1.4 7.9 *** 315 
-1 5.0 10.8 ***  2.7 14.3 ***  762 2.8 3.0 ***  2.1 5.5 ***  143 4.8 9.0 ***  2.7 11.4 *** 506 
0 4.6 7.4 ***  3.0 14.9 ***  886 -0.8 -0.4   1.6 4.2 ***  150 4.1 5.2 ***  3.2 11.5 *** 575 
1 1.9 9.6 ***  1.0 10.6 ***  838 1.6 4.7 ***  1.1 4.5 ***  143 1.4 5.1 ***  0.7 6.3 *** 527 
2 1.5 8.6 ***  0.8 9.8 ***  842 1.3 4.2 ***  0.8 4.4 ***  132 0.9 3.5 ***  0.6 5.0 *** 468 
3 0.8 4.5 ***  0.4 6.6 ***  754 0.9 2.9 ***  0.5 3.0 ***  105 0.2 0.5      0.2 2.3 **  391 
Panel D: Nondiscretionary Long-Term Accruals (NDLA) 
-3 -6.9 -15.9 ***  -6.4 -14.2 ***  340 -6.07 -15.18 ***   -6.6 -8.2 ***  95 -7.3 -10.6 ***  -6.5 -10.7 ***  215 
-2 -9.1 -17.1 ***  -6.4 -18.0 ***  485 -8.88 -9.42 ***   -6.4 -9.3 ***  118 -9.1 -14.6 ***  -6.8 -14.2 ***  314 
-1 -15.3 -14.8 ***  -8.2 -22.3 ***  769 -18.45 -5.4 ***   -6.8 -9.1 ***  141 -15.7 -13.1 ***  -8.7 -18.5 ***  515 
0 -11.1 -19.2 ***  -7.6 -22.9 ***  886 -7.30 -8.3 ***   -6.0 -8.4 ***  144 -13.0 -16.1 ***  -8.4 -18.7 ***  574 
1 -8.7 -16.7 ***  -5.6 -22.3 ***  837 -7.0 -5.5 ***   -5.4 -8.5 ***  138 -10.3 -13.4 ***  -6.1 -17.6 ***  529 
2 -6.4 -16.2 ***  -4.8 -20.6 ***  837 -6.4 -9.2 ***   -6.0 -8.2 ***  130 -7.9 -11.3 ***  -5.3 -14.8 ***  467 
3 -7.1 -14.7 ***  -4.8 -19.8 ***  751 -6.8 -7.0 ***   -5.7 -7.9 ***  102 -8.1 -9.4 ***  -5.1 -12.9 ***  388 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
111 
   
Table 2.6: Comparisons of Accruals between Primary and Secondary SEOs  
Results of tests for difference in DCA, DLA, NDCA, and NDLA between primary and secondary SEOs from 
the three years before to three years after the offering. Mean of accruals are reported in percent. 
Panel A: Discretionary Current Accruals (DCA) 
Primary SEOs Secondary SEOs Fiscal 
Year 
Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum    
z-stat 
-3 1.33 430 -0.06 134 1.38  1.02      0.66    
-2 4.24 570 0.61 172 3.64  2.64 ***  1.18    
-1 2.96 727 0.76 245 2.20  2.29 **   1.56    
0 4.32 785 1.54 282 2.78  3.45 ***  2.26 *  
1 0.89 754 2.11 282 -1.23  -2.04 **   -1.91 *  
2 0.91 811 1.48 288 -0.57  -1.11      -1.25    
3 0.17 757 0.68 298 -0.51   -0.96      -1.08    
Panel B: Discretionary Long-Term Accruals (DLA) 
Primary SEOs Secondary SEOs Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum    
z-stat 
-3 -0.54 411 -2.37 130 1.83  1.63  1.98 *  
-2 -2.31 560 -1.46 170 -0.85  -0.60  0.14  
-1 -2.70 724 -3.14 249 0.44  0.36  -0.00       
0 -0.67 770 0.41 277 -1.07  -1.21  -0.97       
1 -1.14 743 0.34 280 -1.48  -1.48  0.51       
2 -1.44 793 -1.19 282 -0.25  -0.31  -0.09       
3 -1.94 753 -1.32 297 -0.61   -0.82   -0.68       
Panel C: Nondiscretionary Current Accruals (NDCA)  
Primary SEOs Secondary SEOs Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum    
z-stat 
-3 2.92 431 1.62 135 1.30  2.57 ** 0.15    
-2 5.35 580 1.77 175 3.58  1.26    -0.43    
-1 2.09 745 2.54 248 -0.45  -1.11    -2.37 *  
0 3.08 809 3.41 285 -0.33  -0.70    -2.22 *  
1 1.45 774 1.85 281 -0.39  -1.35    -2.40 *  
2 0.83 827 1.28 291 -0.45  -1.71 *  -1.61    
3 0.89 778 1.21 305 -0.32   -1.40    -0.96    
Panel D: Nondiscretionary Long-Term Accruals (NDLA) 
Primary SEOs Secondary SEOs Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum    
z-stat 
-3 -7.24 432 -6.11 134 -1.13  -1.55      -1.43      
-2 -9.44 579 -6.63 174 -2.81  -3.05 ***  -0.69      
-1 -8.69 749 -7.39 254 -1.30  -1.60      -0.58      
0 -8.72 797 -8.13 285 -0.59  -0.99      -1.10      
1 -6.73 774 -7.08 285 0.35  0.57      0.41 *    
2 -6.12 823 -6.32 294 0.21  0.33      -0.00      
3 -6.03 775 -6.14 302 0.11   0.18      0.54      
       ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.7: Comparisons of Accruals between Primary and Combination SEOs  
Results of tests for difference in DCA, DLA, NDCA, and NDLA between primary and combination SEOs 
from the three years before to three years after the offering. Mean of accruals are reported in percent. 
Panel A: Discretionary Current Accruals (DCA) 
Primary SEOs Combination SEOs Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired 
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum    
z-stat 
-3 1.33 430 1.13 329 0.20  0.15     -0.60    
-2 4.24 570 4.18 477 0.07  0.05     -1.35    
-1 2.96 727 6.37 747 -3.40  -2.92 *** -2.54 *  
0 4.32 785 11.11 878 -6.79  -6.37 *** -5.97 *  
1 0.89 754 4.31 821 -3.42  -6.71 *** -6.16 *  
2 0.91 811 1.28 819 -0.38  -0.82     -0.74    
3 0.17 757 1.31 737 -1.14   -2.34 **  -1.86 *  
Panel B: Discretionary Long-Term Accruals (DLA) 
Primary SEOs Combination SEOs Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired 
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum 
z-stat 
-3 -0.54 411 -1.25 329 0.71  0.71      0.99    
-2 -2.31 560 -1.02 470 -1.28  -0.90      -1.03    
-1 -2.70 724 2.29 745 -4.99  -3.76 ***  -3.85 *  
0 -0.67 770 -1.03 863 0.36  0.32      -0.20    
1 -1.14 743 0.46 814 -1.60  -1.94 *    0.20    
2 -1.44 793 -1.77 804 0.33  0.45      1.17    
3 -1.94 753 -1.32 728 -0.61   -0.77      0.56    
Panel C: Nondiscretionary Current Accruals (NDCA)  
Primary SEOs Combination SEOs Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired 
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum 
z-stat 
-3 2.92 431 2.53 332 0.39  0.77     -0.93   
-2 5.35 580 3.03 483 2.32  0.82     -3.30 * 
-1 2.09 745 4.96 762 -2.87  -5.36 *** -7.66 * 
0 3.08 809 4.59 886 -1.51  -2.20 **  -5.49 * 
1 1.45 774 1.91 838 -0.46  -1.84 *   -2.12 * 
2 0.83 827 1.52 842 -0.69  -3.00 *** -3.34 * 
3 0.89 778 0.80 754 0.09   0.40     -0.36   
Panel D: Nondiscretionary Long-Term Accruals (NDLA) 
Primary SEOs Combination SEOs Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired 
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum 
z-stat 
-3 -7.24 432 -6.90 340 -0.34  -0.49     0.20    
-2 -9.44 579 -9.05 485 -0.39  -0.40     1.48    
-1 -8.69 749 -15.30 769 6.62  5.69 *** 5.83 *  
0 -8.72 797 -11.05 886 2.33  3.39 *** 2.80 *  
1 -6.73 774 -8.66 837 1.93  3.17 *** 1.85 *  
2 -6.12 823 -6.39 837 0.27  0.50     -0.37    
3 -6.03 775 -7.18 751 1.15   1.92 *   0.26  
      ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.8: Comparisons of Accruals between Secondary and Combination SEOs 
Results of tests for difference in DCA, DLA, NDCA, and NDLA between secondary and combination SEOs 
from the three years before to three years after the offering. Mean of accruals are reported in percent. 
Panel A: Discretionary Current Accruals (DCA) 
Secondary SEOs Combination SEOs Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum    
z-stat 
-3 -0.06 134 1.13 329 -1.183  -1.128     -1.188    
-2 0.61 172 4.18 477 -3.569  -2.905 *** -2.143 *  
-1 0.76 245 6.37 747 -5.606  -4.811 *** -3.228 *  
0 1.54 282 11.11 878 -9.569  -9.006 *** -6.690 *  
1 2.11 282 4.31 821 -2.193  -3.482 *** -2.844 *  
2 1.48 288 1.28 819 0.193  0.350     0.603    
3 0.68 298 1.31 737 -0.631   -1.080     -0.457    
Panel B: Discretionary Long-Term Accruals (DLA) 
Secondary SEOs Combination SEOs Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum    
z-stat 
-3 -2.37 130 -1.25 329 -1.121  -0.921     -1.213   
-2 -1.46 170 -1.02 470 -0.431  -0.374     -0.720   
-1 -3.14 249 2.29 745 -5.428  -3.641 *** -2.845 * 
0 0.41 277 -1.03 863 1.433  1.397     0.781   
1 0.34 280 0.46 814 -0.124  -0.113     -0.300   
2 -1.19 282 -1.77 804 0.577  0.692     0.989   
3 -1.32 297 -1.32 728 0.002   0.003     1.166   
Panel C: Nondiscretionary Current Accruals (NDCA)  
Secondary SEOs Combination SEOs Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum    
z-stat 
-3 1.62 135 2.53 332 -0.910  -1.972 **  -1.022   
-2 1.77 175 3.03 483 -1.260  -2.575 **  -2.179 * 
-1 2.54 248 4.96 762 -2.417  -4.382 *** -4.010 * 
0 3.41 285 4.59 886 -1.182  -1.632     -2.437 * 
1 1.85 281 1.91 838 -0.069  -0.223     0.440   
2 1.28 291 1.52 842 -0.241  -0.859     -1.032   
3 1.21 305 0.80 754 0.407   1.517     0.565   
Panel D: Nondiscretionary Long-Term Accruals (NDLA) 
Secondary SEOs Combination SEOs Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum    
z-stat 
-3 -6.11 134 -6.90 340 0.788  1.197     1.672 *   
-2 -6.63 174 -9.05 485 2.424  3.463 *** 1.814 *   
-1 -7.39 254 -15.30 769 7.912  6.576 *** 4.676 *   
0 -8.13 285 -11.05 886 2.921  3.961 *** 3.096 *   
1 -7.08 285 -8.66 837 1.581  2.185 **  0.970     
2 -6.32 294 -6.39 837 0.066  0.102     -0.238     
3 -6.14 302 -7.18 751 1.046   1.550     -0.246     
      ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.9: Comparisons of Accruals for Primary SEOs between without and 
with Insider Ownership (1991-1999) 
Results of tests for difference in DCA, DLA, NDCA, and NDLA for the primary SEOs between without 
and with insider ownership  from the three years before to three years after the offering. Insider ownership 
is measured by the percentage of shares held by insiders (managers, officers, and directors). Mean of 
accruals are reported in percent. 
Panel A: Discretionary Current Accruals (DCA) 
w/o Ownership w/ Ownership Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired 
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum    
z-stat 
-3 1.47 231 -0.08 147 1.55  0.73     1.12   
-2 1.43 282 3.06 200 -1.63  -0.89     -0.96   
-1 1.63 305 1.66 272 -0.03  -0.02     -0.10   
0 4.41 326 2.84 290 1.58  1.06     0.87   
1 0.47 311 0.66 263 -0.20  -0.25     -1.00   
2 0.55 295 2.00 232 -1.45  -1.77 *   -2.15 * 
3 0.14 237 0.25 192 -0.11   -0.12     -0.60   
Panel B: Discretionary Long-Term Accruals (DLA) 
w/o Ownership w/ Ownership Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired 
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum    
z-stat 
-3 -0.29 223 -0.73 144 0.43  0.29      0.03      
-2 -1.03 279 -4.73 199 3.71  1.86 *    1.81 *  
-1 -2.35 315 -3.74 268 1.39  0.88      0.57      
0 -1.45 324 -0.50 287 -0.95  -0.50      -0.91      
1 0.12 309 -1.49 257 1.61  1.30      0.58      
2 -0.76 290 -0.20 231 -0.56  -0.35      -0.76      
3 -1.42 232 -1.56 191 0.14   0.08      0.22      
Panel C: Nondiscretionary Current Accruals (NDCA)  
w/o Ownership w/ Ownership Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired 
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum    
z-stat 
-3 2.68 239 3.35 148 -0.67  -0.72     -0.20    
-2 2.61 287 1.57 205 1.04  1.54     1.85 *   
-1 1.67 318 1.49 283 0.180  0.32     1.10    
0 2.44 335 2.92 298 -0.48  -0.76     -0.01    
1 1.43 318 1.23 269 0.20  0.49     0.24    
2 0.98 301 0.67 239 0.31  0.72     1.22    
3 0.97 241 0.11 200 0.86   2.59 *** 2.00 *   
Panel D: Nondiscretionary Long-Term Accruals (NDLA) 
w/o Ownership w/ Ownership Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired 
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum    
z-stat 
-3 -7.46 237 -8.99 149 1.52  1.02      0.27     
-2 -8.14 287 -8.78 203 0.64  0.62      -0.85     
-1 -8.64 323 -8.56 280 -0.09  -0.09      -0.74     
0 -8.32 324 -10.29 295 1.97  2.16 **   1.10     
1 -8.41 318 -7.00 267 -1.41  -1.59      -2.09 *   
2 -7.07 297 -7.88 239 0.82  0.67      0.20     
3 -7.07 241 -7.20 200 0.13   0.09      -0.19     
        ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.10: Comparisons of Accruals for Secondary SEOs between without and 
with Insider Ownership (1991-1999) 
Results of tests for difference in DCA, DLA, NDCA, and NDLA for the secondary SEOs between without 
and with insider ownership from the three years before to three years after the offering.  Insider ownership is 
measured by the percentage of shares held by insiders (managers, officers, and directors). Mean of accruals 
are reported in percent. 
Panel A: Discretionary Current Accruals (DCA) 
w/o Ownership w/ Ownership Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum z-
stat  
-3 0.54 83 -0.82 38 1.36  0.87    1.21     
-2 0.21 95 0.32 55 -0.11  -0.05    -0.39     
-1 0.96 114 1.51 96 -0.55  -0.34    0.10     
0 1.36 117 0.81 104 0.55  0.44    0.37     
1 2.44 113 1.23 102 1.21  1.14    0.78     
2 1.47 96 2.13 98 -0.66  -0.67    0.07     
3 -1.03 87 1.74 77 -2.78   -2.36 ** -2.09 *   
Panel B: Discretionary Long-Term Accruals (DLA) 
w/o Ownership w/ Ownership Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum z-
stat  
-3 -0.73 79 -3.16 38 2.43  1.07       1.20      
-2 -1.08 97 -1.97 53 0.89  0.47       0.71      
-1 -1.51 113 -3.27 98 1.76  0.90       0.78      
0 1.02 114 0.43 105 0.59  0.43       0.58      
1 0.90 112 -1.07 100 1.96  0.66       0.81      
2 1.47 93 -2.51 97 3.98  2.33 **    2.65 *    
3 0.16 84 -1.01 76 1.16   0.55       1.11      
Panel C: Nondiscretionary Current Accruals (NDCA)  
w/o Ownership w/ Ownership Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum z-
stat  
-3 1.62 84 2.04 39 -0.43  -0.47      0.52       
-2 1.65 94 1.22 55 0.43  0.70      1.21       
-1 1.78 116 3.28 99 -1.50  -2.09 **   -1.93 *     
0 1.91 116 4.27 110 -2.36  -2.90 ***  -2.98 *     
1 1.44 112 1.82 104 -0.38  -0.66      -0.84       
2 0.95 98 0.70 95 0.26  0.46      -0.27       
3 1.07 88 0.88 77 0.19   0.36      -0.15       
Panel D: Nondiscretionary Long-Term Accruals (NDLA) 
w/o Ownership w/ Ownership Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum z-
stat  
-3 -6.27 82 -5.40 38 -0.87  -0.74     -1.22     
-2 -7.21 97 -7.44 55 0.24  0.17     -1.02     
-1 -6.41 114 -8.26 100 1.85  1.64     1.57     
0 -9.57 117 -8.33 110 -1.25  -1.08     -0.58     
1 -7.54 112 -7.51 104 -0.04  -0.03     0.45     
2 -8.80 97 -5.87 99 -2.93  -2.00 **  -1.78 *   
3 -6.57 85 -7.19 77 0.62   0.32     -0.17     
       ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.11: Comparisons of Accruals for Combination SEOs between without 
and with Insider Ownership (1991-1999) 
Results of tests for difference in DCA, DLA, NDCA, and NDLA for the combination SEOs between 
without and with insider ownership from the three years before to three years after the offering. Insider 
ownership is measured by the percentage of shares held by insiders (managers, officers, and directors). 
Mean of accruals are reported in percent. 
Panel A: Discretionary Current Accruals (DCA) 
w/o Ownership w/ Ownership Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum    
z-stat 
-3 0.98 93 1.05 208 -0.07  -0.04     0.34       
-2 3.24 114 3.10 310 0.14  0.08     0.33       
-1 3.47 140 7.06 497 -3.60  -1.43     -2.08 *     
0 8.71 146 11.86 569 -3.15  -1.50     -1.59       
1 2.44 145 4.71 515 -2.27  -2.43 **  -2.43 *     
2 0.41 129 1.55 459 -1.15  -1.32     -1.64       
3 1.01 103 1.96 383 -0.95   -0.95     -1.19       
Panel B: Discretionary Long-Term Accruals (DLA) 
w/o Ownership w/ Ownership Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum    
z-stat 
-3 -3.73 94 -0.58 209 -3.15  -1.97 **   -1.21     
-2 -2.69 117 -0.51 307 -2.17  -1.10      -1.19     
-1 4.59 137 0.77 497 3.82  1.21      -0.54     
0 -4.34 143 0.73 565 -5.06  -2.81 ***  -3.34 *   
1 -1.74 135 1.90 518 -3.64  -2.06 **   -0.49     
2 -2.69 126 -2.45 456 -0.24  -0.14      0.43     
3 -2.11 100 0.01 383 -2.12   -1.11      -1.68 *   
Panel C: Nondiscretionary Current Accruals (NDCA)  
w/o Ownership w/ Ownership Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired       
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum    
z-stat 
-3 2.00 93 2.72 212 -0.71  -0.96       -1.18     
-2 3.28 117 2.66 315 0.63  0.89       1.04     
-1 2.75 143 4.78 506 -2.03  -1.83 *     -1.51     
0 -0.77 150 4.12 575 -4.90  -2.53 **    -3.22 *   
1 1.64 143 1.44 527 0.21  0.46       0.72     
2 1.26 132 0.93 468 0.33  0.81       0.81     
3 0.92 105 0.15 391 0.77  1.82 *     1.24     
Panel D: Nondiscretionary Long-Term Accruals (NDLA) 
w/o Ownership w/ Ownership Fiscal 
Year Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Difference 
(Mean1-Mean2) 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum    
z-stat 
-3 -6.07 95 -7.31 215 1.24  1.56      0.92      
-2 -8.88 118 -9.09 314 0.21  0.18      0.73      
-1 -18.45 141 -15.74 515 -2.71  -0.75      1.86 *    
0 -7.30 144 -12.95 574 5.65  4.72 ***  4.11 *    
1 -6.96 138 -10.33 529 3.38  2.28 **   0.60      
2 -6.43 130 -7.92 467 1.50  1.51      -0.57     
3 -6.75 102 -8.10 388 1.35   1.04     -0.02     
       ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
    
Table 2.12: Regression Analysis of Discretionary Current Accruals on Type of SEOs 
Dependent variable is discretionary current accruals (DCA). In Panel A, dummy variable SEOTYPE is equal to one for the 
primary SEOs and zero for the combination SEOs. In Panel B, dummy variable SEOTYPE is equal to one for the 
secondary SEOs and zero for the combination SEOs. In Panel C, dummy variable SEOTYPE is equal to one for the 
primary SEOs and zero for the secondary SEOs, respectively. Control variables include Log(Relative offer Size) and 
Log(MV). Log(Relative offer Size) is the natural log of the offer size measured by the total offer amount divided by the 
market value at the fiscal year end before the offering. Log(MV) is the natural log of the market value and measured at the 
fiscal year end before the offering. The offering date falls in year 0. Sample sizes depend on data availability in 
COMPUSTAT and SDC databases. The t -statistics are in parentheses. 
Panel A: Primary vs. Combination SEOs 
Fiscal 
Year Constant 
SEOTYPE 
(Prim or 
Combin) 
Log( Relative 
Offer Size) Log(MV) N Adj. R
2          F 
-3   0.098    -0.026        -0.022        -0.016      494   0.012 3.03 **     
      (2.22)  **  (-1.54)       (-2.62) ***   (-1.62)                       
-2   0.171     0.004        -0.048       -0.042      674   0.006 2.31 *     
      (1.70)  *  (0.11)       (-2.58) **   (-1.83) *                     
-1  0.121    -0.023        -0.015        -0.016     975  -0.001 0.72      
     (1.89)  * (-0.92)       (-1.23)       (-1.10)                       
0   0.198     0.073        -0.014       -0.016     1106   0.004 2.32 *   
      (2.67)  ***  (-2.53)  **   (-0.98)      (-0.90)                       
1  0.063    -0.031         -0.001        -0.003     1051   0.009 4.28 ***    
     (2.70)  *** (-3.44)  ***   (-0.19)      (-0.61)                       
2   0.036     -0.002        -0.005       -0.005     1084  -0.001 0.59  
      (1.75)  *  (-0.26)       (-1.32)     (-0.97)                      
3   0.038     -0.007         -0.000       -0.006      996   0.001 1.17      
      (1.69)  *  (-0.81)        (-0.10)      (-1.05)                    
                                      ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
    
Table 2.12 (Continue) 
Panel B: Secondary vs. Combination SEOs 
Fiscal 
Year Constant 
SEOTYPE 
(Sec or 
Combin) 
Log( Relative 
Offer Size) Log(MV) N Adj. R
2          F 
-3  0.098    -0.034      -0.018      -0.016  320  0.009 1.93  
     (1.68) *   (-1.24)     (-1.74) * (-1.16)                
-2  0.088     -0.035      -0.009   -0.011  446 -0.004 0.34  
     (0.81)     (-0.67)     (-0.47)  (-0.46)                
-1  0.155     -0.036       -0.016   -0.024  682  0.001 1.21  
     (1.90) *   (-0.92)     (-1.06)  (-1.25)                
0  0.145     -0.090      -0.017   -0.009  780  0.023 7.24 *** 
     (3.01) *** (-3.85) *** (-1.89) * (-0.83)                 
1  0.070     -0.029       -0.003   -0.005  746  0.005 2.25 *     
     (2.32) **  (-1.97) ** (-0.49)  (-0.72)                
2  0.017  -0.003        0.002    0.001  737 -0.004 0.11  
     (0.66)  (-0.28)      (0.41)   (0.18)                
3  0.005  -0.006        0.003    0.002  676 -0.003 0.22  
     (0.18)  (-0.41)      (0.62)   (0.34)           
                         ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
    
Table 2.12 (Continue) 
Panel C: Primary vs. Secondary SEOs 
Fiscal 
Year Constant 
SEOTYPE 
(Prim or Sec) 
Log( Relative 
Offer Size) Log(MV) N Adj. R
2          F 
-3  0.101    0.002  -0.025   -0.024  364  0.025 4.14 *** 
     (2.01) **  (0.09)  (-3.41) *** (-2.53) **               
-2  0.068    0.021  -0.016   -0.016  469  0.005 1.85  
     (1.21)   (0.87)  (-1.91) * (-1.51)                
-1  0.050    0.025  -0.011   -0.011  621  0.001 1.12  
     (0.86)   (0.98)  (-1.25)  (-0.96)                
0  0.062    0.034  -0.006   -0.008  691 -0.000 0.96  
     (0.99)   (1.23)  (-0.67)  (-0.64)               
1 -0.000    0.004  -0.003    0.002  663 -0.002 0.62  
     (-0.00)   (0.36)  (-0.65)   (0.30)                
2  0.020    0.003  -0.003   -0.002  707 -0.003 0.27  
     (0.81)   (0.25)  (-0.77)  (-0.35)                
3  0.035   -0.008  -0.000   -0.005  688 -0.001 0.78  
     (1.42)  (-0.73)  (-0.13)  (-1.04)      
                                      ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively . 
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Primary and Secondary SEO Firms from 1980-1999 
The final sample consists of 1258 primary SEOs and 481 Secondary SEOs from 1980 to 1999. 
The samples are identified through CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and I/B/E/S. Sample firms do not 
necessarily have a complete set of desired COMPUSTAT and I/B/E/S data for every SEO they 
issued. 
Panel A: Time Distribution  
Primary SEOs Secondary SEOs 
Issue Year Number of 
Issues % of Sample 
Number of 
Issues % of Sample 
1980 74 5.88 12 2.49 
1981 61 4.85 26 5.41 
1982 42 3.34 48 9.98 
1983          150          11.92 53             11.02 
1984 26 2.07 13 2.70 
1985 36 2.86 16 3.33 
1986 51 4.05 20 4.16 
1987 51 4.05 12 2.49 
1988 16 1.27   8 1.66 
1989 30 2.38 11 2.29 
1990 32 2.54   7 1.46 
1991 89 7.07 16 3.33 
1992 65 5.17 24 4.99 
1993 76 6.04 31 6.44 
1994 52 4.13 26 5.41 
1995 82 6.52 25 5.20 
1996          112 8.90 38 7.90 
1997 91 7.23 41 8.52 
1998 50 3.97 31 6.44 
1999 72 5.72 23 4.78 
Total        1258        100.00         481            100.00 
Panel B: Exchange Listing Distribution 
Primary SEOs Secondary SEOs 
Exchange Number of 
Issues 
% of Sample Number of 
Issues 
% of Sample 
NYSE 390 31.00 262 54.47 
Nasdaq 656 52.15 178 37.01 
AMEX 105   8.35   23   4.78 
Other 107   8.51   18   3.74 
Total        1258         100.00 481             100.00 
 
121 
   
 
Table 3.1 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Industry Distribution 
Primary SEOs Secondary SEOs 
Industry                                      SIC Codes Number of 
Issues % of Sample 
Number of 
Issues % of Sample 
Agriculture, 
Forestry, and 
Fishing 
0000 – 0999   6 0.48  1 0.21 
Mining 1000 – 1499  89 7.07 25 5.20 
Construction 1500 – 1999  12 0.95  2 0.42 
Manufacturing 2000 – 3999 710        56.44        278         57.80 
Transportation 
and Public Utility 4000 – 4999  81 6.44 30 6.24 
Wholesale  Trade 5000 – 5199  44 3.50 15 3.12 
Retail Trade 5200 – 5999  92 7.31 64         13.31 
Finance, 
Insurance, and 
Real Estate  
6000 – 6999   0 0.00  0   0.00 
Services 7000 – 8999 224        17.81 66         13.72 
Public 
Administration 9000 – 9899   0 0.00  0   0.00 
Nonclassifiable 
Establishment 9900 – 9999    0 0.00  0   0.00 
Total        1258      100.00        481       100.00 
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Table 3.2: Characteristics of Primary and Secondary SEO Firms from 1980-1999 
Total assets, debt to assets ratio, book to market ratio, sales, and market value are measured at the fiscal year end 
prior to the offerings. We conduct the unpaired t test and Wilcoxon Rank Sum test to examine the difference in 
characteristics between primary and secondary SEOs.  
 
SEO 
Type Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. N 
Unpaired        
t-stat 
(Prim-Sec) 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum 
z-stat 
(Prim-Sec) 
Primary 510.99 70.98 1941.93 828 -2.32 ** -8.71 ***  Total Assets -1 
($ Millions) Secondary 771.95 207.46 1609.80 321     
Primary 0.25 0.21 0.23 826 0.64     0.76      Debt to Assets Ratio-1 Secondary 0.24 0.21 0.23 321     
Primary 0.41 0.32 0.39 760 0.62     -0.63      Book to Market 
Ratio-1 Secondary 0.40 0.33 0.28 280     
Primary 520.66 66.41 2030.48 827 -2.94 *** -10.59 ***  Sales -1 ($ Millions) Secondary 907.59 238.78 1919.00 320     
Primary 634.44 128.81 3442.47 785 -1.91 *   -10.03 ***  Market Value-1  
($ Millions) Secondary 983.43 373.64 2299.52 288     
Primary 4.14 2.65 3.98 703 3.61 *** 7.11 ***  Number of Years 
since IPO Secondary 3.09 1.30 4.10 266         
Primary 51.36 27.00 90.29 1258 -4.26 *** -3.84 ***  Total Amount 
Offered ($ Millions) Secondary 92.73 33.10 205.74 481     
Primary 0.33 0.24 0.36 785 9.16 *** 8.42 ***  Total Offer 
Amount/Market Value-1 Secondary 0.19 0.15 0.15 288     
Primary 2.45 1.70 3.19 1258 -3.30 *** 0.45      Total Shares Offered 
(Milllions) Secondary 3.24 1.59 4.91 481     
Primary 25.51 19.05 34.47 989 8.43 *** 8.46 ***  Shares Offered as % of Shares Outstanding 
Before Offer Secondary 14.94 12.11 10.60 302     
Primary 30.20 26.10 20.56 319 -3.03 *** -2.77 ***  % of Shares Held by 
Insiders before Offer Secondary 37.72 34.95 24.33 122     
Primary 23.80 20.10 16.53 313 -2.66 *** -2.28 **   % of Shares Held by 
Insiders after Offer Secondary 29.38 27.50 20.25 116     
Primary 1.03 0.94 0.53 1240 -3.93 *** -4.75 ***  Gross Spread  
($ per Share) Secondary 1.15 1.09 0.52 451     
Primary 1.25 1.22 0.36 1056 9.63 *** 9.38 ***  Underwriting Fee as % 
of Principal Amount Secondary 1.04 1.02 0.31 294     
Primary 21.87 21.18 3.12 1056 2.51 **  3.01 ***  Underwriting Fee as 
% of Gross Spread Secondary 21.36 20.51 3.08 294     
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.3: Earnings Surprise for Issuers of Primary SEOs 
Quarter 0 is the first, second, third, and forth quarterly earnings announcement date following the offerings in 
Panel A, B, C and D, respectively. Sample sizes depend on the earnings data availability in I/B/E/S. 
Panel A: t=0: Q1 Earnings Announcement Date  Panel B: t=0: Q2 Earnings Announcement Date  
Quarter 
Mean t-stat Med 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
t-stat 
N Mean t-stat Med 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
t-stat 
N 
-8 -0.024 -2.16 **  0.000 -1.64       165 0.004 0.38       0.000 -0.02    177 
-7 -0.006 -0.33     0.000 0.41       180 -0.004 -0.39       0.000 -0.65    187 
-6 -0.017 -1.29     0.000 -1.29       186 -0.020 -1.80 *     0.000 0.38    191 
-5 -0.024 -1.82 *   0.010 1.00       194 -0.020 -1.89 *     0.010 0.27    197 
-4 -0.021 -1.81 *   0.010 1.21       200 -0.001 -0.12       0.010 1.93 *  205 
-3 -0.003 -0.34     0.010 1.15       209 -0.002 -0.22       0.010 1.65 *  219 
-2 0.002 0.22     0.010 2.10  **   219 0.007 0.75       0.010 2.19 ** 221 
-1 0.003 0.28     0.000 1.08       213 -0.002 -0.35       0.010 1.51    241 
0 -0.005 -0.68     0.005 1.01       236 -0.013 -2.00 **    0.000 -0.50    252 
1 -0.013 -1.93 *   0.000 -0.11       249 -0.020 -2.78 ***   0.000 -1.35    238 
2 -0.027 -3.53 *** 0.000 -2.66  ***  236 -0.025 -3.25 ***   0.000 -1.96 *  219 
3 -0.034 -3.57 *** 0.000 -2.51  **   209 -0.026 -3.00 ***   0.000 -1.83 *  205 
4 -0.022 -2.95 *** 0.000 -2.43  **   210 -0.015 -1.81 *     0.000 -1.38    196 
5 -0.020 -1.96 *   0.000 -1.15       194 -0.015 -2.16 **    0.000 -1.23    189 
6 -0.017 -2.34 **  0.000 -1.60       187 -0.013 -1.78 *     0.000 -1.37    170 
7 -0.027 -2.38 **  0.000 -2.05  **   166 -0.007 -0.69       0.000 -1.29    164 
8 -0.001 -0.09     0.000 -0.73       163 -0.011 -1.58       0.000 -1.18    159 
9 -0.017 -2.36 **  0.000 -2.04  **   160 -0.004 -0.49       0.000 -0.17    147 
10 -0.004 -0.51     0.000 -0.22       146 -0.004 -0.57       0.000 0.44    131 
11 -0.015 -1.67 *   0.000 -0.62       128 -0.033 -1.55       0.010 0.11    117 
12 -0.022 -1.17     0.000 0.01       115 -0.047 -2.01 **    0.000 -1.28    108 
Panel C: t=0: Q3  Earnings Announcement Date  Panel D: t=0: Q4  Earnings Announcement Date  
Quarter 
Mean t-stat Med 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
t-stat 
N Mean t-stat  Med 
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
t-stat 
N 
-8 -0.011 -1.13       0.000 -0.94     182 -0.010 -1.11       0.000 0.99     190 
-7 -0.014 -1.60       0.000 -0.14     194 -0.018 -1.75  *    0.010 0.52     200 
-6 -0.018 -1.81  *    0.010 0.57     205 0.000 0.04       0.010 1.30     202 
-5 -0.005 -0.68       0.000 0.51     195 0.001 0.10       0.010 1.72 *   219 
-4 0.002 0.20       0.010 2.14 **  215 0.002 0.32       0.010 2.25 **  218 
-3 0.001 0.10       0.010 2.15 **  216 0.004 0.51       0.010 1.47     242 
-2 -0.001 -0.13       0.000 0.76     246 -0.011 -1.62       0.000 -0.31     248 
-1 -0.007 -1.12       0.000 -0.12     247 -0.029 -3.57 *** 0.000 -2.12 **  229 
0 -0.022 -2.82 *** 0.000 -1.34     233 -0.021 -2.91 ***  0.000 -1.54     218 
1 -0.026 -3.28 *** 0.000 -1.71 *   218 -0.029 -3.53 ***  0.000 -2.44 **  210 
2 -0.030 -3.67 *** 0.000 -2.86 *** 210 -0.017 -2.14  **   0.000 -1.31     196 
3 -0.015 -1.90 *    0.000 -1.16     192 -0.016 -2.13  **   0.000 -1.23     184 
4 -0.014 -1.91 *    0.000 -0.99     183 -0.006 -0.79       0.000 -0.79     165 
5 -0.011 -1.37       0.000 -1.36     168 -0.010 -1.01       0.000 -1.29     162 
6 -0.011 -1.08       0.000 -1.79 *   165 -0.013 -1.75  *    0.000 -1.62     161 
7 -0.017 -2.30 ** 0.000 -1.59     156 -0.001 -0.13       0.000 0.18     145 
8 0.005 0.69       0.000 0.52     149 -0.004 -0.62       0.000 0.30     132 
9 -0.013 -1.75 *    0.000 -0.70     131 -0.005 -0.52       0.000 0.25     117 
10 -0.022 -1.14       0.010 0.25     118 -0.043 -1.91  *    0.000 -0.94     109 
11 -0.051 -2.12 **   0.000 -1.56     105 -0.025 -1.78  *    0.000 -1.86 *   99 
12 -0.020 -1.42       0.000 -1.52     100 -0.023 -1.73  *    0.000 -0.99     98 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.4: Earnings Surprise for Issuers of Secondary SEOs 
Quarter 0 is the first, second, third, and forth quarterly earnings announcement date following the offerings in 
Panel A, B, C and D, respectively. Sample sizes depend on the earnings data availability in I/B/E/S. 
Panel A: t=0: Q1 Earnings Announcement Date  Panel B: t=0: Q2 Earnings Announcement Date 
Quarter 
Mean t-stat Med 
Wilcoxon 
Signed 
Rank t-stat  
N Mean t-stat Med 
Wilcoxon 
Signed 
Rank t-stat  
N 
-8 0.011 0.41      0.000 -0.69      71 -0.019 -1.20     0.000 0.12        69 
-7 -0.015 -0.93      0.000 -0.27      71 -0.005 -0.27     0.010 1.75 *      73 
-6 -0.002 -0.10      0.010 2.45 **   70 0.004 0.62     0.010 1.89 *      82 
-5 0.004 0.52      0.000 1.62      81 0.015 2.05 **  0.010 2.45 **     92 
-4 0.014 2.30 **   0.010 2.63 ***  91 0.021 2.35 **  0.010 3.60 ***   100 
-3 0.020 2.27 **   0.010 3.52 ***  103 0.022 2.46 **  0.010 3.85 ***   110 
-2 0.025 2.81 ***  0.010 4.45 ***  113 0.015 2.62 *** 0.010 2.57 **     121 
-1 0.017 2.74 ***  0.010 2.75 ***  119 0.006 0.88     0.010 2.66 ***   124 
0 0.008 1.25      0.010 3.26 ***  121 -0.005 -0.63     0.010 1.59        121 
1 0.000 0.06      0.010 2.68 ***  125 0.004 0.85     0.010 1.55        120 
2 0.007 1.64      0.010 2.29 **   119 0.001 0.13     0.010 1.47        108 
3 0.002 0.17      0.010 1.38      110 0.007 1.08     0.000 0.97        100 
4 -0.001 -0.14      0.000 1.14      103 -0.013 -1.51     0.000 0.65        91 
5 -0.005 -0.74      0.000 1.37      92 -0.006 -1.08     0.000 -0.15        89 
6 -0.005 -0.98      0.000 0.08      89 -0.016 -1.67 *   0.000 -0.76        82 
7 -0.010 -1.18      0.000 -0.11      80 -0.002 -0.24     0.000 -0.73        79 
8 -0.004 -0.40      0.000 -0.89      79 0.005 0.63     0.000 0.85        76 
9 0.002 0.26      0.000 0.62      77 -0.024 -2.15 **  0.000 -0.98        74 
10 -0.024 -2.16 **   0.000 -0.91      72 -0.051 -1.93 *   0.000 -2.04 **     69 
11 -0.050 -1.86 *    0.000 -1.48      68 -0.032 -1.85 *   0.005 -0.39        62 
12 -0.037 -2.06 **   0.000 -0.85      63 -0.012 -1.26     0.000 -1.10        58 
Panel C: t=0: Q3  Earnings Announcement Date  Panel D: t=0: Q4  Earnings Announcement Date  
Quarter 
Mean t-stat Med 
Wilcoxon 
Signed 
Rank t-stat  
N Mean t-stat   Med 
Wilcoxon 
Signed 
Rank t-stat  
N 
-8 0.008 0.74     0.010 1.87 *     71 0.008 1.07      0.000 2.04 **   80 
-7 0.005 0.67     0.000 1.82 *     80 0.014 2.04 **   0.010 2.16 **   91 
-6 0.014 1.95 *   0.000 1.71 *     91 0.015 1.66      0.010 3.14 ***  101 
-5 0.023 2.65 *** 0.010 4.45 ***   100 0.022 2.57 **   0.010 4.36 ***  110 
-4 0.022 2.51 **  0.010 3.81 ***   110 0.017 2.74 ***  0.010 2.82 ***  119 
-3 0.015 2.58 **  0.010 2.62 ***   121 0.008 1.29      0.010 3.24 ***  123 
-2 0.012 1.89 *   0.010 3.50 ***   123 0.000 -0.08      0.010 2.06 **   124 
-1 -0.001 -0.14     0.010 2.42 **    122 0.004 0.79      0.010 1.65 *    115 
0 0.007 1.30     0.010 2.48 **    116 0.000 0.05      0.010 1.17      110 
1 -0.001 -0.09     0.000 1.07       109 -0.002 -0.21      0.000 0.74      102 
2 -0.001 -0.09     0.000 0.81       101 -0.003 -0.42      0.000 1.58      92 
3 -0.003 -0.51     0.000 1.65 *     90 -0.009 -1.51      0.000 -0.28      89 
4 -0.005 -0.99     0.000 -0.12       88 -0.014 -1.55      0.000 -0.74      79 
5 -0.016 -1.83 *   0.000 -1.30       81 -0.005 -0.47      0.000 -1.03      79 
6 -0.003 -0.28     0.000 -0.44       79 -0.002 -0.24      0.000 0.05      76 
7 -0.005 -0.58     0.000 -0.36       75 -0.026 -2.15 **   0.000 -0.73      72 
8 -0.025 -2.18 **  0.000 -1.19       72 -0.048 -1.81 *    0.000 -1.86 *    69 
9 -0.049 -1.85 *   0.000 -1.77 *     69 -0.035 -1.98 *    0.000 -1.09      63 
10 -0.035 -1.98 *   0.000 -0.76       64 -0.027 -1.44      0.000 -0.75      57 
11 -0.025 -1.36     0.000 -0.77       57 -0.026 -1.57      0.000 -1.12      55 
12 -0.033 -1.76 *   0.000 -1.06       54 -0.024 -1.79 *    0.000 -0.93      51 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
    
Table 3.5: Comparisons of Earnings Surprises between Primary and Secondary SEOs 
Quarter 0 is the first, second, third, and forth quarterly earnings announcement date following the offerings in Panel A, B, C and D, respectively. Sample sizes 
depend on the earnings data availability in I/B/E/S. 
 
Panel A: t=0: Q1Earnings Announcement Date  Panel B: t=0: Q2Earnings Announcement Date 
Primary SEOs Secondary  SEOs Primary SEOs Secondary SEOs Quarter 
Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Mean1-
Mean2 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum              
z-stat Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Mean1-
Mean2 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum   
 z-stat 
-8 -0.024 165 0.011 71 -0.035  -1.20     -0.12     0.004 177 -0.019 69 0.023  1.12     0.02    
-7 -0.006 180 -0.015 71 0.008  0.35     0.50     -0.004 187 -0.005 73 0.001  0.04     -1.38    
-6 -0.017 186 -0.002 70 -0.016  -0.68     -2.47 **  -0.020 191 0.004 82 -0.024  -1.85 *   -0.96    
-5 -0.024 194 0.004 81 -0.028  -1.84 *   -0.10     -0.020 197 0.015 92 -0.035  -2.72 *** -0.92    
-4 -0.021 200 0.014 91 -0.035  -2.67 *** -0.73     -0.001 205 0.021 100 -0.022  -1.88 *   -1.44    
-3 -0.003 209 0.020 103 -0.023  -1.94 *   -1.74 *   -0.002 219 0.022 110 -0.023  -2.02 **  -1.80 *  
-2 0.002 219 0.025 113 -0.023  -1.95 *   -1.75 *   0.007 221 0.015 121 -0.008  -0.76     -0.35    
-1 0.003 213 0.017 119 -0.014  -1.15     -1.47     -0.002 241 0.006 124 -0.008  -0.87     -1.01    
0 -0.005 236 0.008 121 -0.012  -1.34     -1.38     -0.013 252 -0.005 121 -0.009  -0.90     -1.45    
1 -0.013 249 0.000 125 -0.013  -1.37     -1.75 *   -0.020 238 0.004 120 -0.024  -2.77 *** -1.88 *  
2 -0.027 236 0.007 119 -0.034  -3.88 *** -3.06 *** -0.025 219 0.001 108 -0.026  -2.20 **  -2.27 ** 
3 -0.034 209 0.002 110 -0.035  -2.72 *** -2.53 **  -0.026 205 0.007 100 -0.033  -3.05 *** -1.51    
4 -0.022 210 -0.001 103 -0.021  -1.89 *   -2.07 **  -0.015 196 -0.013 91 -0.001  -0.10     -1.07    
5 -0.020 194 -0.005 92 -0.015  -1.17     -1.48     -0.015 189 -0.006 89 -0.009  -1.01     -0.44    
6 -0.017 187 -0.005 89 -0.012  -1.39     -0.99     -0.013 170 -0.016 82 0.003  0.22     -0.08    
7 -0.027 166 -0.010 80 -0.016  -1.15     -0.84     -0.007 164 -0.002 79 -0.005  -0.32     -0.20    
8 -0.001 163 -0.004 79 0.004  0.31     0.50     -0.011 159 0.005 76 -0.016  -1.54     -1.08    
9 -0.017 160 0.002 77 -0.019  -1.76 *   -1.50     -0.004 147 -0.024 74 0.020  1.57     1.12    
10 -0.004 146 -0.024 72 0.020  1.47     1.04     -0.004 131 -0.051 69 0.047  1.72 *   2.21 ** 
11 -0.015 128 -0.050 68 0.035  1.25     1.47     -0.033 117 -0.032 62 -0.001  -0.03     0.79    
12 -0.022 115 -0.037 63 0.015  0.58     0.98     -0.047 108 -0.012 58 -0.035  -1.39     0.21    
            ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
    
 
Table 3.5 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: t=0: Q3Earnings Announcement Date  Panel D: t=0: Q4 Earnings Announcement Date  
Primary SEOs Secondary SEOs Primary SEOs Secondary SEOs Quarter 
Mean1 N1 M ean2 N2 
Mean1-
Mean2 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum               
z-stat Mean1 N1 Mean2 N2 
Mean1-
Mean2 
Unpaired         
t-stat 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum   
  z-stat 
-8 -0.011 182 0.008 71 -0.019  -1.30     -1.82 *     -0.010 190 0.008 80 -0.018  -1.54     -0.53      
-7 -0.014 194 0.005 80 -0.019  -1.67 *   -1.15       -0.018 200 0.014 91 -0.032  -2.58 **  -0.70      
-6 -0.018 205 0.014 91 -0.033  -2.61 *** -0.48       0.000 202 0.015 101 -0.015  -1.22     -1.24      
-5 -0.005 195 0.023 100 -0.029  -2.44 **  -2.70 ***   0.001 219 0.022 110 -0.022  -1.86 *   -1.73  *   
-4 0.002 215 0.022 110 -0.020  -1.75 *   -1.15       0.002 218 0.017 119 -0.014  -1.56     -0.83      
-3 0.001 216 0.015 121 -0.015  -1.57     -0.66       0.004 242 0.008 123 -0.004  -0.41     -1.40      
-2 -0.001 246 0.012 123 -0.013  -1.23     -1.90 *     -0.011 248 0.000 124 -0.010  -1.15     -1.42      
-1 -0.007 247 -0.001 122 -0.006  -0.66     -1.64       -0.029 229 0.004 115 -0.033  -3.43 *** -2.29 **  
0 -0.022 233 0.007 116 -0.029  -3.06 *** -2.42 **    -0.021 218 0.000 110 -0.022  -1.80 *   -1.76 *   
1 -0.026 218 -0.001 109 -0.025  -2.10 **  -1.79 *     -0.029 210 -0.002 102 -0.027  -2.22 **  -1.75 *   
2 -0.030 210 -0.001 101 -0.029  -2.41 **  -2.07 **    -0.017 196 -0.003 92 -0.014  -1.37     -1.72 *   
3 -0.015 192 -0.003 90 -0.012  -1.11     -1.54       -0.016 184 -0.009 89 -0.006  -0.66     -0.47      
4 -0.014 183 -0.005 88 -0.008  -0.95     -0.31       -0.006 165 -0.014 79 0.007  0.63     0.18      
5 -0.011 168 -0.016 81 0.005  0.42     0.22       -0.010 162 -0.005 79 -0.005  -0.36     0.10      
6 -0.011 165 -0.003 79 -0.008  -0.55     -0.39       -0.013 161 -0.002 76 -0.011  -1.02     -0.88      
7 -0.017 156 -0.005 75 -0.012  -1.04     -0.52       -0.001 145 -0.026 72 0.025  1.82 *   1.09      
8 0.005 149 -0.025 72 0.029  2.34 **  1.56       0.00 132 -0.05 69 0.04  1.59     2.10 **  
9 -0.013 131 -0.049 69 0.035  1.29     1.39       -0.01 117 -0.04 63 0.03  1.48     1.19      
10 -0.022 118 -0.035 64 0.013  0.50     1.22       -0.04 109 -0.03 57 -0.02  -0.54     0.11      
11 -0.051 105 -0.025 57 -0.026  -0.85     -0.22       -0.03 99 -0.03 55 0.00  0.07     -0.46      
12 -0.020 100 -0.033 54 0.013   0.57     -0.16       -0.02 98 -0.02 51 0.00   0.08     0.16      
               ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
    
Table 3.6: Regression Analysis of Earnings Surprise for SEO Firms 
Dependent variable is the earnings surprise measured by the difference of the quarterly actual EPS and estimated 
EPS. Panel A is for primary SEOs. Panel B is for secondary SEOs. OFFER/OUT is shares offered as percentage of 
shares outstanding before offer. Log(MV) is the natural log of the market value measured at the fiscal year end 
before the offering. Sample sizes depend on earnings data availability in I/B/E/S. Quarter 0 is the quarter 
that has the first earnings announcements after the offerings. The t-statistics are in parentheses.  
Panel A: Primary SEOs 
Independent Variables         
Quarter 
Constant OFFER/OUT Log(MV) N Adjusted R2          F 
-4  -0.049    0.040       0.004  136 -0.014 0.08  
     (-0.58)   (0.35)      (0.34)                
-3   0.084   -0.047     -0.015  140  0.009 1.60  
      (1.46)  (-0.56)     (-1.73) *               
-2   0.152   -0.139     -0.021  149  0.031 3.37 **  
      (2.73) *** (-1.78) *   (-2.58) **                 
-1   0.071   -0.199     -0.005  139  0.009 1.60     
      (0.78)  (-1.59)     (-0.34)                   
0   0.042   -0.108     -0.005  161  0.003 1.24     
      (0.76)  (-1.51)     (-0.54)                   
1   0.041   -0.178     -0.003  168  0.081 8.40 *** 
      (0.88)  (-3.56) *** (-0.33)                   
2  -0.044   -0.117      0.006  157  0.033 3.67 **  
     (-0.71)  (-1.80) *    (0.64)                
3  -0.018   -0.078     -0.001  136 -0.006 0.62  
     (-0.28)  (-0.94)     (-0.05)                
4   0.058   -0.162     -0.009  135  0.017 2.16  
   (1.00)  (-2.07) **  (-1.00)      
                                           ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
    
Table 3.6 (Continue)  
Panel B: Secondary SEOs 
Independent Variables         
Quarter 
Constant OFFER/OUT Log(MV) N Adjusted R2          F 
-4   0.016    0.011   -0.000  60 -0.034 0.02  
  (0.33)   (0.12)  (-0.07)               
-3  -0.005    0.113    0.001  66 -0.014 0.55  
 (-0.08)   (1.00)   (0.12)               
-2   0.045   -0.002   -0.004  67 -0.023 0.27  
  (1.17)  (-0.03)  (-0.68)               
-1   0.007   -0.020    0.003  71 -0.025 0.16  
  (0.13)  (-0.21)   (0.40)               
0   0.010   -0.082    0.002  72 -0.004 0.85  
  (0.23)  (-0.99)   (0.38)               
1   0.003   -0.078    0.001  74 -0.020 0.27  
  (0.04)  (-0.64)   (0.06)               
2  -0.022    0.008    0.005  70 -0.013 0.57  
 (-0.65)   (0.12)   (1.03)               
3   0.043    0.057   -0.006  63 -0.008 0.77  
  (0.85)   (0.61)  (-0.78)               
4  -0.044   -0.092    0.007  58 -0.015 0.58  
 (-0.54)  (-0.61)   (0.60)      
                                                ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Appendix B: Figures 
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Figure 2.1: SEO Time Line Related to Fiscal Year 
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Figure 3.1: SEO Time Line Related to Quarterly Earnings Announcement Day 
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Figure 3.2: Earnings Surprise Surrounding the First Quarterly Earnings Announcements after 
Primary SEOs 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Earnings Surprise Surrounding the First Quarterly Earnings Announcements after 
Secondary SEOs 
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Figure 3.4: Earnings Surprise Surrounding the Second Quarterly Earnings Announcements 
after Primary SEOs 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Earnings Surprise Surrounding the Second Quarterly Earnings Announcements 
after Secondary SEOs 
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Figure 3.6: Earnings Surprise Surrounding the Third Quarterly Earnings Announcements after 
Primary SEOs 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Earnings Surprise Surrounding the Third Quarterly Earnings Announcements after 
Secondary SEOs 
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Figure 3.8: Earnings Surprise Surrounding the Fourth Quarterly Earnings Announcements after 
Primary SEO 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Earnings Surprise Surrounding the Fourth Quarterly Earnings Announcements after 
Secondary SEO 
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